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Abstract 
 
Access to credit is universally believed to be an effective tool to help the poor out of 
poverty. Yet the evidence for this has not considered all settings, especially the peri-urban 
areas of rapidly industrialising Asian countries. In these areas human capital is the main 
asset of the poor, so it is important to understand the input of credit on human capital. 
Therefore, this thesis begins with Chapter 2 showing the importance of human capital in 
income generation in Vietnam during the economic transition. The thesis then examines 
factors affecting credit participation and credit constraints for the poor in the peri-urban 
areas, and investigates whether credit participation impacts the poor‟s education and 
healthcare spending and benefits their children‟s schooling.  
Chapter 2 employs five large datasets of Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS) conducted in 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 by Vietnam General 
Statistics Office (GSO) to examine the rate of return to schooling in Vietnam over the 
period of 1998-2008. The chapter finds that the rate of return has increased quickly during 
the recent economic reform and reached around 9-10 percent.  The chapter clearly 
indicates an increasing importance of education in earnings during the later part of the 
economic transition in Vietnam. Therefore, human capital investment, including 
healthcare and education, is needed to help the poor escape poverty since they rely 
heavily upon labour income, especially in urban and peri-urban areas.  
One of the typical solutions to improve the poor‟s human capital is to provide 
access to credit resources, however, there are many barriers blocking the poor‟s access to 
credit. Chapter 4 uses a novel dataset collected by the author from peri-urban areas of Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnam in 2008 to examine how the poor use their loans, and factors 
affecting their credit participation and credit constraints. The chapter finds the presence of 
many commercial banks in the areas does not help the poor, who rely heavily on informal 
credit. Loans in the peri-urban areas are mainly used for non-productive purposes, which 
stresses the importance of consumption smoothing motives. Further, households in more 
rural wards have a higher probability of borrowing than more urban households, thanks to 
better community relationships and interpersonal trust. Competition by borrowing 
neighbours adversely affects the opportunity for borrowing in urban wards where the poor 
households‟ borrowings rely more on subsidized credit funds. A closer look at specified 
microcredit sources reveals that household behaviours differ in each market segment. 
Furthermore, the poor are highly credit-constrained. Wealthier households, in terms of 
iv 
 
asset holdings and phone possession, appear less credit-constrained. However, except in 
the most rural part of the study area, the likelihood of credit constraints increases with 
distance to the nearest banks, which suggests that supply-side intervention could help in 
overcoming credit constraints. Overall, the poor in urban wards are more credit-
constrained because of exclusion by commercial banks and weak interpersonal trust. 
Given that a sizeable fraction of the poor have participated in credit activities, there 
is a debate about whether microcredit has positive impacts on education and health for 
borrowing households. To provide evidence for this debate, Chapter 5 mainly uses the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to examine the impact of household credit on 
education and healthcare spending by the poor in the peri-urban areas. In addition to 
matching statistically identical non-borrowers with borrowers, my estimates also control 
for household pre-treatment income and assets, which may be associated with 
unobservable factors affecting both credit participation and the outcomes of interest. The 
PSM estimates show significant and positive impacts of borrowing on education and 
healthcare spending. However, multiple ordered treatment effect estimates reveal that 
only formal credit has significant and positive impacts, while informal credit does not 
have significant impacts. 
Whether the effects of credit are homogenous across distributions of outcome 
variables is another question of interest. This question asks whether the impact is the 
same along the outcome distribution, such as for households with already high 
consumption versus those with low consumption, or already high healthcare spending 
versus the low spenders. Chapter 6 employs a Quantile Treatment Effect estimator (QTE) 
and finds heterogeneity in the impacts on household budget shares for education and 
healthcare.  
Finally, household credit for the poor was examined and found to have a positive 
influence on current expenditure on education. However, to test whether the credit to the 
poor has longer term effects on education, in Chapter 7 there are results for estimating the 
impact of the credit on child schooling. Probit, Negative Binomial (NB) and PSM 
estimates roughly indicate no strong evidence of an effect, especially of informal credit, 
although formal credit may have a positive impact on child schooling.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Lasting peace cannot be achieved unless large population 
groups find ways in which to break out of poverty. Microcredit 
is one such means. Development from below also serves to 
advance democracy and human rights.” 
 Norwegian Nobel Committee, October 2006 
1.1 Introduction 
Since Professor Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2006 for their contribution to poverty reduction through microcredit 
programs, there has been a huge public interest in microcredit. Microfinance, of 
which microcredit is the main part but also including other micro financial 
services such as insurance and savings vehicles, has become a popular approach 
and a powerful tool in poverty alleviation strategies in developing countries 
(Microcredit Summit, 2004). 
The first Microcredit Summit in February 1997 launched a nine-year 
campaign to reach 100 million of the world‟s poorest households by 2005. In fact, 
microcredit has reached even more clients, rising from 13.5 million families in 
1997 to about 155 million families by the end of 2007 (Microcredit Summit, 
2009). By the end of 2007, supposing that each household has an average of five 
members, then microcredit has affected about 775 million people on the earth.  
However, the statistics may be underestimated as information on informal 
credit, which is a part of microcredit, is not readily available. It is believed that a 
majority of people in developing countries borrow from the informal credit sector, 
such as relatives, friends, neighbours, moneylenders, and others (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2010). For example, in a survey of 13 developing countries, Banerjee and 
Duflo (2007) find that only about 6% of the funds borrowed by the poor came 
from the formal credit sector. Another example; in Bangladesh about 75% of rural 
households borrowed from the informal credit sector in 1989,
1
 and in another 
surveyed village in India, 86% of total loans and more than 60% of the total credit 
amount were from the informal credit sector (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 
2001). It therefore implies that a large proportion of the poor and low income 
households seek credit resources from the informal credit sector. Both the 
                                                 
1
 www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/I_0066.HTM  
2 
 
unrecorded informal credit borrowers and the number of clients reported by the 
Microcredit Summit would have amounted to hundreds of millions of households.  
In Vietnam, microcredit has continued to be of great importance in 
providing credit to the poor and low income households. In 2007, there were 
about 20 million households in Vietnam, but the number of active microfinance 
institution clients was about 7.1 million, of which 4.6 million were from the 
poorest households (Microcredit Summit, 2009).
2
 A sizeable fraction of 
households, especially the poor, continued to borrow from informal credit 
providers, although the percentage decreased from 73% of household‟s loans in 
1993 to about 34% in 2006 (McCarty, 2001; UNDP, 1996; VHLSS, 2006).  
Furthermore, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), the Job 
Creation Support Fund (JCSF), People‟s Credit Fund (PCF), and other political 
social organizations (e.g. Women Union) have typically provided preferable or 
subsidised loans. All loans from these providers, and from informal lenders, such 
as private moneylenders, relatives and friends and other informal sources, are 
often small and could be considered microcredit.
3
 Taking all the borrowers of 
these providers/sources together adds up to more than 50% of total borrowing 
households.  
Microcredit, including formal and informal sectors has substantially 
provided credit or small loans to the poor and low income households worldwide 
including Vietnam, but the effects of microcredit on the poor remain debatable. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to empirically study the impacts of microcredit on 
education and healthcare of the poor in Vietnam. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Existing literature on the impacts of microcredit has provided ambiguous or non-
robust evidence of impacts. Many studies claim positive impacts. For example, 
the highly cited studies (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 2005) show that 
microcredit has positive impacts and helps the poor out of poverty, especially 
Gremeen Bank clients. Other studies by Islam (2007, 2008), Nguyen (2008), 
Quach, Mullineux, and Murinde (2005), and Rahman, Mallik and Junankar (2007) 
also find positive impacts on microcredit borrowers‟ welfare. On the other hand, 
                                                 
2
 Suppose one client is in each borrowing household, so about one third of households in Vietnam 
borrowed from microcredit sources. 
3
 Microcredit and household credit are used interchangeably in this study  
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many other studies are sceptical of the impact of microcredit participation on 
borrowers‟ welfare, finding that microcredit borrowers are not better off 
(Coleman, 1999, 2006; Morduch, 1998, Roodman & Morduch, 2009). Even some 
studies of randomised control trials, such as Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and 
Kinnan (2009), Roodman (2009), and Rosenberg (2010) provide limited evidence 
of the impacts. Thus, evidence of microcredit impacts is mixed.  
Moreover, the existing literature often considers effects of credit programs 
or formal credit but does not consider effects from informal credit. Besides 
borrowing from programs or the formal credit sector, a sizeable fraction of poor 
people also borrow from informal sources such as friends, relatives, neighbours, 
moneylenders and other informal credit sources, so the existing estimated effects 
would also include informal credit effects. Failing to take into account the impact 
of informal credit separately from formal credit will cause biased estimates.  
A further feature of the literature is that most analyses are for rural areas, 
but rural areas hold a declining share of the world‟s poor (Haddad, Ruel, & 
Garrett, 1999; Mooya & Cloete, 2007; Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula, 2007). In 
fact, while the poor in developing countries often migrate to cities, they tend to 
reside in peri-urban areas since city centres are too expensive for them to live. In 
peri-urban areas, credit often supports consumption expenditure such as 
healthcare, school fees and food, rather than production as in rural areas. This sort 
of consumption affects human capital formation. Moreover, the poor often live on 
labour income in peri-urban areas where human capital is the most important 
household asset and more important than in rural areas since returns to human 
capital (education) is higher in urban and peri-urban areas than in rural areas 
(Goetz & Rupasingha, 2004; Sicular et al, 2007). However, most of the existing 
literature has focused on the impacts of microcredit on rural areas and for 
production purposes. 
Therefore, what is needed is comprehensive research showing the links 
between credit access and human capital (in terms of education and health). 
Moreover, to the extent that links between human capital and earnings strengthen 
in transition economies, the economic impacts of credit access operating via 
human capital investment will become more important over time.   
In summary, the existing research on the impact of microcredit fails to reach 
a consensus conclusion, fails to consider the impact of informal credit, fails to 
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consider the impacts of microcredit for urban areas, and fails to establish a link 
between microcredit access and human capital, and then between human capital 
and earnings. These shortcomings prompt the current thesis to provide empirical 
evidence on how microcredit, including the informal credit, impacts the poor in 
terms of human capital investment in peri-urban areas. 
1.3 Significance of the research 
Vietnam has experienced impressive economic growth and poverty reduction over 
the last 20 years. The real GDP per capita has increased remarkably from US$98 
in 1990 to more than US$1,000 in 2009 (IMF, 2010).  Poverty incidence has 
declined sharply, from 75% in the middle of 1980s to 58% in 1993 (VHLSS, 
1993) and to 15.5% by 2006 (VHLSS, 2006). These achievements resulted from 
macroeconomic policies favouring adjustment to a market economy and from 
policies targeting the poor.  
In Vietnam, poverty is universally attributed to insufficient access to capital 
and low investment in education (Le & Tran, 2005; McCarthy, 2001; VDR, 2004; 
WB, 1998). To alleviate poverty, the Vietnamese government has recently 
introduced microcredit programs to alleviate poverty and vulnerability for the 
poor through the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction program (HEPRF), 
the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (VBARD), and Job Creation Support Fund (JCSF). However, 
there has been no officially reliable study on the program impacts by any 
government organizations. Nhu Trang (2005) observed that the efficiency of the 
programs seems to be rather low in terms of meeting credit demand and long-run 
stability because a considerable fraction of households have been continuing to 
seek informal credit sources regardless of their usury interest rates. Moreover, 
microcredit institutions need subsidies from government funds. For instance, in 
order to survive the VBSP has received government subsidies for interest 
disparity and operation costs equivalent to more than 51% of its annual revenue.
4
  
However, there are only a few studies on the impacts of credit on household 
consumption in Vietnam. These few studies focus only on rural areas and never 
consider impacts on child schooling, or spending on education and healthcare, 
which are important factors affecting human capital formation and productivity of 
household members, as well as sustainable poverty reduction (Nguyen, 2007; 
                                                 
4
 Annual report of VBSP, available at www.vbsp.org.vn/Icon_BCTN/36.gif  
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Nguyen, 2008; Quach et al, 2005).  Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, no 
single impact study of microcredit for peri-urban or urban areas in Vietnam exists.  
1.4 Objectives of the research  
The thesis has six objectives: 
i. To examine how the rate of return to schooling has changed in Vietnam 
during the economic transition period, and to provide evidence of the 
increasing importance of education in earnings and poverty reduction. The 
objective enables us to understand the growing importance of human 
capital formation in Vietnam. 
ii. To determine important factors affecting the probability of credit 
participation and credit constraints for the poor in peri-urban areas of Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnam. 
iii. To estimate impacts of household credit on education and healthcare 
spending of the poor. 
iv. To examine whether the impacts of household credit on household budget 
shares for education and healthcare are heterogeneous amongst the peri-
urban poor population. 
v. To examine the impact of household credit on human capital formation 
among the poor through child schooling outcomes.  
vi. To determine the impacts of different sources of household credit on the 
poor. 
1.5 Research questions 
To achieve the above objectives the thesis will answer the following research 
questions: 
 Has education become a more important driver of earnings in Vietnam 
during economic transition from centrally planned economy to a market 
economy? 
 Who are the microcredit clients and what determines household credit 
participation and credit constraints in the peri-urban areas? 
 What are the impacts of household credit on healthcare and education 
expenditure? 
 Are the microcredit effects heterogeneous across outcome distributions 
of household budget shares? 
 Does microcredit really help the schooling of poor children? 
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1.6 Background  
1.6.1 Urban population growth in Vietnam, the Southeast region and Ho Chi 
Minh City 
Poverty in developing countries is increasingly urban, with the poor urbanising 
more quickly than the population as a whole. Moreover, in 2008 humanity passed 
the threshold of more than 50% of the world population in urban areas (United 
Nations, 2007). These trends are also apparent in Vietnam, with the share of urban 
population rising from 23.7% in 1999 to 29.6% in 2009 (GSO, 2010). In the 
period 1980-1985 (before the economic reform), migration only contributed 28% 
of the urban population growth, but since the reform era immigrants to urban 
areas have contributed 50% and 62% of the urban population growth in the 
periods 1990-1995 and 2000-2005 (Euromonitor International, 2005). Over the 
period 1999-2009, 77% of the population growth in Vietnam is in urban areas. 
The urban population growth rate is 3.4%/year, 8.5 times as high as that of rural 
areas (0.4%/year), with this higher growth mainly due to rural-urban migration 
(GSO, 2010). 
Within Vietnam, the Southeast region has experienced the highest recent 
population growth (3.2%/year) due to the substantial migration to this region. The 
key destinations of immigrants in the Southeast region, which includes Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) and 5 provinces of Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, 
Baria-Vung Tau and Tay Ninh, are Binh Duong, HCMC and Dong Nai. Their 
inward migration rates are 340 per thousand, 136 per thousand, and 66 per 
thousand, respectively (GSO, 2010, p. 5-6). Within the Southeast, following Binh 
Duong‟s population growth of 7.3% per year, HCMC is not only the largest city, 
but also the second fastest growing population in Vietnam (3.5%/year) during the 
last 10 years (GSO, 2010, p. 35). In addition, the fact that the fastest growing 
province of Binh Duong is adjunct to HCMC makes HCMC and its neighbouring 
provinces the most dynamic population areas in Vietnam. The main reason for 
migration to the region is to seek economic opportunities in non-agricultural 
sectors. Most migrants to the region arrive in Binh Duong, HCMC and Dong Nai 
(these destinations have 43 industrial parks and export-processing zones and 
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account for one third of total accumulated FDI capital since Vietnam implemented 
the FDI law in 1988) to seek employment (GSO, 2010, p. 77 & 81).
5&6
  
In contrast, rural areas hold a declining share of the world‟s poor (Haddad, 
Ruel, & Garrett, 1999; Mooya & Cloete, 2007; Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula, 
2007), which is also evident in Vietnam. Poverty sharply declined over the period 
1998-2008 from 37.4% to 14.5%. Urban poverty rate has been declining from 
9.5% in 1998 to 3.3% in 2008, but the urban areas have a rising share of poverty, 
from 5.99% in 1998 to 6.63% in 2008 due to fast population growth in urban 
areas during the same period (VDR, 2010; VHLSS, 2008; GSO, 2010). The 
poverty is becoming more urban in Vietnam, and thus study of urban poverty is 
becoming significant for poverty reduction policy in Vietnam. 
1.6.2 Fast urbanisation, employment and poverty in peri-urban/urban areas  
Peri-urban and urban poor people often depend more on wage-paid employment 
and cash incomes (Bryld, 2003; Rakodi, 1995), but less on agricultural activities 
to earn because of the declining arable land due to urban enchroachment 
(Midmore & Jansen, 2003). Furthermore, the higher cost of living and market 
reliance could result in a slower pace of poverty reduction in peri-urban and urban 
areas (Ravallion et al, 2007). Thus, the higher unemployment rate in the areas will 
result in unstable livelihoods and imperfect consumption smoothing (Meng, 
2003). Moreover, poverty in urban and peri-urban areas is likely to concentrate on 
immigrants (Rashid, 2000, p. 242). 
Urbanisation has reduced agricultural land in HCMC, from 95,799 hectares 
of arable land for annual crops in 2000 to 44,441 hectare in 2009.
7
 In my study 
area (District 9) agricultural land fell from 5,661 hectares to 332 hectares during 
the same period. This reflects the substantial population growth rate,
8
 
establishment of new enterprises (from about 400 in 1997 to 1,658 enterprises by 
2006),
9
 and the construction of HCMC High Tech Park (about 1,000 hectares).
10
 
As a consequence of the arable land decline, the peri-urban poor in HCMC rely 
more on seasonal and unstable jobs such as street vendors, construction workers 
                                                 
5
 Vietnam has 249 industrial parks and processing zones by the end of 2009, see at 
http://www.khucongnghiep.com.vn/news_detail.asp?id=159&IDN=2247&lang=vn  
6
 See at http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=471&idmid=3&ItemID=9937  
7
 See at http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2009/nong_nghiep/0507.htm 
8
 See at http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh?ID=2000 
9
 See at http://www.quan9.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/Office_Infor.asp?Cat=9&ID=192  
10
 See at  http://www.shtp.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/Sites/Web/NewsDT.aspx?PostID=916&CateID=68  
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and unskilled factory workers (VDR, 2004). This indicates that the poor depend 
more on labour incomes, so adverse shocks which cause loss of working members 
such as illness, injury, accidents and death, and limited access to quality social 
services will lead to unstable livelihoods (VDR, 2004, p. 110). Therefore, such 
approaches as improving human capital (education and health) and facilitating 
access to social and financial services are needed to mitigate vulnerability and 
effectively eliminate poverty. 
1.6.3 What defines peri-urban areas in HCMC? 
The term peri-urban is widely used in the literature, but there is no a standard 
definition. OECD (1979, p. 10) states “the term peri-urban cannot be easily 
defined,…it is a name given to the grey area which is neither entirely urban nor 
purely rural in the traditional sense; it is at most the partly urbanised rural areas”. 
FAO (2001) defines peri-urban areas as being associated with urban city centres, 
lower population density, geographical proximity to a city, urban growth and 
expansion. Overall, there are three main features of peri-urban areas: first, they are 
often associated with the urban fringe or surrounding areas of a city. Second, peri-
urban is different from urban in terms of socio-economic conditions; especially 
infrastructure is less developed than urban areas (FAO, 2001; Norstrom, 2007, p. 
5). Third, peri-urban areas have both traditional (rural) and modern (urban) social 
characteristics (Clough, 1996). Moreover, peri-urban areas are closely linked to 
the urbanisation process. In peri-urban areas, population size and density, and 
non-agricultural labour force are increasing, result from rural-urban migration to 
seek non-agricultural employment (Iaquinta & Drescher, 2000).   
There are no criteria to define peri-urban areas in HCMC. To classify urban 
and peri-urban districts, I use the economic structure (agricultural and non-
agricultural contribution in district GDP), proximity to the city centre, and 
population density (Figure 1.1) and population growth.
11
 
                                                 
11
 See at 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2000/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0203.htm/view, 
and 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2009/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0201.htm/view  
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Figure 1.1: Ho Chi Minh City population density by district in 2009 
(persons/km
2
) 
 
Accordingly, Can Gio, Cu Chi, Nha Be, Binh Chanh, Hoc Mon, Thu Duc, Binh 
Tan and Districts 2, 7, 9, 12 are peri-urban districts (11 districts). These districts 
have a certain agricultural contribution in their GDP and have a lower population 
density, from 104 to about 10,000 people/km
2
. These districts are also on the 
urban fringes, and have experienced fast population growth, from 32% to 150% 
(depending on districts) over the period 1997-2009. My study district (District 9), 
which has population growth rate of 72%, belongs to the peri-urban district group. 
The other 13 districts which have a very high population density, from 18,600 to 
46,500 people/km
2
, are classified as urban districts. Almost all urban districts 
have negative or low population growth rates over the period 1999-2009. 
1.7 Research methods and data sources 
The thesis applies various econometric methods to two sources of data to achieve 
the research objectives.
12
 First, to achieve the first objective of studying changing 
returns to schooling, datasets from five rounds of Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (VHLSS) conducted by Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO) 
in 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 are used. The samples are representative for 
the national level of Vietnam. The surveys offer all necessary information to 
estimate the returns using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Heckman 
selection model. 
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 Detailed discussions on econometric methods are presented in Chapters 2, 4, 5 , 6 and 7. 
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Second, for the remaining objectives of the thesis, I conducted a field 
survey. A sample of 411 borrowing and non-borrowing households was 
interviewed in early 2008 in the peri-urban District 9, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) 
Vietnam.
13
 Since my focus is on microcredit impacts on poor households, the 
sample was selected from a list of poor households whose initial income per 
capita was below the HCMC general poverty line of VND 6 million 
(approximately US$1 per day).
14
 The target sample size was set at 500 
households, including 100 reserves, to achieve a realised sample of 400 
(Appendix 1.1). In fact, 411 households were successfully interviewed, 
accounting for 26% of the total number of poor households in each of the selected 
wards in the district. The interviewed sample provides 304 borrowing households 
and 107 non-borrowing households, with 2,062 members, 955 (46.3%) males and 
1,102 (53.7%) females, including 483 school-aged children. The sample is likely 
to be representative for the poor group whose initial income per capita is below 
the poverty line at the survey time in the district but will not be representative for 
Ho Chi Minh City nor for Vietnam. 
The survey was designed to collect data on household and individual 
demographic-economic variables, commune characteristics, household durable 
and fixed assets, child schooling and education expenditure, healthcare, food, non-
food, housing expenditure, and borrowing activities. I also utilised GPS receivers 
to collect data on locations of households and facilities in order to measure 
distances from each household to facilities.  
The surveyed areas are located in the most dynamic region, Ho Chi Minh 
City (HCMC), in Vietnam. The city is the biggest economic-financial centre in the 
country; it accounts for only 6.6% of the country‟s population in 2005 but one 
third of GDP. The city economy has recently been growing at above 10% per 
annum.
 15
  
The surveyed district is the 5
th
 lowest population density district, and one of 
the peri-urban districts of HCMC. When it was established in 1997, the district 
relied heavily on agricultural production, but its economic structure has changed 
                                                 
13
 HCMC has 24 Districts. District 9 has the 5
th
 lowest population density, with a population of 
227,816 (in 2008). For its position, see Figures 1.2 and 1.3 at the end of this chapter. 
14
 The list was provided by the District Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs. 
15
 See at 
http://www.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/gioithieu/lists/posts/post.aspx?Source=/gioithieu/&Category=Gi
%E1%BB%9Bi+thi%E1%BB%87u+chung&ItemID=9&Mode=1  
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drastically due to current fast industrialisation and urbanisation. The average 
growth rate of industrial production and services has been very high for the period 
1997-2008, namely 24.7% and 28.1% per year respectively. The total number of 
enterprises, approximately 400 in 1997, increased to 1,658 in 2006.
16
 In addition, 
the district population growth rate is very high; it increased 59% over the period 
1997-2008. Population density within the surveyed district in 2008 is 
heterogeneous. Some wards are very highly populated e.g. Phuoc Binh (PB) 
(18,981 people/km
2
), Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) (6,546 people/km
2
), while others 
are relatively low, e.g. Long Phuoc (LP) (300 people/km
2
), Long Truong (577 
people/km
2
). The main economic activities of the district are non-farm economic 
activities such as industrial production, construction and services (see Appendices 
1.2 and 1.3). For my sample, 72% of household heads are small traders, 
housewives, casual workers, factory workers and the jobless. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis  
The current thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the returns to schooling in Vietnam during the 
economic transition. This chapter will explain the increasing importance of human 
capital in earnings during the economic transition and how education investment 
is becoming important to improve human capital, especially for the poor.  
Chapter 3 presents a general literature review on microcredit. The chapter 
will provide general ideas and concepts of microcredit and microfinance, 
microcredit providers, reasons why the poor use microcredit, reasons for existence 
of informal credit providers in developing countries, and interest rates charged by 
microcredit providers. Other relevant literature on empirical methodologies will 
be presented in each main chapter for each topic of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 examines factors affecting the likelihood of credit participation 
and credit constraints for the poor households, and use of formal and informal 
credit. In addition to showing the important determinants of participation in each 
credit sector, the chapter also investigates how poor households‟ behaviour in the 
credit market differs between urban and rural areas. 
Chapter 5 reviews credit impact studies and impact measuring 
methodologies and presents the findings for credit impacts on education and 
                                                 
16
 See at http://www.quan9.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/Office_Infor.asp?Cat=9&ID=192  
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healthcare expenditure. The chapter mainly employs propensity score matching 
(PSM) to measure the impacts, and multiple treatment effect estimators to detect 
unobservable selection bias. 
Chapter 6 examines whether the impacts are heterogonous by employing the 
Quantile Regression. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) estimator is 
also applied to analyze household budget shares of the poor households.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the impacts of household credit on child schooling 
(current enrolment and schooling gap). Probit and Negative binomial models are 
applied in the chapter. The chapter restricts analysis to a sub-sample of children 
aged 6 to 18 years old. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions. The shortcomings of the study are also 
discussed to provide some further avenues for future research in the field. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.1: Sample distribution and sampling procedure 
Ward name 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
No of poor 
households 
 
 
 
(2) 
Contribution 
to total 
district  poor 
households 
 
(3) 
Number 
of 
household 
targeted 
 
(4) 
Selection 
rate 
 
 
(5)= 
(4)/(2) 
Reser- 
-vations 
 
 
(6)= 
0.25x(4) 
Number 
of 
selected 
household 
(7)= 
(4)+(6) 
PhuocBinh 314 6.8% 80 0.25 20 100 
TNPA 307 6.6% 78 0.25 20 98 
LongTruong 467 10.1% 119 0.25 30 149 
LongPhuoc 484 10.5% 123 0.25 30 153 
Total 1,572 34.0% 400  100 500 
Sources: Figures in column 1 are from Statistical Department of District 9 (2007), and 
Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs of District 9 (2008). 
 
Two-step sampling was used, first selecting wards and then households. First, all 
13 wards of the district were partitioned into two groups based on preliminary 
socio-economic information from the district government statistics report. The 
first group was more urbanised and highly populated (over 2,800 people/km
2
). 
This group consists of seven wards: Phuoc Binh, Hiep Phu, Phuoc Long A, Phuoc 
Long B, Tang Nhon Phu A, Tang Nhon Phu B, and Tan Phu). The second group 
was less urbanised and less populated (below 1,500 people/km
2
), and has retained 
some agricultural economic activities. This group included six wards: Long 
Truong, Long Thanh My, Long Binh, Long Phuoc, Phu Huu, Truong Thanh). I 
randomly selected two wards from each group. Accordingly, in the first group 
Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) and Phuoc Binh (PB) were selected, and in the same 
way, Long Truong (LT) and Long Phuoc (LP) were selected from the second 
group. 
 
Appendix 1.2: Some basic information of the surveyed wards 
Ward name 
 
Population 
density 
(persons/km
2
) 
Contribution 
 to district  
poor 
households 
(%) 
Population in 
agricultural 
sector 2003 
(%) 
Population in 
agricultural 
sector 2006 
(%) 
PhuocBinh 18,981 6.8 0.18 0.05 
TNPA 6,546 6.6 1.37 0.39 
LongTruong 577 10.1 15.34 9.71 
LongPhuoc 300 10.5 24.71 17.8 
District 9 1,882 34.0 3.67 2.36 
Sources: author’s estimation from Statistical Department of District 9 (2007). 
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Appendix 1.3: Economic structure of District 9, Ho Chi Minh City                     
Sector contribution 
  
2006 
Value % 
Industrial production (current price)      7,089  65.41 
Construction (current price)        439  4.05 
Services (current price)     2,870  26.48 
Transport (current price)        386  3.57 
Agricultural production (current price)          55  0.50 
Total    10,839  100 
Source: Statistical Department of District (2007) 
Note: values in this Table are measured in VND billion; USD/VND=15,965 in 2006. 
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Figure 1.2: Regional map of Vietnam 
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Figure 1.3: Location of District 9 in Ho Chi Minh City 
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Chapter 2: Background on the increasing importance of 
education in Vietnam during the economic transition 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A key stylized fact about transition economies is that the returns to schooling tend 
to rise as economic reform progresses (Orazem & Vodopivec, 1995). The increase 
in returns to schooling in transitional economies are found in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia (Chase, 1998), and in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and Poland 
(Brainerd, 1998). The rise marks the movement away from distorted labour 
markets and the effects of longer-term changes in patterns of human capital 
formation. 
Since human capital is the major asset of the urban poor, it is important to 
study the trend over time in the rate of return to human capital investment. 
Existing research suggests that Vietnam does not follow the typical pattern (see 
Appendix 2.2). In 1992, rates of return were very low at the beginning of 
transition: below 3% using basic Mincerian earnings equation and even below 2% 
if further controlling for other variables (Glewwe & Patrios, 1998; Gallup, 2002). 
Using both the basic and extended Mincerian earnings model, Gallup (2002) 
shows increasing returns between 1992-1998. However, when compared with the 
world rate of return at about 9% to 10% around the same time (Psacharopoulos, 
1994), the rates of return for Vietnam are still low. Contrary to Gallup, estimates 
reported by Liu (2006) suggest falling rates of returns for men in Vietnam, from 
5.9% in 1992 to 3.5% in 1998 and little increase for women, from 4.2% to 4.8% 
in the same period.
17
 One possible reason for the divergence from the patterns in 
Eastern Europe is that gradual economic reform policies have been applied in 
Vietnam and the Vietnamese government has intervened in the economy 
substantially, whilst in Eastern European countries the “Big Bang” reforms were 
introduced.  
To test whether the rate of return to schooling in Vietnam rose during the 
economic transition, I examine data from the period 1998-2008, called the later 
period of the reforms, when the reforms may have had longer time to have an 
                                                 
17
 Note that the comparison may be inappropriate because the different models, the Heckman 
selection correction and OLS model, are applied in 1992 and 1998 respectively by Liu(2006). In 
the context of Vietnam, higher educated people tend to work in wage-paid jobs, so the selection 
models typically yield higher returns to schooling (Doan & Gibson, 2009). Given the higher 
returns by selection models, the decrease in males‟ returns over the period from 1992 to 1998 
would be smaller; conversely the improvement in female returns would be greater.  
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effect. Moreover, recent years have seen continued development of the private 
sector (66% of GDP, and 91% of employment in 2008) which has stimulated 
competition in the labour market with consequent changes in relative wages. 
Concurrently, income inequality also rose during the later reform period, with the 
Gini index rising from 0.35 in 1994 to 0.42 in 2006 (VHLSS, 2004, 2006). Since 
participation rates in the wage labour market have risen during the period and 
wage earners have higher education achievement relative to non-wage earners 
(see Appendix 2.1), the analysis not only relies on the basic Mincerian earnings 
function but also accounts for sample selection bias.  
The next section reviews studies of the returns to schooling in transition 
economies. Section 2.3 discusses the data and econometric specifications. Section 
2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 discusses possible explanations for the 
changing returns and provides some conclusions. 
2.2 Literature on return to schooling in transitional economies 
Existing studies show that rates of return to schooling increase over time in 
transitional economies. For example, returns to schooling increased from 3.6% in 
1988 to 12.2% by 1993 in China, from 1.5% in 1989 to 5.4% by 1994 in Estonia, 
and from 2.9% in 1986 to 7% by 1996 in Poland (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 
2004, Table A4). Most of these studies use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) which 
does not allow for endogenous schooling choice, but when Heckman and Li 
(2004) use Instrumental Variables (IV) they find an even higher rate of return to 
each year of schooling, of around 14% for four-year college attendance in China. 
This rate is much higher than the rate of return estimated by Chow (2001) for 
China in the 1980s which was much closer to zero. Johnson and Chow (1997) 
state that employment in the stationary state sector, which dominated China‟s 
urban areas in the late 1980s, leads to lower rates of return. Zhang et al (2005) 
also suggest that economic reform and technical changes have enhanced 
competition among workers in China, with the newly-skilled rewarded at an 
increasing rate. More evidence of the increasing returns during the reforms in 
transitional economies can be found in Fleisher (2005) and Fleisher, Sabirianova 
and Wang (2005). These authors find that the speed of economic transition and 
the degree of economic volatility explain differences in the increase in the rates of 
return to schooling over time and across economies. 
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Yet studies of Vietnam for either the single year 1992 or the period of 1992-
1998 find low rates of return to schooling, and only a modest rise over time 
(Gallup, 2002; Glewwe & Patrinos, 1998; Liu, 2006; Moock, Patrinos, & 
Venkataraman, 2003). It is notable that the study by Liu (2006) was for over ten 
years of the economic reforms, yet the estimated rate of return was still relatively 
low (3.5% and 4.8% for male and female in 1998, respectively). However, these 
studies may not have captured the full effects of the transition to a market-oriented 
economy given the cautiously gradual nature of early economic reforms in 
Vietnam. Hence, it is important to see the trend in the returns to schooling over 
the recent period 1998-2008, which is long enough to allow more apparent effects.  
In addition to the timing issue, some existing studies on Vietnam ignored 
the important problem of sample selection bias (Gallup, 2002; Glewwe & 
Patrinos, 1998; Moock, Patrinos, & Venkataraman, 2003). Since there was a 
rising participation rate in the wage labour market during transition, the omission 
may bias not only the level of the estimated rate of return but also the trend over 
time. Consequently, in this chapter I control for sample selection bias.  
2.3 Model specification 
2.3.1 Data  
Datasets used in the current chapter are from the 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 
2008 rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). There are 5,999 
households with 28,624 household members in VLSS1998, 29,542 households 
with 132,374 members in VLSS2002,
 18
 9,188 households with 40,419 household 
members in VLSS2004, 9,189 households with 39,071 members in VLSS2006, 
and 9,186 households with 38,247 members in VLSS2008. These samples are 
representative for the national levels of Vietnam. Sub-samples of wage-earners 
aged from 15 to 60 are used in the estimations, which yield 3,244 from 
VLSS1998, 26,268 from VLSS2002, 7,177 from VLSS2004, 7,436 from 
VLSS2006, and 7,532 from VLSS2008. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 VHLSS2002 dataset has significantly more observations than other VHLSS datasets. The reason 
is that Vietnam General Statistical Office (GSO) wanted to provide bigger datasets since 
VHLSS2002, but the GSO tremendously encountered issues of timing and costs, thus after this 
survey the GSO maintained the sample sizes at around 9,000 households. 
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2.3.2 Mincerian earnings model 
To estimate the returns to schooling, the Mincerian earnings equation is used: 
LnYi =  + 1.Si + 2Expi + 3Expi
2
 + i   (2.1) 
where LnY is the natural log of hourly wages including bonuses, allowances, and 
subsidies (both in cash and in-kind), S is years of schooling,  Exp is potential 
experience (calculated as age minus schooling years minus six) and the experience 
squared term, Exp
2
, is included to allow a non-linear pattern in lifecycle earnings. 
To test increasing rates of return to schooling over time, I use four pooled datasets 
with the base year of 1998 and the compared-with years, so-called the second year 
(either 2002 or 2004 or 2006 or 2008) and an interaction term between years of 
schooling and a year dummy for the compared-with year. In addition, to capture 
the gender difference in earnings, I also include a dummy variable for gender and 
its interaction term with the second year dummy. The estimation model now is as 
follows:  
LnYi = +0.Year2 1.Si +1.Si*Year2 2.Expi +2.Expi*Year2 +3.Expi
2 
+3.Expi
2
*Year2 +4.Gender +4.Gender*Year2  i         (2.2) 
2.3.3 Sample selection bias-corrected model 
Sample selection bias results when the subset of wage earners used for the 
Mincerian earnings function is not randomly sampled from the general population. 
OLS estimates using the Mincerian earnings equation are biased and not 
representative for the whole population since the OLS estimates the return to 
schooling for a subset of wage-earners only. To address the problem I apply the 
sample selection model (Heckman, 1979) as follows: 
Wage equation:    wi = zi 1 + u1i    (2.3) 
Where wi is log of hourly wage, zi is a vector of schooling, experience and gender 
variables for individual i 
Selection equation:    hi* = xi 2 + u2i   (2.4) 
where hi* is a latent variable; and wi is observed if hi  =1, and hi =1 if  hi* > 0, and 
wi is not observed if hi = 0, and hi = 0  if  hi* ≤ 0. Xi is a vector of schooling, 
experience, gender, household size and household non-wage income. The 
selection equation is used to correct the sample selectivity bias. People may self-
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select into wage employment sector according to their education, household size 
and non-wage income. Furthermore, the assumptions about the errors are that:  
u1i ~ NID(0, σ
2
) and u2i ~ N(0,1) and cov(u1i, u2i) =  12. 
In the first estimation stage, a binary Probit model on all observations (those in 
wage employment and those not) is used to estimate the correction term i, which 
is the inverse Mill‟s ratio or Heckman‟s Lambda: i = xi xiThe term 
is then included in the second stage of the augmented earnings function:  
wi  =  zi 1 + σ12.i +  i    (2.5) 
These two equations can also be estimated in one single step procedure using 
Heckman maximum likelihood estimator, which is more efficient (StataCorp, 
2001) than the two-step procedure. Identification is achieved by including 
variables (xi) such as household size and household non-wage income in the 
selection equation but not in the wage equation. Justification for the use of these 
variables is that they affect wage employment participation probabilities, through 
changing the opportunity cost of being in the wage labour force, but an employer 
is unlikely to pay a different wage rate depending on one‟s household size or non-
labour income. Household size may affect wage employment participation 
because low productivity and limited arable land in the agricultural sector have 
led to labour surplus in the sector if households have more members. For 
example, in 2009, 54% of Vietnam‟s labour force was in the agricultural sector, 
but that sector contributed only 17% to Vietnam‟s GDP (PHC, 2009).19 Therefore, 
household size relates to labour surplus and affects wage employment 
participation. Given the same household size, households with higher non-wage 
incomes from self-employed, family businesses and farming should have a higher 
reservation wage and hence may not send their members out to work in the wage 
employment sector. Therefore, household size and non-wage income are likely to 
significantly affect the probability of being wage-earners. 
2.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics show that in 1998 the average educational attainment of 
wage earners in Vietnam was about 9 years,
20
 and 10 years by 2008 (Appendix 
                                                 
19
  Population and Housing Census 2009 (conducted by Vietnam General Statitiscal Office). 
20
 Sample size and sampling strategy of VHLSS2002 is quite different from the remaining surveys 
so the number of schooling years is slightly lower (see VHLSS, 2002 and 2004: Basic Information 
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2.1). Non-wage earners‟ education attainment is lower than that of wage earners 
in all years. The average hourly wage rate was 2,569 Dong (US$0.187) in 1998 
and in nominal terms had risen to 8,854 Dong (US$ 0.537) by 2008. 
2.4.1 Basic Mincerian estimates of the returns over time 
Table 2.1 contains the basic earnings function estimates. All of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% level but the explanatory power of the model is 
substantially higher in 2008 than in 1998. The coefficient on years of schooling 
implies an average private rate of return to an additional year of education of 2.9% 
in 1998 rising to 9.5% by 2008. These results obviously show the increasing 
returns to schooling during the recent economic reforms. The results are also quite 
consistent with the increasing trend found in other transition economies. For 
example, Zhang et al (2005) report a seven percentage point rise in the rate of 
return to schooling in China between 1988 and 2001. 
The female wage is lower than males‟. According to the coefficient on the 
gender dummy variable in the first column of Table 2.1, hourly wages were about 
14.8% higher for men than for similar educated and experienced women in 1998; 
the gap was about 20% in 2008.
21
   
2.4.2 Selectivity-corrected estimates of returns to education 
To overcome selectivity bias I apply the Heckman selection-correction model. 
After correcting for sample selection bias, the estimated rates of return to 
education are somewhat higher than in the OLS estimates reported in Table 2.1. 
However, the basic feature of a significant rise in the rates of return between 1998 
and 2008 is not altered. The full results of using the bias correction model are 
reported in Table 2.2. The estimated rates of return in most cases rise by about one 
percentage point relative to the OLS estimates, except in 2002. The rise in the 
average private rate of return to a year of schooling is illustrated in Figure 2.1 
showing both the basic Mincerian earnings equation and selectivity-corrected 
estimates. Both sets of estimates show a rise of about 6.6 percentage points 
between 1998 and 2008.  
                                                                                                                                     
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986-118173055198/3877319-
1207074161131/BINFO_VHLSS_02_04   
21
 For dummy variables in a semi-logarithmic regression the percentage is calculated  
as 100 x (e
i
-1) 
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Figure 2.1: Returns to schooling using cross sectional data sets (Mincerian 
earnings equation and selection bias-corrected estimates) 
 
The joint estimation of the selection and wage equations shows that the 
residuals of the two equations are positively correlated for all the years. 
Specifically, the coefficient on the inverse Mills‟ ratio (λ) varies from 0.12 to 
0.285 and is always highly statistically significant. This implies a positive 
correlation between the selection equation errors and the wage equation errors, 
since λ=ρσ (and σ must be positive). In other words, individuals with a 
comparative advantage in entering the wage-earning labour force also earn more 
than observationally similar workers. Hence the observed wage is higher than the 
wage that would prevail for a sample of individuals selected at random fashion 
from the working-age population. 
The positive coefficients on years of schooling in the selection equations 
show a benefit of education which is omitted from the standard wage equations, 
which is that education provides a higher probability of entering into waged 
employment. To help interpret the effect, the Probit coefficients from the selection 
equation are transformed into marginal effects, showing the change in probability 
of being in waged employment for a unit change in the explanatory variable; I 
report the marginal effects of characteristics on the probability of waged 
employment in Table 2.3. 
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There appears to be a substantial rise over time in the effect of education on 
the probability of waged employment participation. In 1998, an additional year of 
schooling raised the probability by just over one percentage point. But ten years 
later the marginal effect of an extra year of schooling had risen to over three 
percentage points. In other words, people with higher education have an 
increasingly higher likelihood of having waged jobs. It is also notable that the 
overall rise in the predicted probability of waged employment for an individual 
with average characteristics increased from 14% in 1998 to 34% by 2008. The 
rapid increase in the probability of being in waged work resulted from the rapid 
industrialization in Vietnam‟s urban and peri-urban areas which helped generate 
more non-farm jobs and absorb surplus labour from rural areas (demand side). 
Furthermore, the important Enterprise Law (a law for domestic private 
enterprises) passed in August 1999 (came into effect from 1
st
 January, 2000) 
stimulated mass establishment of new businesses, especially small businesses 
which helped absorb surplus labour from the agricultural sector (mostly self-
employed family farming) to waged employment sector (industrial and service 
sectors). The Vietnam enterprise statistics show that the number of enterprises 
increased substantially, from 42,288 in 2000 to 155,771 by the end of 2007, and 
76% were domestic private and limited liability enterprises.
22
 These enterprises 
are the main labour absorbers in Vietnam (Tran & Doan, 2010). This helps to 
explain the reason behind the rise in the probability of being wage earners over 
the studied period. The increasing significance of household size as a positive 
predictor of waged employment is also consistent with the surplus labour 
interpretation in rural areas (supply side). The opportunity cost of having a 
household member work in waged employment is lower for a larger family since 
other family members are able to continue to work either on-farm or in some non-
farm informal enterprises. Finally, availability of other non-wage employment 
from household business, self-employment, and larger farming, which generates 
household non-wage incomes, reduces the likelihood of being in waged 
employment. 
2.4.3 Checking the robustness of the increasing return to schooling over time 
One may question the validity of comparing estimated returns between each year 
of 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 and the base year of 1998 using separate 
                                                 
22
 Available at www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=479&idmid=4&itemID=8722  
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regressions. To validate the comparison and consolidate the finding of rising 
returns over time, I use pooled data and the interaction terms as discussed in 
Section 2.3. Specifically, VHLSS1998 is pooled with, one after another, 
VHLSS2002, VHLSS2004, VHLSS2006, and VHLSS2008 to set up four pooled 
datasets.  
The reason for using the interaction terms is to test whether the returns to 
schooling are the same over time. The hypothesis is that the slope of the hourly 
wage, in logarithm (lnY), with respect to years of schooling (S) is the same for 
both years (1998 and the second year). In other words, I test H
A
0: 1 = 0 in the 
equation 2.2. 
The results of the pooled Mincerian earnings equation estimation are 
presented in Table 2.4. The estimated rates of return to schooling using pooled 
data 1998/2002, 1998/2004, 1998/2006, and 1998/2008 are presented in columns 
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2.4 respectively. In the first column, the return to schooling 
for year 1998 is 2.9%. For 2002, the rate of returns is 2.87% + 4.69% = 7.6%. 
Likewise, the rates of return are 8.6%, 8.8% and 9.5% for 2004, 2006 and 2008, 
respectively (the last row of Table 2.4). The tests for difference in rates of return 
between the compared-with years and the base year of 1998 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level (see the test for H
A
0). Therefore, I can conclude that 
there is strong evidence against the hypothesis that the returns to schooling are 
constant over the period. From these estimates, the trend of increasing returns is 
observed during the period 1998 to 2008. Moreover, the parameter test rejects the 
hypothesis that all interaction terms jointly equal zero; it implies that the effects of 
not only education but also other factors on earnings, especially experience, vary 
over time.  
To strengthen the finding, I apply the selection correction model to the 
pooled datasets, and the estimated results are shown in Table 2.5. In the first 
stage, the Probit model is applied to estimate the correction term (i). The 
identification is achieved by including household size and household non-wage 
income and their interaction terms with the second survey dummies in the 
selection equation.  
The trend of increasing returns is re-confirmed during the period 1998 to 
2008 using the selection bias-corrected models with inclusion of the interaction 
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terms. All the differences (1) in rates of return over time are significantly 
different from zero. The estimates on the interaction terms are all positive and get 
larger for later years (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) showing a clear rising trend of 
the returns from 1998 to 2008 (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). However, the rate of increase 
in the rates of return slowed down in the later years from 2004 to 2008. The 
interaction term coefficients of schooling year and the second survey for pooled 
2004/2006 and 2006/2008 data turn out to be insignificantly different from zero.  
Overall, the estimated results are robust with a trend of increasing returns to 
schooling over the studied period in Vietnam. The rate of return seems to match 
the world rates around 10% (Psacharopoulos, 1994).  
The effects of the Asian financial crisis and minimum wages on earnings 
also appear in the time effect coefficients (0) over time in Table 2.5. Because of 
the crisis, the Vietnamese government reduced minimum wages in late 1998 (see 
first column of Table 2.5), and many enterprises also reduced wage rates to keep 
costs lower in order to survive. During the period 1999-2004, nominal wages were 
almost kept the same. In other words, because of the wage rate cuts in late 1998, 
the average wage rate in 2004 is about 10% lower than in 1998. However, due to 
spontaneous mass strikes in late 2005, the government had to raise minimum 
wages by 40% in early 2006 (Tran, 2007).
23
 The adjustment resulted in a great 
shift of the time effect (year dummy) in the columns 3, 4, 6 and 7 of Table 2.5. 
2.5 Discussions and conclusions  
The results reported in the current chapter on returns to schooling in Vietnam 
using VHLSS1998, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 differ from the previous literature. 
The rate of return for 2008 is much higher than estimates for either 1992 or 1998 
reported by Gallup (2002), Glewwe and Patrios (1998), Liu (2006), and Moock, 
Patrinos and Venkataraman (2003). Moreover, although there was a rising trend 
between 1992 and 1998 found by Gallup (2002), or an ambiguous trend examined 
by Liu (2006), the returns to education for the early economic transition in 
Vietnam are still relatively low. The current results show a very rapid rise in the 
rates of return to schooling between 1998 and 2008. The rising trend appears to be 
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 The increase in minimum wages was applied for FDI enterprises. Even the government did not 
set minimum wages for domestic enterprises, but the labour strikes also happened in domestic 
enterprises, and therefore the enterprises did increase wages for employees to cool down the labour 
pressure and to keep employees.  
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robust to self-selection consideration, e.g. the selection into the waged 
employment. 
What could account for such a rapid rise in the rates of return to schooling, 
especially given the previously sluggish change reported in the literature? The 
period studied here coincides with further market opening and integration into the 
global economy, deeper reforms, and a consequent investment boom with 
accelerated structural change that has generated many technical-skilled jobs in 
Vietnam. Investment grew dramatically, from 32% of GDP in 1998 to 41% in 
2008, with almost all of the investment into industry and services; about 94% of 
all investment in 2008. Consequently, the growth rate of the industry sector is 
very high, about 15.4% during the period 1998-2008 and the industrial growth 
helped absorb surplus labour from the traditional sector. There was also 
considerable growth in foreign trade, such that overall openness (the ratio of 
exports plus imports to GDP) reached over 160% by 2008.
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On the labour supply side, changes in labour market laws from the early 
1990s were having increasing effects in the early period of the economic reforms. 
Initial reforms in 1993 to the labour contract system introduced the “basic wage” 
as the minimum wage. But employers often relied on the basic wage to compute 
actual wages for employees without concern for appropriate differentials for 
educational attainment, skills and productivity. Further impetus for negotiating 
and signing employment contracts came in 1994 when the Labour Code was 
passed, allowing employers more flexibility in hiring and firing workers. The 
greater flexibility is also likely to have offered greater mobility for workers, 
allowing the more highly educated employees to seek out jobs that paid an 
appropriate wage premium for their skills. On the labour demand side, resulting 
from the further economic reforms especially the first Enterprise Law issued in 
late 1999 and a Unified Enterprise Law issued in 2005, investment in industrial 
production and the service sector was liberalized. A huge increase in the number 
of enterprises and an investment boom in the industrial and service sector as 
discussed earlier generated more wage jobs for labourers. Moreover, higher-
educated workers may have benefitted from recent technological modernization 
and the transfer of technical and managerial skills from FDI enterprises which 
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 The information used in the paragraph are available at 
www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=470&idmid=3  
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resulted from the boom of FDI in the liberalisation period. These are likely causes 
for increasing returns to schooling over the period 1998-2008. 
Moreover, Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 with a commitment to 
further open up markets, including the labour market, so growing competition 
between employers is likely to continue to affect the returns to schooling in future. 
Hence, a continued rise in the rate of return to schooling is likely until the country 
becomes a fully-fledged market economy in common with the pattern observed in 
other transitional economies.
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Chapter summary 
This chapter has examined the trend in the rate of return to schooling in Vietnam 
over the period 1998-2008 when the economic reforms have had a longer time to 
have an effect. The application of OLS and Heckman selection estimators finds 
that returns increased quickly during the later period of economic reform but the 
pace slowed down once rates of return approach the global average of around 10% 
per year of schooling completed (Psacharopoulos, 1994). The chapter clearly 
shows that the role of education in earnings has been increasing during the 
economic transition to a market economy in Vietnam. Therefore, human capital 
investment is necessary for the poor, who rely heavily upon labour income to 
escape poverty, especially in urban and peri-urban areas. One of the typical 
solutions to improve the poor‟s health and education and to eliminate poverty is 
providing access to microcredit. In this respect, the following chapters will 
investigate whether microcredit works for the poor. 
                                                 
25
 By May 2010, only 22 countries had recognized Vietnam‟s market economy (Vietnamnet.vn, 28 
May 2010). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Basic Mincerian Earning Function Estimates by years (1998-2008) 
Variables 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Years of schooling  0.0287 0.0756 0.0861 0.0877 0.0952 
 (7.64)** (43.96)** (37.98)** (38.99)** (40.70)** 
Experience (years) 0.0150 0.0178 0.0263 0.0299 0.0401 
 (2.90)** (7.43)** (8.69)** (10.66)** (14.05)** 
Experience squared  -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0010 
 (3.69)** (6.19)** (7.20)** (8.52)** (12.31)** 
Gender (male=1) 0.1381 0.1614 0.1422 0.1365 0.1820 
 (4.55)** (10.89)** (7.57)** (7.68)** (10.17)** 
Constant 0.2935 0.1387 0.1797 0.4060 0.6356 
 (6.01)** (5.80)** (5.45)** (12.46)** (18.66)** 
R-squared 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.26 
F-statistics  23.85 550.93 396.45 410.94 466.63 
Prob > F (all coeffs=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 3,244 26,268 7,177 7,436 7,532 
 Robust t-statistics in parentheses (corrected for sampling weights), statistically significant at 10% 
(+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**); dependent variable is hourly wage in log, hourly wage is measured 
in VND 1,000 (and for all Tables hereafter) 
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Table 2.2: Heckman selection bias-corrected estimates by years (1998-2008) 
 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Wage  Selection  Wage  Selection  Wage  Selection  Wage  Selection  Wage  Selection  
Years of  0.0381 0.0500 0.0772 0.0386 0.0952 0.0885 0.0966 0.0882 0.1045 0.0874 
schooling (9.24)** (12.58)** (42.47)** (15.65)** (32.15)** (27.53)** (32.60)** (24.47)** (33.10)** (25.51)** 
Experience  0.0155 -0.00002 0.0247 0.0810 0.0403 0.0913 0.0436 0.0978 0.0556 0.1037 
(years) (3.00)** (0.01) (8.56)** (39.48)** (10.75)** (30.08)** (12.02)** (30.82)** (13.67)** (33.37)** 
Experience   -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0027 
squared (4.15)** (2.62)** (7.50)** (40.93)** (9.38)** (28.98)** (10.23)** (30.12)** (12.44)** (32.21)** 
Gender (male=1) 0.2448 0.4703 0.2018 0.5052 0.2064 0.4557 0.1956 0.4297 0.2433 0.4341 
 (7.20)** (19.57)** (11.65)** (35.41)** (9.52)** (21.88)** (9.49)** (19.75)** (11.40)** (20.38)** 
Household size  0.0009  0.0446  0.0388  0.0460  0.0444 
  (0.12)  (8.19)**  (5.72)**  (5.27)**  (5.83)** 
Non- wage 
 
 -0.0752  -0.2468  -0.1870  -0.1053  -0.0632 
income
(a)
  (7.65)**  (11.01)**  (15.22)**  (9.22)**  (10.34)** 
Constant -0.2649 -1.5129 -0.0542 -1.2933 -0.2240 -1.7260 0.0182 -1.8462 0.2200 -1.8957 
 (2.97)** (23.04)** (1.08) (31.85)** (3.01)** (31.74)** (0.24) (29.01)** (2.56)* (32.08)** 
Lambda ( 
0.2849 
(7.49)** 
 
0.1200  
(4.39)** 
 
0.2102 
(6.15)** 
 
0.2049 
(5.92)** 
 
0.2173    
(5.44)** 
 
Wald 2 (4)  143.12  1865.33  1064.76  1110.98  1108.43  
Prob > 2 (all 
coeffs=0) 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Selectivity test 
(=0) 
2(1)= 56.67** 2(1)= 19.28** 2(1)= 37.59** 2(1)= 34.91** 2(1)= 29.44** 
Observations 3,244 20,627 26,268 80,575 7,177 20,866 7,436 21,209 7,5432 21,311 
Robust z statistics in parentheses (corrected for sampling weights); + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; the dependent variable in wage 
equation is hourly wage in logarithm and the dependent variable in the selection equation takes value 1 for wage-earners and 0 for non-wage earners. 
(a) 
non-wage 
income divided by 10,000.
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Table 2.3: Marginal effects of characteristics on probability of wage employment 
(1998-2008) 
Explanatory variables  1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Years of schooling 0.0105 0.0133 0.0315 0.0316 0.0316 
 (12.23)** (15.63)** (27.53)** (24.68)** (25.53)** 
Experience (years) 0.0001 0.0279 0.0328 0.0353 0.0379 
 (0.17) (39.44)** (30.07)** (30.73)** (33.33)** 
Experience squared  -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (3.14)** (40.91)** (28.99)** (30.04)** (32.15)** 
Gender (male=1) 0.1028 0.1732 0.1623 0.1549 0.1582 
 (18.92)** (35.41)** (22.02)** (19.81)** (20.51)** 
Household size 0.0017 0.0155 0.0154 0.0182 0.0173 
 (1.13) (8.13)** (6.31)** (5.52)** (6.12)** 
Non-wage income -0.0145 -0.0854 -0.0663 -0.0381 -0.0229 
(/10,000) (7.33)** (10.88)** (14.62)** (9.25)** (10.11)** 
Wald 2 (6) 698.71 3028.58 1953.72 1699.20 1962.78 
Prob > 2  (all coeffs=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prediction of being  
wage- earners at x-bar 
0.14 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 
Observations 20,836 80,619 20,866 21,209 21,311 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses (corrected for sampling weights), statistically significant at 
10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**) 
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Table 2.4: Basic Mincerian estimates of returns to schooling with the interaction terms 
Explanatory variables 1998/2002 1998/2004 1998/2006 1998/2008 2002/2004 2004/2006 2006/2008 
Second year dummy (0) -0.1548 -0.1139 0.1125 0.3421 0.0410 0.2264 0.2296 
 (2.85)** (1.93)+ (1.92)+ (5.75)** (1.01) (4.88)** (4.87)** 
Years of schooling (1) 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 0.0756 0.0861 0.0877 
 (7.64)** (7.64)** (7.64)** (7.64)** (43.96)** (37.98)** (38.99)** 
Schooling years*second year (1) 0.0469 0.0573 0.0590 0.0665 0.0104 0.0017 0.0075 
 (11.34)** (13.05)** (13.46)** (15.01)** (3.67)** (0.52) (2.31)* 
Experience (2) 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150 0.0150 0.0178 0.0263 0.0299 
 (2.90)** (2.90)** (2.90)** (2.90)** (7.43)** (8.69)** (10.66)** 
Experience*second year (2) 0.0028 0.0114 0.0150 0.0251 0.0085 0.0036 0.0102 
 (0.49) (1.90)+ (2.55)* (4.27)** (2.21)* (0.87) (2.54)* 
Experience squared (3) -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (3.69)** (3.69)** (3.69)** (3.69)** (6.19)** (7.20)** (8.52)** 
Experience squared*second year (3) 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.88) (0.33) (0.69) (2.36)* (1.87)+ (0.51) (2.56)* 
Gender (Male=1) (4) 0.1381 0.1381 0.1381 0.1381 0.1614 0.1422 0.1365 
 (4.55)** (4.55)** (4.55)** (4.55)** (10.89)** (7.57)** (7.68)** 
Gender*second year (4) 0.0233 0.0041 -0.0015 0.0439 -0.0192 -0.0056 0.0455 
 (0.69) (0.12) (0.04) (1.25) (0.80) (0.22) (1.80)+ 
Constant 0.2935 0.2935 0.2935 0.2935 0.1387 0.1797 0.4060 
 (6.02)** (6.01)** (6.01)** (6.01)** (5.80)** (5.45)** (12.46)** 
Observations 29,512 10,421 10,680 10,776 33,445 14,613 14,968 
R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.36 0.50 0.17 0.24 0.30 
F-statistics   305.05 337.60 497.49 854.75 494.09 408.52 517.26 
Prob > F (all coeffs = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test (Prob > F) H
A
0: 1 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.602 0.021 
Test (Prob > F) H
B
0:0 =1=2= 3=4=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Rate of return for the 2
nd
 year (1 + 1) 7.56% 8.60% 8.77% 9.52% 8.60% 8.77% 9.52% 
Robust t statistics in parentheses (corrected for sampling weights); + significant at 10%; * at 5%; and ** at 1%; the dependent variable is hourly wage in log. 
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Table 2.5: Heckman selection model for earnings equation with the interaction terms 
Explanatory 
variables 
1998/2002 1998/2004 1998/2006 1998/2008 2002/2004 2004/2006 2006/2008 
 Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection 
Second  year   -0.0995 0.2247 -0.1046 -0.2133 0.1243 -0.3349 0.3510 -0.3831 -0.0004 -0.4425 0.2319 -0.1215 0.2444 -0.0504 
dummy (1.81)+ (2.91)** (1.76)+ (2.51)* (2.10)* (3.63)** (5.84)** (4.33)** (0.01) (6.48)** (4.84)** (1.45) (4.91)** (0.58) 
Years of  0.0339 0.0499 0.0362 0.0500 0.0346 0.0501 0.0349 0.0501 0.0773 0.0386 0.0950 0.0888 0.0943 0.0882 
schooling  (8.67)** (12.57)** (9.13)** (12.58)** (8.84)** (12.58)** (8.86)** (12.58)** (42.75)** (15.65)** (35.06)** (27.52)** (34.67)** (24.52)** 
Schooling years 0.0437 -0.0114 0.0597 0.0382 0.0608 0.0378 0.0683 0.0370 0.0145 0.0496 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0057 -0.0007 
*second year (10.35)** (2.44)* (13.06)** (7.48)** (13.43)** (7.07)** (14.89)** (7.06)** (4.85)** (12.26)** (0.47) (0.13) (1.63) (0.14) 
Experience  0.0152 0.0000 0.0154 -0.0000 0.0153 -0.0000 0.0153 -0.0000 0.0254 0.0810 0.0400 0.0914 0.0444 0.0978 
 (2.97)** (0.01) (2.99)** (0.00) (2.97)** (0.00) (2.98)** (0.00) (9.16)** (39.49)** (11.15)** (30.07)** (13.30)** (30.83)** 
Experience  0.0116 0.0809 0.0259 0.0912 0.0264 0.0977 0.0381 0.1036 0.0097 0.0103 0.0036 0.0064 0.0105 0.0060 
*second year  (1.98)* (19.90)** (4.18)** (19.66)** (4.39)** (20.64)** (6.20)** (22.10)** (2.49)* (2.82)** (0.87) (1.45) (2.54)* (1.35) 
Experience -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0026 
squared (3.95)** (2.64)** (4.06)** (2.63)** (3.98)** (2.63)** (3.99)** (2.63)** (8.07)** (40.94)** (9.77)** (28.97)** (11.32)** (30.12)** 
Exp_squared -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
*second year (0.44) (19.22)** (2.28)* (17.96)** (2.27)* (19.07)** (4.04)** (20.09)** (2.05)* (1.88)+ (0.52) (1.38) (2.47)* (0.72) 
Gender  0.1966 0.4697 0.2224 0.4702 0.2042 0.4704 0.2080 0.4704 0.2059 0.5052 0.2050 0.4560 0.1978 0.4296 
(male=1)  (6.14)** (19.53)** (6.87)** (19.56)** (6.41)** (19.55)** (6.44)** (19.55)** (12.31)** (35.40)** (9.79)** (21.92)** (10.02)** (19.75)** 
Gender 0.0174 0.0353 -0.0116 -0.0149 -0.0169 -0.0404 0.0266 -0.0360 -0.0235 -0.0485 -0.0092 -0.0263 0.0460 0.0046 
second year  (0.51) (1.26) (0.32) (0.47) (0.48) (1.25) (0.75) (1.12) (0.98) (1.93)+ (0.35) (0.87) (1.78)+ (0.15) 
Household  size 0.0017  0.0012  0.0013  0.0012  0.0445  0.0384  0.0459 
 (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (8.20)**  (5.81)**  (5.24)** 
HHsize* second year 0.0427  0.0381  0.0461  0.0442  -0.0033  0.0077  -0.0014 
 (4.79)**  (3.94)**  (4.06)**  (4.26)**  (0.39)  (0.70)  (0.12) 
Non_wageincome -0.0748  -0.0754  -0.0757  -0.0758  -0.2466  -0.1875  -0.1051 
 (7.54)**  (7.62)**  (7.62)**  (7.63)**  (11.03)**  (15.68)**  (9.19)** 
 
(Continued next page) 
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Table 2.5: Heckman selection model for earnings equation with the interaction terms (continued) 
Explanatory 
variables 
1998/2002 1998/2004 1998/2006 1998/2008 2002/2004 2004/2006 2006/2008 
Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection Wage  Selection 
Non_wage income -0.1713  -0.1106  -0.0299  0.0124  0.0596  0.0823  0.0418 
*second year (6.96)**  (7.05)**  (1.97)*  (1.06)  (2.34)*  (4.99)**  (3.25)** 
Constant -0.0127 -1.5178 -0.1478 -1.5143 -0.0529 -1.5145 -0.0726 -1.5142 -0.0738 -1.2933 -0.2151 -1.7248 0.0229 -1.8458 
 (0.19) (23.07)** (2.12)* (23.01)** (0.80) (22.96)** (1.03) (22.96)** (1.63) (31.90)** (3.34)** (31.71)** (0.38) (28.95)** 
Lambda () 0.1560 
(6.33)** 
 0.2250 
(8.85)** 
 0.1766 
(7.82)** 
 0.1866 
(7.16)** 
 0.1322 
(5.60)** 
 0.2055 
(7.24)** 
 0.2116 
(7.96)** 
 
Wald 2  2075.12  1990.36  2889.50  4369.98  3462.52  2448.51  3277.96  
Prob > 2 (all 
coeffs=0) 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Selectivity test 
(=0)2(1) 
39.81** 75.21** 60.03** 50.76** 31.36** 52.21** 62.98** 
Observations  29,512 101,202 10,421 41,493 10,680 41,836 10,776 41,938 33,445 101,441 14,613 42075 14,968 42,520 
Robust z statistics in parentheses (corrected for sampling weights); + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2.1: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of some main 
variables of wage earner sub-sample 
Variables 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Hourly wage rate 2.569 
(2.399) 
3.781 
(5.534) 
4.442 
(4.155) 
5.777 
(5.266) 
8.854 
(9.109) 
Years of schooling 9.180 
(3.833) 
8.216 
(4.308) 
9.779 
(3.841) 
9.854 
(3.839) 
10.044 
(3.850) 
Experience (years) 15.224 
(10.397) 
16.487 
(10.348) 
16.469 
(10.603) 
16.613 
(11.075) 
16.921 
(11.306) 
Age (years) 31.581 
(10.777) 
32.845 
(10.538) 
33.489 
(10.886) 
33.853 
(11.145) 
34.398 
(11.289) 
Non-wage earners‟ schooling 
years  
7.965 
(3.474) 
7.443 
(3.572) 
8.484 
(2.923) 
8.658 
(2.935) 
8.852 
(2.943) 
No of wage earners
(a) 
3,244 26,268 7,177 7,436 7,532 
Fraction
(b)
 of wage earners (aged 
15-60)  
15.3% 32.8% 35.2% 35.5% 36.4% 
Sources: VHLSS1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Hourly wage rates are in 1,000 Vietnam Dong, and 
in 1998 the average exchange rate was 13,765 Dong/USD, 15,244 Dong/USD in 2002, 15,705 
Dong/USD in 2004, and 15,965 in 2006, 16,481Dong/USD in 2008. 
(a)
Excluding some extreme outliers; 
(b)
Observation probability after Probit for the selection equation. 
 
Appendix 2.2: Existing studies on rates of returns to schooling in Vietnam for 
1992-1998 
Author(s) Year Coefficient Method Other controlled variables 
Glewwe & 
Patrinos 
(1998) 
1992/93 0.016 OLS 
Experience, experience 
squared, gender, types of 
school, regions  
 
Gallup (2002) 
1992/93 0.029 
OLS Experience, experience squared 
1998 0.050 
1992/93 0.019  
OLS 
Experience, experience 
squared, gender, minority, 
Chinese, non-agricultural 
employment, private, 
employer, HCMC, Hanoi 
1998 0.035 
Moock et al, 
(2003) 1992/93 0.048 OLS 
Experience, experience 
squared, log week hours 
worked 
 
Liu (2006) 
1992/93 
Male:    0.059 Heckman 
selection 
Experience, experience 
squared, married, migrant, 
urban, regions, majority, state 
employees, SOEs employees, 
industries 
Female: 0.042 
1998 
Male:    0.035 
OLS 
Female: 0.048 
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Chapter 3:  Literature review on microcredit 
 
In this chapter, the general literature on microcredit, microfinance and credit to the poor 
is reviewed. Specific literature relevant to the methodologies used will be presented in 
subsequent chapters, in turn, for each topic of the thesis. In contrast, this chapter 
reviews general concepts of microcredit and microfinance, reasons why the poor need 
microcredit, reasons for existence of informal credit in developing countries, and also 
discusses interest rates charged by microcredit providers. 
3.1 Microcredit and microfinance 
The concept of credit is not new. The history of microcredit and microfinance can be 
summarized as follows (see Helms, 2006, p. 2-5). Small, informal savings and credit 
groups were documented in 1462 in Europe, but until 1700s small loans were first lent 
to poor farmers who had no collateral. After the Second World War, especially during 
the 1950s-1970s, many countries established state-owned development banks, credit 
institutions and credit cooperatives to provide loans to small farmers in hopes of 
improving agricultural productivity and incomes. In this period, because of heavily 
subsidized credit and state intervention, most of the credit programs failed.  
 In early 1970s, experimental programs which provide small loans to the poor were 
initiated in Bangladesh, Brazil, India, and in few other countries, marking the birth of 
microcredit. In the 1980s, microcredit programs proved and asserted that the poor are 
reliable clients and willing to pay cost-recovered interest rates (Helms, 2006, p. 4). Due 
to the success of microcredit institutions like ASA, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and 
Bank Rakyat in Indonesia in reaching the poor, remaining profitable and providing 
growth opportunities in the long term, the 1990s witnessed the blossoming of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in many countries and massive attention from 
development researchers, international development agencies and networks. As a result, 
microcredit was considered an approach to eliminate poverty. Since then, the term 
microfinance, instead of microcredit, has been widely used (Helms, 2006, p. 5). The 
event of Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank from 
Bangladesh in 2006 benchmarked the roles of microcredit and microfinance in 
improving living standards for the poor and low-income households, and its position in 
the financial system. 
 Today, the term microcredit has been interchangeably used with microfinance. 
According to Robinson (2001, 2004), microcredit is defined as the extension of small 
loans to the unemployed, poor entrepreneurs, and poor households who usually lack 
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collateral or fail to meet minimum requirements for access to traditional formal credit. 
Yunus further extended the term microcredit to “loans from agricultural credit, or rural 
credit, or cooperative credit, or credit unions, or from moneylenders” (Yunus, 2006, p. 
1). Meanwhile, microfinance is a broader concept; it is defined as small-scale financial 
services to the poor and low-income households, which include consumer credit, loans, 
savings, pensions, insurance, remittances services and other basic financial 
services.
26&27
  
 Microfinance not only provides loans to poor households to generate income and 
smooth consumption but more importantly to help poor households to diversify their 
income sources, increase their financial confidence, and to manage their economic 
production more efficiently (Robinson, 2001). Thus, microfinance has been widely 
considered an innovative tool to help the poor and the poorest not only to generate 
employment and income but also to come out of poverty (Robinson, 2001). Today, 
microfinance has become a part of the financial market where formal and informal 
credit institutions extend small loans to the poor. The borders between microfinance and 
formal financial system have become blurred (Helms, 2006, p. 5). Microfinance is 
considered as a segment of the broader financial market where microfinance is the 
“lower end” or grassroots level of the broader financial system and not an isolated 
marginal sector (Nieto, 2007). For the formal financial institutions, microfinance or 
microcredit is simply an extension of small-amount-loans to the poor, low-income 
households, small entrepreneurs, the unemployed, farmers, or small traders. Today, the 
formal financial institutions increasingly move down to the “lower end” to serve large 
numbers of poorer, disadvantageous and remote clients since these clients practically 
also bring profits to them (Helms, 2006).  
3.2 Microcredit providers 
According to a microfinance handbook by Ledgerwood (1999), credit providers can be 
divided into three sectors: Formal, semi-formal and informal institutions. Formal credit 
providers are regulated by official laws and general regulations as well as specific 
regulations by central banks. They include commercial banks, development banks, 
agricultural banks, social policy banks, postal saving funds and non-bank institutions. 
Semi-formal credit providers are registered officially, based on corresponding laws and 
regulations including commercial laws, but are not regulated and controlled by central 
banks. They include credit and saving associations, credit funds, credit cooperatives, 
multiple-purpose cooperatives, NGOs and registered self-help groups. Finally, informal 
                                                 
26
 http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/about/  
27
 http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1302/  
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credit providers are not regulated by any banking laws and regulations. They include 
moneylenders, pawn-brokers, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), 
relatives, friends, neighbours, small traders and unofficial self-help groups/community 
groups.  
 Both semi-formal and informal credit providers often provide small loans and 
have quite similar operational principles (e.g. collateral-free, working within a 
geographical proximity), so they sometimes can be classified as informal credit sector 
so as to contrast with formal credit sector. The role of formal credit is often to finance 
large scale projects of firms, while the role of informal credit is to finance micro 
projects of low-income households or the poor (Bouman, 1989). Clients of informal 
credit are often unbankable households, written off by commercial banks because of 
illiteracy (low ability to repay as the banks presume) and insufficient collateral 
(Armemdariz & Morduch, 2010). Although informal credit providers are sometimes 
regarded as exploiters of the poor due to the high interest rates they charge, they do 
exist throughout human history (Pain, 2008, p. 49). They always complement formal 
credit, especially for the poor, and provide credit and other financial services to most 
poor households (Helms, 2006, p. 37). 
 About 80 percent of the 4.5 billion people living in developing countries are 
unable to have access to formal financial services, and in many countries most of the 
poor have little or no access to credit sources (Robinson, 2001, p. 11). Therefore, the 
poor have to seek substitute sources of credit from informal providers (Amin, 1989; 
Rutherford, 1999; Srinivas, 1991). This reliance on informal credit providers reflects 
several facts (Robinson, 2001, p. 186-187): First, informal credit usually offers short-
term and small loans which are matched with the demands of the poor. Second, loans 
are immediately available when needed, in a flexible manner with minimum 
documentation or even without any complicated paper requirements or collateral. Third, 
the informal credit, such as ROSCAs, also creates opportunities for the poor to save and 
to earn interests for their savings, while the formal credit institutions often ignore small 
savings.  
However, the informal credit has some controversial disadvantages: the first is 
high interest rates. For example, in many countries, informal credit providers charge 
from 10% to 100% per month (Robinson, 2001, p. 16). However, not all informal credit 
providers charge high interest rates; loans from neighbours, relatives, friends and 
mutual-help groups have low interest rates or even are interest-free. Interest rates 
charged by informal interest-earned lenders vary widely, and the degree of exploitation 
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(high interest rates) in informal credit markets declines with economic development in 
the operating areas (Robinson, 2001). For example, in some countries like Thailand, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Bolivia, moneylenders (a typical type of informal credit 
provider) charge quite low interest rates, while the lenders charge very high rates in 
other countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Malawi (Robinson, 
2001, p. 199-200). Second, informal credit providers are often able to provide limited 
amounts and for short time frames, often less than one year (Robinson, 2001, p. 187), 
that are not suitable for long term and big projects. But for household level projects, 
there is little evidence that informal funds are scarce and rejections are due to other 
reasons rather than availability of funds (Aleem, 1993, Siamwalla et al, 1993). Third, 
the lenders usually keep accounts in traditional ways and issue no legal receipts or 
documents which may lead to a failure to provide evidence when disputes arise. That is 
why informal credit activities such as ROSCAs, private money-lending, etc. are illegal 
in many countries (Robinson, 2001, p. 188). However, the lenders often work within 
small geographical areas, have good information about their borrowers or know 
borrowers‟ reputation, and have interlinks (between lenders and borrowers) and these 
factors enable them to successfully collect their loans. 
3.3 Microcredit interest rates 
Microcredit interest rates are typically higher than conventional credit rates, especially 
for informal sources like moneylenders, pawnbrokers, ROSCAs, etc. For example, a 
recent survey of 13 developing countries showed that informal credit lending rates are 
commonly between 40% and 80% per annum (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007, 2010), and 
from 10% to 100% per month in many other countries, (Robinson, 2001, p. 16). Even 
big microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as Grameen Bank charges 20% per annum, 
and other MFIs in Asia and the Pacific usually charge 30% to 70% per annum (CGAP, 
2002). 
The key principle of running any financial business including microfinance is that, 
for long run viability, revenue should cover all administration costs, costs of capital, 
risk, and increasing equity (CGAP, 2002). Only sustainable institutions are able to 
provide permanent access to their resources to hundreds of millions of clients, and they 
are therefore forced to charge higher effective-interest rates to cover all the costs and 
earn reasonable profits to survive in the long term (CGAP, 1996; Morduch, 2000). In 
practice, the poor that are excluded from formal credit providers due to insufficient 
collateral would be well served by the sustainable microfinance institutions (Morduch, 
2000).  
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On the other hand, only microcredit institutions that receive preferable sources or 
subsidies from governments and donors are able to offer low-interest-rate loans. 
However, these generally benefit only a small number of borrowers for a short period 
(CGAP, 2002). Subsidized loans have low repayment and high default rates in many 
countries such as Vietnam, India and China (Robinson, 2001) because the borrowers 
think that their loans are „gifts‟ so that there is no motivation to repay. There is an 
argument that only MFIs that stand on their feet without subsidies from governments 
and donors and follow the “win-win” proposition are able to serve more poor clients; 
these MFIs therefore have to charge high interest rates in order to cover the costs and 
earn some reasonable profit (Morduch, 2000).  
 Other reasons for microcredit providers to charge higher rates than conventional 
banks are: Costs of paperwork to make a small loan are not significantly different from 
larger loans; this leads to higher costs charged on each unit amount of small loans than 
costs for the larger loans (Morduch, 2000). In addition, poor clients often live in 
backward (geographical/physical or socially isolated) areas where infrastructure, such as 
road systems and telecommunication facilities, is poor. Thus, transaction costs are 
higher due to difficulties in administering, loan monitoring and the travel required by 
credit lenders to reach borrowers‟ places (Morduch, 2000; CGAP, 2002). This makes 
lending costly and riskier. Moreover, clients often have no collateral, low education, and 
lack legal documentation so that they are likely to be deemed greater risk (Armendariz 
& Morduch, 2010; Morduch, 2000). Consequently, the rates should be high enough to 
offset the higher likelihood of credit default. 
On the demand side, poor borrowers can accept higher rates of interest because 
they earn a higher rate of return to additional unit of capital borrowed relative to richer 
households because of decreasing returns to capital. Armendariz and Morduch (2005, 
2010) argue that the poor entrepreneurs have a higher marginal return on capital and 
thus higher ability to repay than the richer entrepreneurs. However, very high interest 
rates applied by moneylenders and pawnbrokers do not necessarily reflect higher returns 
on capital, they may reflect the urgent need for money and riskier loans. Borrowers have 
no option other than „hot‟ or „urgent‟ loans to survive today, although they may suffer 
serious destitution tomorrow. On the other hand, running businesses requires many 
things more than capital; skills, other inputs, market information, social networks, etc, 
of which the richer likely have more than the poor. In this case, the poorer borrowers 
may have lower marginal returns than richer borrowers; thus, risk-adjusted interest rates 
for the poorer clients may be lower than for the richer (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, 
2010; Morduch, 2000; Weiss & Montgomery, 2005). Furthermore, there may be 
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“insider” factor blocking capital flows from lower demand locations (low interest rate) 
to high demand locations (Klonner & Rai, 2010). These are likely causes for interest 
rate differences between the microcredit (informal) credit markets and the traditional 
(formal) credit markets. Thus, the interest disparity always exists. In other words, the 
interest rate differences between credit markets for the rich and the poor do not create 
the capital flows between them. 
Nevertheless, Fernando (2006) states that we should not consider microcredit 
interest rates too high by comparing microcredit interest rates with that of commercial 
banks because such comparisons are inappropriate because the poor sometimes have to 
pay extra money to access formal (subsidized) sources due to credit rationing and rent-
seeking practices by credit officers. If these costs are added, real interest rates of the 
loans may be much higher, and the comparison therefore may be misleading. 
In some developing countries like Vietnam, to avoid high interest rates the 
government has set up interest rate ceilings and introduced massive subsidies on interest 
rates. The consequence of this policy is that there has been a shortage in credit supply, 
and the outreach has been low for lenders (Morduch, 2000). To reach a targeted number 
of poor customers, governments have to add on to interest rate shortfall or provide 
preferred credit funding to credit lenders. As a result, the subsidized institutions have 
heavily relied on subsidies and government fund sources to keep their operations going. 
For instance, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) in 2005 received about 
USD55.38 million of subsidies for interest disparity and transaction costs, accounting 
for 51.2% of total revenue of the bank. An increasing reliance on subsidies has been 
evident over time, from 32% of total bank revenue in 2003, to 44% in 2004 and 51.2% 
in 2005.
28
 This means that self-sufficiency of the bank is about 50%, and the bank has 
had a very high rate of losses at 13.7% (i.e. return on equity is -13.7%) and the profit 
margin at -97.6% in 2006.
29
 Therefore, subsidies to microcredit institutions result in 
inefficiency in terms of operating costs per borrower, and subsidy level is strongly 
correlated with lower profit rates (Cull, Kunt, & Morduch, 2009, p. 14).  
 Interest rate ceilings may improve the affordability of financial sources for the 
poor; however, interest rate ceilings may lead to losses to microcredit providers if they 
are without subsidies from sponsors (NGOs or governments), since the regulated rates 
are not high enough to cover all costs of the loans. This will undermine viability of 
microcredit institutes in the medium and long term. Furthermore, according to Fernando 
                                                 
28
 Annual Report of VBSP, available at http://www.vbsp.org.vn/Icon_BCTN/36.gif  
29
 Microfinance – The MIX market – profile for VBSP available at 
www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.show.profile.asp?ett=2156  
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(2006, p. 5), interest rate ceilings cause a shift to more short-term loans to avoid risks 
such as high inflation. In addition, interest rate ceilings create an excess demand for 
credit, and thus result in credit rationing and rent-seeking/bribe opportunities for credit 
officers (p. 4). Finally, interest rate ceilings, if without subsidies, force the microcredit 
providers to lower their mobilisation or saving interest rates in order to survive, and the 
lower saving interest rates in turn will discourage the poor from saving (Morduch, 
2000). Interest ceilings suppress the poor‟s savings and are not the answer to improve 
access to financial services for the poor (Fernando, 2006). 
Governments‟ intervention like subsidisation and interest ceilings are associated 
with inefficiency; subsidized credit programs have failed globally (Morduch, 2000). 
They have led to high default rates, government budget deficit, undermining savings 
mobilisation, mis-targeting to richer and politically-connected entrepreneurs, and 
eventually high costs for targeted clients (p. 620). Especially, government interventions 
in subsidised credit programs have diverted cheap credit sources far away from targeted 
poor households but have brought the cheap loans to politically powerful groups of non-
poor households. This is evident in many countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and 
China (Coleman, 1999, 2006; Morduch, Park, & Wang, 1997; Nguyen, 2008). Thus, 
minimizing roles of government, especially direct involvement, is necessary to improve 
the transparency and accountability of programs and guarantee properly credit 
allocation to targeted poor and low-income households (Morduch, 2000).  
3.4 Microcredit clients 
Clients of microfinance in developing countries are the unbankable (Armemdariz & 
Morduch, 2010; Helms, 2006). They include self-employed, micro-enterprise owners, 
small farmers, street vendors, shopkeepers, small traders at marketplaces, and factory 
workers.  
 The poor can be classified as (see Helms, 2006): Destitute, extreme poor, 
moderate poor and vulnerable non-poor depending on their positions relative to the 
poverty line (a common poverty line is set at US$1/day/person). Accordingly, the 
destitute are at the bottom 10% of all the poor; from 10% to 50% are the extreme poor; 
the top 50% of households below the poverty line are called the moderate poor, and 
those who are just above the poverty line are classified as vulnerable non-poor. Not 
everyone under the poverty line is a microcredit client; most microcredit clients are the 
moderate poor and vulnerable non-poor, those are around the poverty line, while the 
destitute group or the poorest is almost excluded (Helms, 2006, p. 21). This is observed 
in many countries such as Bangladesh, Philippines, Bolivia and Uganda. The destitute 
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group are not potential clients of microcredit institutes, even of formal microcredit 
sources that are subsidised by governments or by international organisations. Since the 
likelihood of repayment of those clients is very low, the destitute group needs direct 
assistance rather than credit e.g. immediate income transfer or allowances.  
In Bangladesh, where the mass-microcredit programs, such as ASA, BRAC, 
BRDB and Grameen Bank, are more independent from government intervention and 
less subsidised, it is likely that the microfinance programs reached eligible clients, the 
poor (Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003; Armendariz & Morduch, 2005; Morduch, 2000). On 
the other hand, subsidised microcredit programs have mis-targeted the eligible clients, 
and ended up in the hands of non-poor clients because subsidies and credit allocation 
have been influenced by politically powerful groups (Morduch, 2000, p. 624). For 
example, in Vietnam, the non-poor account for a larger proportion of the program 
participants (Nguyen, 2008); in Northeast Thailand microfinance programs failed to 
target the poor, and instead the richer households benefited from the programs 
(Coleman, 2006). Eliminating subsidies may avoid the mis-targeting problem 
(Morduch, 2000). With market-level interest rates, the non-poor will not be interested in 
the program loans anymore since they will not earn an interest-disparity that is the key 
drive for them to borrow from the subsidized programs. In addition, at market interest 
rate levels, the non-poor will not borrow from the programs as the program loans are 
often small so that they do not match the non-poor‟s bigger demand. 
3.5 The roles of microfinance for the poor and low-income households 
In the essay “The poor and their money”, Rutherford (1999) shows that the poor use 
their money for three main purposes: life-cycle events, emergency needs, and income 
generation or investment. The life-cycle events include birth, marriage, funerals, 
holidays, and school fees. Emergency needs include healthcare expenditure (sickness, 
injury), labour loss, employment loss, property loss, and disasters. The investment 
involves family businesess, farming, buying land, buying household, production assets 
and inputs.  
According to Helms (2006), to sucessfully help the poor out of poverty, programs 
or policies need to enable the poor to have permenant access to credit and to have 
facilities or capacity to reduce risks. Thus, the poor need more than credit, financial 
services such as savings, money transfers, pension fund, and insurance are also needed. 
These financial services and credit will ensure stable and continuous cash flows for the 
poor currently and in future. To illustrate how the microfinance services help the poor in 
different circustances, the diagram below can shows the relationships between the poor 
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and microfinance service providers. On the left hand side are the financial 
(microfinance) services that the poor need, on the right hand side are events/occurences 
or shocks that induce demand for the microfinance services.  
Credit and other financial services help the poor expand business, diversify 
income, promote education and health, save for future, make use of financial services, 
and consequently reduce poverty and improve future livelihoods for the poor (Helms, 
2006; Littlefield et al, 2003; Robinson, 2001). 
 
Source: The photos used in this diagram are from  
http://www.uncorneredmarket.com/photos/tag/microfinance/page1/ 
Many current studies show that microfinance has a positive impact on the poor 
(Littlefield et al, 2003; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Nguyen, 2008), while other studies such 
as Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2009), Coleman (1999, 2006),  Morduch 
(1998), Roodman and Morduch (2009), Roodman (2009), and Rosenberg (2010) find 
limited evidence of the impacts. But Helms (2006) is optimistic about impacts of 
microfinance; she said “existing evidence on the impact of microfinance probably 
underestimates the value of financial services for the poor, because studies focus only 
on microcredit” (p. 32). Microfinance helps the poor not only to survive but also to plan 
for future, improve living condition, invest in healthcare and education, and to empower 
women (Helms, 2006; Littlefield et al, 2003). However, microcredit is not expected to 
work for everyone, especially for the destitute and hungry, nor work everywhere 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Helms, 2006). 
3.6 Conclusions 
Although in many developing economies there has been great progresses in economic 
development over the last 30 years, millions of the poor and low-income households, 
Credit access -
Savings -
Remittances, transfers -
Insurance -
Pensions -
- Working capital needs 
- Sickness, accident, injury
- Education, birth, marriage 
- Death, asset protection 
- Old age 
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who are just around the poverty line, rely heavily upon microcredit, especially informal 
credit, as primary sources of credit to meet their demand for credit. The existence of an 
informal credit sector in almost all of the economies around the world especially in 
developing countries is the reality and reflects the failure of formal financial markets to 
meet poor clients‟ financial needs. Understanding the determinants of access to informal 
credit and its impacts compared with the impacts of formal credit is thus an important 
topic, which the rest of this thesis addresses. 
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Chapter 4:  What determines credit participation and credit 
constraints of the poor in peri-urban areas 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Microfinance, including microcredit as the main part, and other micro financial services 
such as insurance and savings vehicles, has become a popular tool in poverty alleviation 
efforts in developing countries (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Microcredit Summit, 
2004). The poor have inadequate access to formal credit resources because of barriers 
imposed by lenders and relatively high transaction costs for small-size loans that 
discourage lending to the poor (e.g. Khandker, 2005; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; 
Microcredit Summit, 2007). Thus, a sizeable proportion of poor households are almost 
certain to borrow from the informal credit sector (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007, 2010). In 
Vietnam, the poor typically fail to meet the formal credit requirements, and hence find it 
difficult to access formal credit. Recent studies show that in 2002 the informal credit 
sector provided approximately 50% of the total credit to the poor and low income 
households (IFC, 2006; VDR,
30
 2004).  
The success of microcredit in alleviating poverty first depends on credit 
participation and credit constraints. The existing empirical evidence on determinants of 
credit participation and credit constraints is well established for rural areas (Barslund & 
Tarp, 2007; Diagne, 1999; Diagne, Zeller, & Sharma, 2000; Izumida & Pham, 2002; 
Nguyen, 2007; Thaicharoen, Ariyapruchya, & Chucherd, 2004), and for western 
countries (Avai & Toth, 2001; Chen & Chivakul, 2008; Crook, 2001; Crook & 
Hochguertel, 2005; Crook & Hochguertel, 2007; Del-Rio & Young, 2005; Margi, 
2002). In contrast, investigation into determinants of credit participation and credit 
constraints for peri-urban households, in Vietnam and elsewhere, is rare.  
Lack of analysis for peri-urban areas probably results from a belief that in these 
areas financial services are available to everyone. This may not be true, as the poor in 
developing countries who migrate to cities often dwell in peri-urban areas and usually 
rely on credit to smooth their consumption expenditure.
31
 Unlike the rural poor who can 
increase labour earnings via off-farm work, reduce purchased other inputs and use more 
self-produced products when they face shocks, the urban or peri-urban poor cannot have 
the same coping strategies (Kochar, 1995). Most of the urban and peri-urban poor are 
                                                 
30
 Vietnam Development Report  
31
 For example, data from HCMC Statistical Office show that population growth rates are 2.7% and 82% 
for urban districts and peri-urban districts over the last 12 years (1997-2009), respectively. These data are 
available at 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2000/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0203.htm/view, and 
http://www.pso.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/so_lieu_ktxh/2009/Dan_so_va_lao_dong/0201.htm/view 
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unskilled and involved in the informal sector; most of them tend to work casually as 
wage or daily workers (Rashid, 2000, p. 247). During adverse (e.g. disaster, economic) 
shocks, work opportunities and wages reduce, so households are unable to offset the 
income decline by sending more members to labour markets or by increasing the 
number of working hours (Fallon & Lucas, 2002; McKenzie, 2004; Rashid, 2000). 
Therefore, to fill the income shortage, credit would become important in these areas, 
especially for the poor who have low savings (Skoufias, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
determinants of credit participation and credit constraints for the poor in these areas 
remain unknown. 
This gap in the current literature prompts the current study to search for answers 
to the following questions: First, does the presence of financial institutions fully offer 
the peri-urban poor access to credit resources? Second, what are determinants of credit 
constraints and credit participation by the poor? Third, is the credit market segmented, 
even just amongst the poor, in the peri-urban areas? 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides theoretical 
background. Section 4.3 discusses the analysis framework. Empirical results are 
presented in Section 4.4. The final section offers a summary. 
4.2 Theoretical background 
Although the concept of credit access and participation has been used interchangeably 
in the literature, access to credit differs from credit participation. Access to credit means 
a household is both able to borrow, thanks to credit availability, and can satisfy lending 
criteria, including interest rate levels, established by lenders; regardless of whether they 
borrow or not. On the other hand, credit participation means that a household has 
chosen to borrow and has already borrowed, even the borrowed amounts may be at the 
market clearance point (or optimal point) or any points below the below the market 
clearance point if without interest subsidies.  A household that has participated in 
borrowing activities has, of course, access to particular credit resources, whereas a 
household having access to credit may choose whether or not to participate in 
borrowing activities.  
According to Diagne (1999, p. 7), credit participation is more related to potential 
borrowers‟ choice (demand-side), whereas credit access is more from the supply-side 
and related to potential lenders‟ choice. Therefore, the concept of credit access closely 
links to credit constraints. Full credit access implies no constraints imposed by lenders. 
Likewise, limited credit access means some forms of credit constraints being imposed. 
As a result, to examine factors determining demand for credit should model credit 
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participation, while factors determining credit supply should be components of credit 
constraints if credit resources are unlimited. 
There are two approaches to investigate household credit participation and credit 
constraints: the demand for consumption smoothing and the analysis of determining 
factors. The first approach has been widely used to examine how smooth household 
consumption is during adverse income shocks, and the ways by which households can 
cope with risks. Although the current research does not have data to test the 
consumption smoothing theory, the consumption smoothing approach helps to explain 
why households need credit and why households are credit constrained. Once we 
learned why households need credit transaction and why household are credit 
constrained, the second approach is employed to determine factors affecting household 
credit participation and constraints. I shall discuss these approaches in turn. 
4.2.1 Consumption smoothing approach 
In the consumption smoothing approach, there are two ways to explain the existence of 
credit transactions: the permanent income hypothesis and community risk 
pooling/sharing.  
First, the permanent income hypothesis: according to Friedman (1957), any 
change in consumption caused by shocks to income (transitory income) could be 
smoothed sufficiently by borrowing under perfect capital markets,
32
 because households 
will try to maximize their utility over the life cycle by borrowing when having 
transitory low income and by saving when having transitory high income. Thus, 
demand for household credit is derived from the demand for smoothing consumption 
against the income shocks. The violation of assumptions of perfect capital markets in 
developing countries where the financial markets are heavily distorted by asymmetric 
information problems, however, could be a reason to justify the existence of credit 
constraints and credit rationing (Conning & Udry, 2007; Morduch, 1995). Therefore, 
under imperfect financial markets, consumption is not completely smoothed (Dercon & 
Krishnan, & Studiën, 2000; Duflo & Udry, 2004; Goldstein, 2004). Dependence of 
consumption on not only permanent income but also transitory income implies that 
households are not able to borrow sufficiently to fill the income gap caused by adverse 
shocks; thus, under this condition the households are credit-constrained (Morduch, 
1995, p. 107).  
                                                 
32
 The theory says that both household income and consumption consists of permanent and transitory 
components; while permanent components of income and consumption are positively related, there is no 
correlation between transitory components or between either transitory component and the permanent 
component of the other variable. Therefore, a temporary change in income (i.e. transitory income) would 
have no effect on consumption. 
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However, the violation of the permanent income hypothesis could result from not 
only credit constraints but also household precautionary behaviour (Deaton, 1991; 
Morduch, 1990; Paxson, 1992). Household savings, other accumulated assets, external 
assistance and remittances or cash transfers could be effective absorbers of the income 
shocks which help to keep household consumption smoothed even if the household is 
credit-constrained (Deaton, 1991; Kurosaki, 2006). In such cases, demand for credit 
would not be derived directly from demand for consumption smoothing, and the credit 
constraints could not necessarily be inferred from tests for consumption smoothing.  
Moreover, many households, especially the poor, may not have enough savings. 
Such households may want to spend money today rather than waiting until tomorrow; 
and this approach to spending makes credit constraints more persistent (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2005, p. 193). And of course, no savings means no accumulated assets. 
Armendariz and Morduch argue that credit constraints may be explained by the 
existence of saving constraints.  
In addition, in many developing countries, a significant proportion of the 
population is not insured or is inadequately insured. Many governments are not able to 
afford safety nets for their citizens to help them mitigate adverse shocks. Therefore, 
adverse health shocks to non-working members of households, which do not directly 
affect household income, will still generate credit demand if the households have 
inadequate savings to pay healthcare bills (Kochar, 1995). Consequently, credit 
constraints may occur if the households are not able to borrow sufficiently. 
In addition, in developing countries the demand for credit is not only for coping 
with income shortage, but also for financing household economic activities; under 
imperfect financial markets, the credit constraints may exist if the households are not 
able to borrow adequately to meet the demand for production capital. The credit demand 
would be greater if households either have larger production projects or face adverse 
shocks to their production activities such as animal death, harvest loss, drought, 
flooding, and other disasters; hence households need more capital to enlarge or restore 
their production. 
The community relationship and risk pooling/sharing: is another channel of 
adverse shock absorption and risk sharing. To see how changes in current income affect 
household consumption, and how completely a community shares the risks, we consider 
the following equation (Townsend, 1995, p. 90). 
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where y
i
 and c
i
 are income and consumption of household i respectively, g is the group 
(village or community), and  is the error term. The dependent variable is the 
consumption change for a particular household. The main explanatory variables of 
equation (4.1) are: the first component is mean consumption change for the community 
or risk-pooling group, and the second component is the idiosyncratic income change for 
a particular household, and the last is any other shocks. If the risk sharing (pooling) is 
complete, the coefficient of group consumption will be one (β=1), and the coefficient of 
idiosyncratic household income will be zero (=0). 
Empirically, β is often smaller than one and  is greater than zero; it implies the 
risk sharing is substantial, but less than perfect (Townsend, 1995, Table 2). This fact 
rejects the hypothesis of full risk-sharing because  is greater than zero. The higher  is 
the less complete is insurance by risk-pooling community/group; changes in household 
consumption are more associated with changes in current household income. For 
instance, Townsend (1995, p. 93-94) shows that the coefficient of risk-sharing is lower 
for the greater Bangkok region than for other poorer regions in Thailand because the 
consumption changes of the households in Bangkok are highly correlated with their 
own idiosyncratic income shocks, but less correlated with pooling of risk among their 
community. On the other hand, households in rural (poorer) areas have better risk-
sharing than their counterparts in urban areas since the changes in village‟s average 
consumption affects household‟s consumption through borrowing transactions and other 
mutual help (Townsend, 1994).  
Furthermore, Townsend (1994) finds that household consumption co-moves with 
village average consumption, but is not much influenced by current household income, 
sickness, unemployment, and other household idiosyncratic shocks. He also finds that 
responses to changes in income in order to smooth consumption could be borrowing 
activities from the community or banks. Moreover, responses to household income 
fluctuations are credit transactions rather than sales of assets (Lim & Townsend, 1994; 
Townsend, 1994).  
Kochar (1995, 1999) argues that income shocks do not necessarily require credit 
participation because households are able to prevent the decline of household income by 
increasing labour earnings and reducing other inputs. On the other hand, income 
fluctuations caused by demographic shocks (e.g. death, sickness) can only be smoothed 
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by using credit and depleting non-financial assets since households have lost potential 
earning labour. Kurosaki (2006, p. 75) provides evidence that villagers in Pakistan used 
credit, especially informal credit, as the most important mechanism to cope with adverse 
income shocks. 
Furthermore, the demand for insurance and credit is high in most low-income 
economies (Morduch, 1995, p. 105) because income is not only low but also unstable. 
Households become vulnerable when consumption declines after adverse income 
shocks. In well-functioning markets, households may not be vulnerable to income 
shocks because all risks should be diversified away, hence idiosyncratic or transitory 
shocks should have no impact on consumption. Households can borrow or save to fill 
up or send off the changes in their income, therefore, consumption smoothing is 
complete. When credit markets are imperfect, households are constrained in their ability 
to obtain credit, and the effect of transitory income on consumption would help explain 
unsmoothed consumption.  
In short, the response to consumption fluctuations is complex. It can be 
community risk sharing, production diversification, labour earnings, external assistance, 
sales of accumulated assets, and borrowing. Labour income may be one of the solutions, 
but it is ineffective in conditions of inadequate employment (both wage and self-
employment) during economic downturn/crises (McKenzie, 2004); credit access is the 
other absorber of the shocks. However, capital market imperfection may result in 
imperfect risk sharing and credit constraints. 
4.2.2 Analysis of determining factors approach  
This approach to investigating credit participation and credit constraints uses household 
information, such as physical and human capital endowments, in a reduced-form 
regression equation, to identify the determinants of credit participation and constraints 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2007; Chen & Chivakul, 2008; Crook & Hochguertel, 2005, 2007; 
Diagne, Zeller & Sharma, 2000; Jappelli, 1990; Zeller, 1994). Most of the studies define 
credit-constrained households as the rejected applicants and discouraged households. 
Kedir, Ibrahim, and Torres (2007) add another group of households; those who are lent 
an amount less than the amount they demanded (borrower‟s optimum amount). 
However, few of the studies define precisely the credit-unconstrained households. They 
implicitly treat all households who did not borrow as credit-constrained; but in fact, 
some households did not borrow because they had enough resources. These households 
should be considered credit-unconstrained.  
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Credit participation (demand-side factors) should be determined by borrowers‟ 
demand for credit and their creditworthiness, which is used as criteria to sort out clients 
by the lenders. Therefore, factors determining credit participation should represent 
either borrowers‟ demand for credit or borrowers‟ creditworthiness. If borrowers are 
from the general population rather than just from poor households, better endowments 
(physical and human resources - components of creditworthiness) may enable the 
households to participate in borrowing activities (Johnston & Morduch, 2007). For 
example, income, farm size, land and house value, other durable and fixed assets, 
education, household size or labour force, occupation and ages are important 
determinants of credit participation (Crook, 2001; Del-Rio & Young, 2005; Diagne, 
1999; Izumida & Pham, 2002; Margi, 2002; Nguyen, 2007).  
On the other hand, if focusing on poor households, the above determinants may 
play other roles in explaining credit participation. They could be driving demand factors 
rather than components of creditworthiness. For example, physical endowments (e.g. 
assets/land) and human endowments (e.g. education) have a negative relationship with 
credit participation (Khandker, 2001; Khandker, 2005; Thaicharoen, Ariyapruchya, & 
Chucherd, 2004).  
The different determinants of credit participation for different groups of borrowers 
imply that the credit markets in developing countries are segmented. The lenders may 
apply different strategies to screen applications and evaluate clients‟ creditworthiness 
for different credit segments (Conning & Udry, 2005, p. 7). 
Credit constraint (supply-side factors) is the typical feature of the credit market in 
developing countries (Conning & Udry, 2005). Potential borrowers are often excluded, 
discouraged, rejected, or rationed to smaller loans relative to what they might have 
optimally demanded. Potential borrowers are systematically sorted out due to their low 
endowments.  
Determinants of credit constraints would better represent barriers to credit markets 
than those of credit participation because credit constraints reflect obstacles on the 
credit supply side that block borrowers from accessing credit sources. Thus, the factors 
affecting credit constraints are components of lending criteria, and are often used by the 
lenders to evaluate their clients‟ creditworthiness in order to sort out potential 
borrowers. Factors such as age, income, assets, education, occupation, and borrowing 
experience are empirically found to be significant determinants of credit constraints 
(Avai & Toth, 2001; Chen & Chivakul, 2008; Crook & Hochguertel, 2005, 2007; Kedir 
et al, 2007; Jappelli, 1990; Zeller, 1994).  
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In addition, in many poor countries, especially in rural areas where real estate 
markets are rigid due to asymmetric information problems and difficulties in enforcing 
contracts (Morduch, 1995), the fixed assets are often under-valued. As a result, fixed 
assets such as land and dwellings may not be important determinants of credit 
constraints and credit rationing. For example, Zeller (1994) shows that physical 
collateral plays an insignificant role in credit rationing in both informal and formal 
credit markets. Even in urbanised areas, where the real estate markets function better, 
lack of legal documents for household property would also cause lenders to not accept 
the pledge of the fixed assets as collateral or else they substantially undervalue the 
assets when they are lodged as collateral.   
Another obstacle to borrowing involves invisible barriers such as complicated or 
ambiguous procedures. These discourage potential borrowers, especially the poor, who 
are likely to have little education and limited social networks. Further, many households 
“fear” commercial banks and civil servants when they deal with them to have 
documentation completed for borrowing from formal credit suppliers. Consequently, 
poorer households may treat the banks and civil servants as alien entities, so the close 
geographical proximity fails to help the urban poor access formal credit. For example, 
Barslund and Tarp (2007) find that in Vietnam distance to nearest banks has no effect 
on credit rationing. It is likely that nearby households are not impeded by the distance to 
the banks, but are probably blocked by the invisible obstacle of complicated procedures. 
Therefore, improving education and simplifying lending procedures may be necessary 
to mitigate credit constraints.  
4.3 Analytical framework
33
  
4.3.1 Models for the probability of credit participation and credit constraints 
In this study, the aim is to determine possible factors affecting credit participation and 
credit constraints. Credit participation and credit constraints are binary variables where 
participating in credit (or being credit-constrained) takes a value of one, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, to estimate the probability of credit participation and credit constraints 
when dependent variable Y equals one given a set of explanatory variables xi, the Probit 
model is employed. The Probit model is written as follows. 
p(Y=1| x1, x2, …,,xk)= (z)= (+.x1  + .x2 + …+xk ) 
where pj is the outcome of the dummy (0-1) variable for the jth observation,  is the 
standard cumulative normal, xj is the vector of explanatory variables for observation j 
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 Sample design and data collection were discussed in Section 1.7 of Chapter 1. 
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and  is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. The Probit coefficients are not 
directly interpretable, but marginal effects for continuous variables could be calculated 
(at the mean) as: 
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where xk is a vector of independent variable (k is the number of independent variables), 
 is the vector of estimated coefficients, and is the normal density function. For 
dummy variables, the discrete change in probability when the dummy variable switches 
from zero to one is calculated as )()( 01  xx   where xxx  01  except that the 
ith elements of 1x  and 0x  are set to one and zero respectively (StataCorp, 1997). 
The current literature suggests using physical and human capital endowment as 
explanatory variables to predict the probability of credit participation and credit 
constraints. Therefore, the Probit models include the household head‟s gender, age, 
education, marital status, household size,
34
 pre-survey income per capita,
35
 pre-survey 
assets (land/house/durable assets),
36
 a dummy variable for phone ownership,
37
 location 
dummies, and distance to nearest bank.
38
 Effects of other borrowing neighbours may 
affect the probability of credit participation and constraints because neighbouring 
households are likely to share information and borrowing experiences. So the 
proportion of borrowing neighbours within a radius of one kilometre of each respondent 
is used as a proxy for information flows.
39
 Accordingly, the model for credit 
participation is as follows: 
BORROWERij =  + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j  + ij   (4.2) 
where BORROWERij is a binary variable representing whether household i in ward j 
borrowed (1) or not (0). X1ij is a vector of household characteristics and X2ij is the 
                                                 
34
 The number of under-18-year old children and number of older-than-60-year old members are collinear 
with household size. However, the ratios of various age groups to total household size may not collinear 
with household size, thus I ran a regression with ratio of children to household size and ratio of the older-
than 60 years old members to household size, but the estimates are statistically insignificant. As a result, I 
dropped the variables. 
35
 The income was collected by the District 9 Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in 
collaboration with the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Unit of each ward in the district from 
December 2005 to January 2006 in order to classify poor households who are eligible for receiving 
assistance including preferred loans from the HEPRF. 
36
 I use only assets acquired over 24 months prior to my survey (rather than all assets) and pre-survey 
income (rather than current expenditure) to avoid possible endogeneity and reverse causality.  
37
 I use the dummy as a proxy for information access; I do not classify phones as durable assets because 
recently phones, especially landline phones, are given free by the service suppliers. Subscribers have to 
pay connection fees, monthly fixed charge and actual call charges. 
38
 To avoid the collinearity between ward dummy and the distance, the interactions between the distance 
and ward dummy are used instead of the distance itself. 
39
 Alternatively, borrowing neighbours may cause a crowding-out effect because they could be potential 
competitors when credit resources are limited. 
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physical endowment of household i in ward j, while X3 is a vector of ward-level 
characteristics. These include the proportion of borrowing households within a radius of 
one kilometre and the distance to the nearest bank within a ward. 
In equation (4.2), all borrowers are treated the same in the sense that there is no 
difference between those who borrowed from formal credit sources and those who 
borrowed from informal credit suppliers. However, it is possible that segmented 
markets may exist causing the determinants of who can borrow from formal credit to be 
distinct from the determinants of who can access only informal credit. As a result, 
multinomial models may help to uncover the roles of each factor in segmented credit 
markets. Accordingly, the model can be as follows: 
SPECIFIED_BORROWERij =  + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j ij   (4.3) 
where SPECIFIED_BORROWERij is a multinomial variable representing whether a 
household i in ward j did not borrow (N), or borrowed from the informal credit only (I), 
or from both the informal and formal credit (B), or from the formal credit only (F). Xis 
are the same as previously defined.  
The results of equation (4.3) are reported as the Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). For 
example, for binary independent variables, suppose beta () is for the head‟s gender (1, 
0 for male and female respectively), then to get the RRR: 
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where e
1
, e
2
, and e
3
 is RRR of household head‟s gender of corresponding outcome Y1, 
Y2, and Y3. 
For a continuous variable (e.g. head‟s age),40 the RRR (or eis obtainedas follows: 
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To examine the determinants of credit constraints, the following model is used: 
CONSTRAINTij = 0 + X1ij 1 + X2ij  + X3j  + ij  (4.4) 
                                                 
40
 If continuous variables in log form, we now are measuring the marginal increase in the RRR ratios for 
100% increase in X at the mean. 
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where CONSTRAINTij is a binary variable representing whether household i in ward j 
is credit-constrained (1) or not (0). Credit-constrained households include rejected 
households, discouraged households, and partial borrowers; credit-unconstrained 
households consist of full borrowers and other households who do not want to borrow 
because they have sufficient resources to meet their demand for credit. Xis are the same 
as defined in credit participation modelling. 
4.3.2 Tobit Type 2 model for credit amount received 
Regarding credit amounts received, the dependent variable is continuous and can vary 
between zero (for non-borrowers) and a certain positive value. Therefore, in this case 
the Tobit model provides an appropriate estimator (Verbeek, 2004).  
Let Y* denote credit amount borrowed, and Zi is vector of explanatory variables, the 
estimation equation is postulated as follows: 
Yi* = Zi + ui  ui  ~ NID(0, σ
2
) 
However, for a large number of households the credit amount is zero; Tobin (1958) 
suggests the following model: 
Yi =  .Zi + ui    if  Yi* > 0      for households with credit amount is positive, and 
0       if  Yi* ≤ 0     for households with credit amount is zero 
 A shortcoming of standard Tobit model regression is that the model may produce 
biased and inconsistent estimates if heteroscedasticity exists (Amemiya, 1984; Johnston 
& Dinardo, 1997, p. 441). To overcome the problem, a Tobit Type 2 model, which can 
account for heteroscedasticity, is used. The model is implemented by using the interval 
regression estimator, which is a generalisation of the Tobit model, where responses can 
be point data, interval data, left-censored or right-censored. The error terms of the 
regression are presumed to be normally distributed, and the log likelihood function is as 
follows: 
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where ( ) is the standard cumulative normal and wj is the sampling weight for the jth 
observation. The vector of parameters of interest,   plus , are chosen to maximize the 
likelihood by a modified Newton-Raphson routine. For Lj  the data are left-censored, 
where the unobserved yj is only known to be less than or equal to the threshold yLj.  For 
Rj  the data are right-censored, with the unobserved yj only known to be greater than 
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or equal to the threshold yRj. The other Ij  observations are intervals, where all that is 
known is that the unobserved yj is in the interval ].,[ 21 jj yy  In the current case, the data 
of credit amounts received are left-censored, the unobserved yi is known to be equal to 
zero for non-borrowing. 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Main features of poor households’ credit 
As a preview to the econometric results, a general overview of poor households‟ credit 
in the peri-urban study areas of HCMC is provided. Formal credit provides 55% of 
credit (Table 4.1), which is mainly credit resources from government subsidised sources 
such as Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), social political organisations, the Job 
Creation Support Fund (JCSF) and the Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Fund 
(HEPRF). These lenders provide „preferred‟ or sometimes called „soft‟ or „subsidised‟ 
loans (low interest rate and easy lending conditions), and are the main sources of credit 
accounting for 51% of the total loans to the poor in the peri-urban areas (Table 4.2). 
However, the informal credit sector still plays a substantial role in providing 
credit to the poor; approximately 45% of loans, albeit of a smaller average value than 
formal loans. Amongst informal credit providers, mutual help amongst relatives, friends 
and neighbours provide more than one third of all loans. The Rotating Saving and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs), private moneylenders and pawnbrokers only provide 
8.4% of total loans to the poor (Table 4.2). This low share may be because interpersonal 
trust and social ties are weak in peri-urban and urban areas (Allcott et al, 2007; 
Debertin, n.d; Hofferth & Iceland, 1998). 
Interest rates for the poor‟s loans vary widely, from 0.78% per month on average 
for the formal credit to 2.14% (about 26% per year) for the informal sector with a large 
standard deviation of 5.9% (Table 4.2). The interest rate for informal credit is high 
compared to formal credit, but still lower than in many other developing countries. For 
example, a survey of 13 developing countries by Banerjee and Duflo (2007, 2010) 
shows that informal credit lenders charged annual rates of 40% to 80% per annum. 
However, when loans from friends, relative and neighbours that are almost interest-free 
are excluded, the informal lenders charge very high interest rates at 11.3% per month or 
about 130% per year, higher than in many other developing countries. According to 
another survey by Conning and Udry (2005, p. 8), informal credit lenders charge 
interest at 40% to 120% annually in Pakistan, 20% to 120 % in India, 24% to 84% in 
rural Thailand, and over 90% annually in Nigeria. 
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Table 4.3 shows that the main purpose of the loans taken by the poor in the peri-
urban areas is for non-production (73.4%). Consumption expenditure such as food, 
school fees and healthcare accounts for about 64% of total loans. On the other hand, 
only a quarter (in terms of both number of loans and loan value) is used for small 
production and businesses. This usage pattern is similar to the pattern found by Kedir et 
al (2007) in urban Ethiopia, but is much different from typical loan usage patterns in 
rural areas (Barslund & Tarp, 2007; Johnson & Morduch, 2007). 
Table 4.4 shows the incidence of credit participation and credit constraints. Less 
than 10% of households had sufficient capital and did not want to borrow. Another 10% 
were discouraged from seeking capital. Amongst those households seeking credit in the 
24 months prior to my survey, 43.8% of all households had borrowed sufficiently, 30% 
borrowed amounts less than the value they demanded, and 7.5% were denied by credit 
providers. Overall, three quarters of the surveyed households borrowed in the 24 
months prior to the survey (304 households).
41
 Almost all households had loans in both 
periods; 0-12 months and 12-24 months prior to the survey.  
For credit participation, I simply treated households as borrowers if they had at 
least one loan during the 24 months prior to the survey, and otherwise they were 
classified as non-borrowers. Meanwhile, potential borrowers are often excluded, 
discouraged, rejected, or rationed to smaller loans relative to what they might have 
optimally demanded; these potential borrowers are deemed credit-constrained. 
Accordingly, the number of credit-constrained households, unconstrained households, 
and credit participants were estimated and presented in Table 4.4. Although there are 
more than ten banks and credit institutions in the surveyed areas, the poor are highly 
credit-constrained (48% of the surveyed households). Since approximately 45% of the 
poor‟s loans were from the informal credit sector, and the poor might have been 
excluded from the formal credit, I could regard them as the formal credit-constrained. If 
that is true, the incidence of credit constraints would be higher than the current 
estimates suggest. 
Finally, Table 4.5 provides some preliminary information about differences 
between borrowers and non-borrowers. Overall, the borrowers and non-borrowers are 
no different in terms of occupations, gender, education, and marital status of the 
household head, access to internet/newspapers, TV/radio ownership, initial income, and 
assets acquired more than 24 months prior to the survey. However, the borrowers are 
                                                 
41
 Households often borrowed more than one loan, some loans during the past 12 months, some loans 
somewhere between 12 and 24 months prior to the survey. 
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younger, have bigger households and more young household members, and own fewer 
assets acquired during the two years preceding the survey.  
Figure 4.1: Study household and financial facility locations in District 9 
 
Note: DongNai River is a large river and there is no bridge between District 9 and other side 
(DongNai province) of the river. All banks and credit institutions in the district appear in the 
green pentagons. 
  
To city centre (16 km) 
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In addition, borrowers tend to dwell in more rural wards and further away from 
markets and banks. We used GPS receivers to collect data on coordinates of each 
household and facility such as bank branch and market in order to estimate distance 
from each household to the nearest market and nearest bank. Figure 4.1 shows that there 
are many bank branches and credit institutions in the urban wards (or nearby) of Tang 
Nhon Phu A (TNPA) and Phuoc Binh (PB), while only one bank branch in the rural 
ward of Long Truong (LT) and no bank branch in (or nearby) the other surveyed rural 
ward of Long Phuoc (LP). Similarly for market presence, only one market in each rural 
ward, but many in urban wards or nearby. Clearly, the proximity to financial institutions 
does not help the poor to have access to credit. Other barriers rather than the proximity 
may play a role in obstructing the poor on the way to obtaining credit. 
4.4.2 Determinants of credit participation by the poor: An econometric analysis 
4.4.2.1 The Probit estimates 
Estimates from probit models of the determinants of credit participation are presented in 
Table 4.6. Because of highly heterogeneous population density across the wards and 
possible multicollinearity between ward dummies and distance to the nearest banks 
(which vary mainly by ward), three separate estimation models are reported. 
The estimates reveal several determinants of credit participation by the poor in 
peri-urban areas. Households with older heads and those currently married have a lower 
probability of borrowing. The fact is that households with unmarried-heads have 
smaller household size and have to borrow to smooth consumption when they have 
adverse shocks because they have lower ability to increase income from labour (Kochar, 
1995, 1999). Indeed, the estimates show that larger households are more likely to be 
borrowers, perhaps because they maybe have lower credit risks because they have more 
relationships with community and more diversified sources of income (Schreiner & 
Nagarajan, 1998). It is also the case that initially richer households are more likely to be 
borrowers. The pre-survey income per capita, which is closely associated with labour 
income of the poor, has a significantly positive impact on credit participation. In 
addition, phone ownership that represents household wealth through the ability to afford 
phone bills and connection fees, and represents better conditions to communicate and 
maintain social networks, also positively influences credit participation (Table 4.6). In 
contrast, total values of fixed assets such as house, land,
42
 and other durable asset 
acquired over the 24 months prior to the survey have no impacts on borrowing (Table 
4.6, columns 1, 2 and 3). The poor in peri-urban areas often lack or have incomplete 
                                                 
42
 No single household acquired land and house within the last 24 months from the survey. 
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legal documentation for the assets, e.g. land-use right certificates and house ownership 
certificates (Kim, 2004) because they do not have money to pay fees and do not know 
how and where to get the certificates done, hence the assets are unable to be lodged as 
collateral for their desired loans. 
There is no gender bias in microcredit participation in the peri-urban areas, 
contrast to what is found in rural Vietnam by Barslund and Tarp (2007) and Nguyen 
(2007). My results also show that education of household heads does not significantly 
influence credit participation. The poor‟s household heads in my survey have low 
education, only 5.5 years of schooling compared to 8.9 years of schooling for general 
household parents in Vietnam surveyed in 2006 (VHLSS, 2006). Moreover, these poor 
household heads usually work in unskilled sectors, such as small trade, factory workers, 
housewives and casual workers, where education is not rewarded well. My finding is 
contrary to other studies from other developing countries where education has an 
important role in credit participation (Swain, 2007; Zeller, 1994). 
Households‟ dwelling location is an important determinant of credit market 
participation in the peri-urban areas. Almost all loans by the poor are small, collateral-
free, and mainly based on social capital or interpersonal trust. Households in the more 
rural parts of the peri-urban area have better social capital than more urban households, 
thus they have higher likelihood of credit participation. This is shown by the 
significantly positive coefficients on the two rural wards, Long Truong (LT) and Long 
Phuoc (LP), in column 1 of Table 4.6.
43
 When exploring the role of distance within each 
ward, in the rural ward of LT, households that are far away from the nearest bank (also 
far away from the ward centre where households are more urban) are also found more 
likely to borrow (Figure 4.2).
44
 This re-confirms the role of social relationship and 
interpersonal trust in credit transactions in peri-urban areas. 
                                                 
43
 Inclusion of distance to nearest market (interacted with ward dummies) in the models gives the similar 
result as distance to nearest bank, thus I do not report results of the regression with the distance to nearest 
market. 
44
 In LT ward, households living far away from the centre are rural household farmers or casual workers, 
while households near the ward centre are small traders, grocery shop keepers. In LP ward, all households 
are involved in rural economic activities. 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities of credit participation by distance to the nearest 
bank 
 
The data exploration shows that most borrowing households (56%) in urban 
wards (TNPA and PB) borrowed from the formal (subsidised) credit channels, in 
contrast, most borrowing households in rural wards (LT and LP) borrowed from the 
informal credit sector. This means that the more rural poor households rely more on 
informal credit, whereas their more urban counterparts rely on government subsidised 
funds. 
The impact of distance to the nearest banks and main sources of the poor‟s credit 
in rural and urban areas could imply that households far away from ward centres 
(dwelling in rural countryside) could have better community relationships and 
interpersonal trust; better social capital helps to ease access to informal credit sources, 
such as relatives, neighbours, friends, and other providers who mainly lend money on 
the basis of interpersonal trust rather than collateral. 
The proportion of borrowing neighbours influences negatively and significantly 
the likelihood of borrowing in urban wards (TNPA and PB), but not in rural wards (LT 
and LP) (Table 4.6, column 2). This implies that households in urban areas compete 
against their neighbours in accessing limited credit resources from subsidised funds, but 
this is not the case in the rural wards because the poor there rely more on informal 
credit. 
In summary, household size, younger households, initial income, phone 
ownership, and living in more rural countryside areas are important determinants of 
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credit participation by the peri-urban poor. On the other hand, gender, education and 
assets do not matter in credit participation of poor households. Further, households in 
rural wards with presumably better relationships and interpersonal trust have advantages 
in accessing credit, especially informal credit. Competition by other borrowing 
neighbours in accessing credit resources, especially subsidised funds, is also an 
influential factor for credit participation by the poor in urban areas. 
4.4.2.2 Tobit Type 2 for loan amounts received by the poor 
The Tobit model estimates in Table 4.7 reveal some key findings: First, gender does not 
really matter in credit participation as found and discussed in the preceding section, but 
it plays a role in explaining loan size. Male-headed households received lower amounts 
of loans than female-headed households. The finding is contrary to the common trend in 
developing countries because females are often involved in small businesses which need 
smaller loans (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, p. 181); however, in peri-urban areas 
loans are mainly used for non-production so the type of business activity of females 
may matter less for loan size. 
Second, the age of household heads has a slightly positive effect on loan size. The 
older households tend to receive greater loans, with a maximum at about 46 years old. 
Very young or very old headed-households have a smaller labour force, and hence have 
lower ability to earn and repay.
45
 Therefore, they may be lent smaller amounts, or they 
themselves favour smaller loans to fit with their demand and ability to repay.  
Third, the initial income per capita and household sizes are important 
determinants of loan size because an increase in household size would help to increase 
labour income and diversify income sources (Schreiner & Nagarajan, 1998), and also 
increase demand for consumption. Finally, education level of household heads, head‟s 
marital status, assets acquired prior to borrowing, location dummies, distance to the 
nearest banks and the proportion of borrowing neighbours make no significant 
difference to loan sizes. 
4.4.2.3 The Multinomial Logit estimates for credit participation  
The binary Probit models help examine the roles of household characteristics and 
endowments in credit participation regardless of credit sources and of possibly different 
roles of each factor in specified credit market segments. Pooling credit market segments 
would conceal the roles of each factor. Therefore, to provide more nuanced insights, the 
surveyed households are classified into four groups: Non-borrowing, borrowing from 
                                                 
45
 Scatter plot of household size against head‟s age or regression household size on head‟s age and head‟s 
age squared give a clear inverse U-shaped relationship between household size and head‟s age.  
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informal credit, borrowing from formal credit, and borrowing from both informal and 
formal credit. The Multinomial Logit model (MNL) is then employed to examine 
factors influencing the probability of specified credit participation.  
Amongst 411 households, 26.0% of the surveyed households did not borrow, 
23.6% borrowed from only informal sources, 25.3% borrowed from only formal 
sources, and 26.0% borrowed from both formal and informal credit. The purpose of the 
MNL model is to compare each outcome probability with the base outcome of the non-
borrower group. The estimates are presented in Table 4.8, in the form of the relative risk 
ratios (RRR).  
Household heads’ gender and age 
To interpret the estimated coefficients, I provide two illustrations by using a 
dummy (e.g. gender) and a continuous variable coefficient (e.g. age). The head‟s gender 
coefficient e

 =1.3865 (Table 4.8, Model 1, column 1) means that the probability of 
borrowing from informal credit by males is 38.65% (i.e. 1.3865-1.00) higher than for 
females. Similarly, e

 = 0.8756 means that the probability of borrowing from formal 
credit by males is 12.44% (i.e. 0.8756-1.00) lower than for females. Nevertheless, the 
effect of head‟s gender is not statistically significant across models and credit market 
segments.  For a continuous variable of head‟s age, the RRR is about 0.96 across 
models and sources of credit, smaller than one, meaning that when a household head 
gets an additional year older the ratio of credit participation probability will decline by 
about 4%, keeping other things constant.  
Household size, phone ownership, and pre-survey income  
The estimates show that the ratios of borrowing probability increase with 
household size in all credit market segments. Greater household size represents a bigger 
demand for consumption and a better ability for income generation and debt repayment. 
Similarly, having a phone has a positive influence on the likelihood of participation in 
all credit markets, but the effect is highly significant only in the formal credit market. 
Owning a phone has advantages to communicate and obtain information about formal 
credit sources, and also proxies for household wealth through affordability of 
connection charges and phone bills. Similar to phone ownership, the pre-survey income 
per capita positively affects credit participation in all credit market segments (Table 4.8 
and Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Predicted probabilities of participation in specified credit sources by 
pre-survey income (in logarithm) 
 
Note: The slope-downward line depicts the declining probability of being non-borrowers as the 
income increases. 
Marital status of household heads 
As expected, single-head households such as the divorced, separated, widowed 
and unmarried tend to borrow more from informal credit than the current married-head 
households. These single-head households are often older-headed households who have 
less ability to smooth consumption by themselves if they face adverse shocks, especially 
demographic shocks, because they do not have enough working household members to 
increase income by increasing labour working hours. Therefore they are forced to 
borrow especially from informal credit as discussed in Kochar (1995). This variable is a 
demand-side factor.  
Household dwelling locations and distance to the nearest banks 
In addition, loans to the poor are small, collateral-free, and based mainly on social 
capital or interpersonal trust. As discussed earlier, households in the rural wards have 
more advantages compared to urban households when accessing informal and both-
credit sources, hence the ratio of credit participation probability in informal and both-
credit-sources by households in rural wards (LT and LP) is higher (Table 4.8, Model 1). 
So the distance and dwelling locations are demand-side factors since the distance and 
locations proxy for degree of rurality and people in rural areas have more outside 
options as they can get informal credit easier thanks to tighter community relationships.  
In contrast, greater distance and living in rural areas may increase the physical 
barriers to getting formal credit, so the distance and rural living locations would be 
supply factors. However, household dwelling locations and distance to the nearest bank 
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do not affect the ratios of probability of formal credit participation. In other words, 
formal credit is evenly distributed across wards (Table 4.8, Model 1, column 3) and 
within each ward (Table 4.8, Model 3, column 3). When considering distance to the 
nearest banks within each ward, the distance does not significantly affect the ratio of 
probability of informal credit participation in the urban wards, but it positively affects 
the ratio of probability of informal credit participation in rural wards. In other words, 
the ratios of probability of informal credit participation increase significantly with 
distance to the nearest banks only in rural wards (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.4). Once 
again, the degree of rurality as a demand-side factor plays a important role in getting 
informal credit even in rural ereas. 
Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of participation in specified credit sources by 
distance to the nearest bank 
 
The upward-slope of the curves indicates that the probability of participation in a 
specified credit markets will increase with the distance from each household to the 
nearest bank. However, the multinomial Logit models report the ratio of probability of a 
specified credit participation and probability of being in the base (non-borrowing) 
group. Therefore, the gap between each curve for a particular borrower group and the 
base curve becomes the issue of interest, for example the gap between informal credit 
borrowing (the red dashes) and the base curve of non-borrowing (solid-curve) 
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represents the ratio of the probability of informal credit participation and the probability 
of being in non-borrowing group. In rural wards (two top panels of Figure 4.4), the gaps 
become larger when households dwell far away from banks which are often located at 
ward centres. These households have easier access to informal credit thanks to possibly 
tighter community relationships and higher interpersonal trust.  
In short, households in rural wards have greater propensity to borrow from 
informal credit compared to urban households; and within a rural ward, households far 
away from ward centres, more rural, rely more on informal credit because of either 
better social relationship. These demand-side factors play more important roles in 
accessing informal credit. 
Proportion of borrowing neighbours: Competition or crowding-out effects 
The estimates of the interactions between the proportion of borrowing neighbours 
and ward dummies reveals that there is a crowding-out effect from the neighbours in 
accessing only formal (subsidised) credit in all the wards.  For example, the RRR is 
0.0159 (Table 4.8, Model 2, column 3), meaning that when the rate of borrowing 
neighbours in LP ward increases by 10 percentage points the ratio of formal credit 
participation probability will decline by about 9.8% [i.e. (1.00-0.0159)x10%], keeping 
other things constant. 
Other insignificant factors 
Controlling for other variables, education and the initial assets play no significant 
roles in credit participation even in the formal credit sector. However, as previously 
discussed, most formal credit to poor households in the studied areas are from the 
government subsidised funds, such as the HEPRF, VBSP, and other supporting funds, 
but very few of the loans are from commercial banks. Consequently, the key lenders 
require neither collateral nor specific education when making lending decisions.  
In summary, age, household size, and pre-treatment income have important roles 
in all credit market segments. In contrast, gender, education, and pre-survey assets are 
found to have no role in explaining credit participation in any specified credit market 
segments. The household location, phone ownership, and marital status of household 
heads have different roles in different credit segments for the poor in the peri-urban 
areas. Finally, credit subsidies may lead to credit demand excess and crowding-out 
effect amongst the borrowers. 
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4.4.3 Determinants of credit constraints of poor households 
Though 74% of surveyed households borrowed, the predicted probability of credit 
constraints is high, at 48% (Table 4.9). If credit constraints are more related to the credit 
supply side, then the determinants of credit constraints could be more related to 
obstacles in the credit markets of developing countries. Similar to Crook and 
Hochguertel (2005), Jappelli (1990), Magri (2002), and Thaicharoen et al (2004), I find 
that higher income reduces the likelihood of being credit-constrained, even though all 
my study households were poor.  
Surprisingly, the income also has a U-shaped effect on the probability of credit 
constraints (Figure 5) with the minimum probability at the income level of about VND 
3.5 million (about US$210). This U-shaped effect of income on credit constraints is 
contrary to Chen and Chivakul (2008) who found the inverted-U shape effect for 
general households rather than the poor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All households in 
my sample were poor and most of them borrowed from informal and preferred formal 
credit; extremely poor households, however, were excluded by both informal lenders 
and government subsidised funds.
46
 Therefore, the higher is income per capita the lower 
the credit constraints. On the other hand, households whose income per capita is higher 
than VND 3.5 million were more credit-constrained as income increased. As we learned 
previously, 96% of credit to the poor was from small credit sources (small subsidized 
credit and informal credit). Thus, the credit constraints from the income level of VND 
3.5 million onward could not be due to the exclusion by the microcredit lenders but due 
to higher demand for credit to finance bigger projects, businesses or spending but these 
households were lent less than what they really wanted to borrow (partial borrowers). 
This group of households should be financed by (bigger) formal credit, especially 
commercial banks, but their demand for credit was not yet met, and hence the 
households were still credit-constrained. This finding also suggests that if subsidised 
formal credit funds lend the poor households, the credit amounts should not be fixed for 
all the poor but should vary according to their income levels, at least two fixed amounts, 
one amount for households whose income is below VND 3.5 millions and one amount 
for households whose income is above VND 3.5 million. 
                                                 
46
 According to local HEPRF officers, even all the poor are eligible for preferred loans, they did not lend 
to the extreme poor because the households could not repay. They should have received direct assistance 
rather than credit. 
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Figure 4.5: Predicted probabilities of credit constraints by pre-survey income per 
capita 
 
In addition to income, in the Vietnamese context, assets such as land, house and 
durable fixed assets mainly represent household wealth because households usually lack 
investment choices for their savings due to unstable capital markets and high inflation 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2007). In my surveyed areas, fast industrialisation and urbanisation 
have caused real estate to be more marketable and increase property values. This 
enabled the poor to access credit because lenders may consider the property or fixed 
assets as collateral, if asset owners have legal documentation, when they sort out their 
clients (Crook & Hochguertel, 2005; Kedir et al, 2007; Jappelli, 1990; and Zeller, 
1994). Without documentation the assets are not used as collateral, but the assets may 
indicate potential repayment ability because the peri-urban and urban poor also have 
informal property transactions without legal documents since informal property markets 
function well in developing countries including Vietnam (Kim, 2004; Mooya & Cloete, 
2007). As a result, the households owning higher asset values are less likely to be 
credit-constrained because the assets can be informally sold to repay debts even though 
they are not able to be lodged as collateral when borrowing. 
Contrary to Barslund and Tarp (2007), Izumida and Pham (2002), Kedir et al, 
(2007), Jappelli (1990), and Zeller (1994), the credit-constrained and unconstrained 
households are homogenous in terms of household heads‟ gender, age, education, 
marital status, and household size,
47
 perhaps because the current study focuses on the 
poor rather than general population. In addition, the probability of the constraints is not 
                                                 
47
 I also checked with household labour force (persons aged 18-60 years old), the estimation result is 
similar to the case of household size. 
.4
.6
.8
1
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Pre-survey income per capita (VND1,000)
Predicted Probability of Credit Constraint
 70  
different across wards, and not affected by the proportion of borrowing neighbours 
(Table 4.9, Model 2). 
Finally, households dwelling far away from banks within each ward had a higher 
probability of being credit-constrained. The effect of the distance to the nearest bank is 
significant for TNPA, PB, and LT wards, but is not for LP ward (Table 4.9, Model 3). 
LP ward is a purely rural area where the distance does not obstruct the poor households 
from credit resources, and the likelihood of credit participation and credit constraints are 
not determined by where the households are situated. Better community, relatives, 
neighbouring relationships and interpersonal trust may help households in pure rural 
areas like LP ward to have not only a higher probability of credit participation (Table 
4.6), especially credit from informal sector, but also lower the likelihood of being 
credit-constrained (Table 4.9) compared to the other wards in the areas. This suggests 
that community mutual help systems through credit could do a good job in smoothing 
consumption and investing in healthcare and children‟s schooling. On the other hand, 
given the condition of weak community relationships in more urban wards, poor 
households find it hard to borrow and are highly credit-constrained. Subsidised funds 
are usually the last resort for lenders to help the poor in the urban areas. 
For the purely rural ward of LP, the distance to the nearest bank does not affect 
the probability of credit participation and credit constraints. This finding is consistent 
with Barslund and Tarp (2007, p. 499) who find that distance to district centres where 
there are bank offices does not affect the likelihood of credit rationing in rural Vietnam. 
On the contrary, in my case, all poor households sited near banks in the urban wards 
have lower probability of being credit-constrained. Thus, it suggests that one would 
better consider the effect of distance within each region or area (i.e. using interaction 
terms between the distance and dummy of areas) rather than compare across various 
areas because each area has its own socio-economic conditions, and thus distance 
matters in credit constraints in some certain areas. 
4.5 Summary of findings 
Examining factors affecting credit participation and credit constraints in peri-urban 
areas in Vietnam reveals:  First, the presence of many commercial banks does not help 
the poor to access to formal credit, and hence the poor in the peri-urban areas rely 
heavily on informal credit. Furthermore, unlike the usage pattern of loans in rural 
Vietnam, loans in the peri-urban areas are mainly used for consumption. Second, 
households in rural wards have a higher probability of borrowing than their counterparts 
in the urban wards because of better social relationships in rural areas. Moreover, 
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competition from borrowing neighbours adversely affect the propensity of borrowing 
only in urban wards where the poor depend more on government subsidised credit 
funds, which are limited.  
Third, a closer look at specified microcredit sources reveals that the roles of 
marital status, communication facilities, dwelling places, and competition from 
neighbours vary across different credit market segments. Accordingly, married-head 
households tend to avoid informal credit, whereas the better-communicating households 
borrow more from formal credit lenders. Households far away from banks were unable 
to borrow from the formal credit resources; however, these households in rural areas 
were more likely to borrow from informal credit lenders. Moreover, the competition 
among households exists only in formal credit markets which provide mostly subsidised 
credit loans. Overall, pooling formal and informal credit market segments would blur 
the picture of determining factors of credit participation. 
Finally, wealthier households in terms of asset holdings and phone ownership 
amongst the poor group appear less credit-constrained. The likelihood of both credit 
participation and credit constraints increases with distance to the nearest banks, which 
implies that households living far away were able to borrow but their credit amounts 
were less that their optiomal amounts since they mainly borrowed from informal (and 
also small) credit. This suggests that supply-side intervention could help in overcoming 
credit constraints. Overall, the poor in urban wards are slightly more credit-constrained 
due to exclusion by commercial banks, and by informal credit presumably due to weak 
community relationships and interpersonal trust. 
There remain some caveats in this study; the determinants of credit participation 
and constraints would come from the unobservable attributes such as households‟ 
entrepreneurial ability, attitude to risks, and access to social networks, which are 
assumed to be associated with pre-survey incomes and assets in this study. Further 
advances on the current research should control for these attributes by employing fixed 
effects methods on panel data to confirm the finding in this chapter. 
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TABLES 
Table 4.1: Sources and sizes of loans by credit provider 
Sources of loans Frequency 
(no of 
loans) 
Percent in  
total (%) 
Mean 
(VND 
1,000)  
Standard  
Deviation 
Formal credit  336 55.26 9,327 33,421 
VBSP (1) 37 6.06 9,622 15,764 
Agribank (2) 18 2.96 26,444 46,482 
Other commercial banks (3) 8 1.32 119,000 176,254 
JCSF (4) 29 4.77 4,564 3,655 
Social political organisations (5) 62 10.20 4,564 3,472 
HEPRF (6) 182 29.93 5,176 4,189 
Informal credit  272 44.74 5,229 12,760 
Moneylenders, ROSCAs, 
pawnbrokers, others (7) 
51 8.39 9,218 15,870 
Friends, relatives, neighbours (8) 221 36.35 4,308 11,780 
Overall  608 100 7,494 26,330 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey;  
VBSP: Vietnam Bank for Social Policies; JCSP: Job Creation Support Fund; HEPRF: The 
Hunger Elimination and Poverty Reduction Funds; ROSCAs: Rotating savings and credit 
associations  
 
Table 4.2: Sources, sizes and interest rates of loans 
Credit sector Percent in  
total  
Loan sizes  
(VND 1,000) 
Monthly interest  
rates (%) 
 (%) Mean  Std.Dev Mean  Std.Dev 
By formal/informal sector      
Formal 55.26 9,327 33,421 0.78 0.70 
Informal  44.74 5,229 12,760 2.14 5.93 
    Friends, relatives & 
neighbours 
36.35 4,308 11,780 0.033 0.27 
    Other informal sources 8.39 9,218 15,870 11.29 9.22 
By preferred sources      
Preferred loans  51.00 5,503 6,725 0.76 0.72 
Non-preferred loans 49.00 9,564 36,897 2.05 5.67 
Overall  100 7,494 26,330 1.40 4.05 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
Notes: Preferred loans include items 1, 4, 5, and 6, and Non-preferred loans are of 2, 3, 7, and 
8 in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.3: Shares and sizes of loans by purposes 
Purpose of loans Percent in 
total (%) 
Mean 
(VND 1,000) 
Standard 
deviation 
Production/business 26.64 6,512 5,729 
Non-production 73.36 7,850 30,550 
    Consumption  30.92 3,163 4,846 
    Debt payment 4.61 14,661 37,752 
    House acquisition/repairs 3.62 40,977 63,517 
    Schooling fees 16.94 3,665 2,239 
    Health care  16.12 11,346 51,013 
    Others  1.15 15,143 17,478 
Overall  100 7,494 26,330 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
Note: Exchange rate in USD/VND = 16,481 
 
Table 4.4: Demand for credit, credit participation and credit constraints 
Specified categories Number of 
households 
Percent in  
total (%) 
Household has demand for credit in the past 24 
months prior to the survey? 
411 100 
No, do not want to borrow 76 18.49 
Sufficient capital, no need credit (a) 35 8.52 
Discouraged households (b) 41 9.97 
Yes, households need capital 335 81.51 
Was not lent any money (denied) (c) 31 7.54 
Was lent amounts less than what households 
wanted (d) 
124 30.17 
Was lent fully (e) 180 43.80 
Credit participation in the past 24 months 411 100 
Borrowers (d & e) 304 73.97 
Non-borrowers  (a, b & c) 107 26.03 
Credit constraints  411 100 
Credit-constrained (b, c & d) 196 47.69 
Credit-unconstrained  (a & e) 215 52.31 
Source: own calculation from author’s survey 
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Table 4.5: Means of some main variables and t-values for equal means by 
borrowing status 
Variable Borrowers Non-borrowers t-value  
Mean  Std. 
Dev 
Mean  Std. 
Dev 
Job (favourable jobs=1) 0.122 0.327 0.140 0.349 0.48 
Head‟s sex (male=1)  0.507 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.03 
Head education (year) 4.911 3.35 4.664 3.76 0.60 
Head‟s married (yes=1) 0.648 0.478 0.607 0.491 0.74 
Head‟s age 52.901 13.97 59.467 15.46 3.87** 
Household size 5.191 2.343 4.523 2.597 2.34* 
Child under 6 years old (yes=1) 0.309 0.463 0.178 0.384 2.89** 
Children aged 6-18 1.118 1.024 0.869 1.100 2.05* 
Persons aged 18-60 3.230 1.694 2.692 1.793 2.71** 
Older-than-60 person (yes=1) 0.352 0.478 0.533 0.352 3.25** 
Rural area (LT & LP =1) 0.635 0.482 0.477 0.502 2.83** 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) 2.226 2.098 1.804 1.900 1.92+ 
Distance to nearest market (Km) 1.409 1.032 1.085 0.872 3.10** 
Have a phone (yes=1) 0.809 0.394 0.644 0.481 3.18** 
Internet/newspapers (yes=1) 0.053 0.224 0.037 0.191 0.68 
Have a TV and radio (yes=1) 0.944 0.230 0.925 0.264 0.66 
Durable & fixed assets acquired 
within 24 months prior to survey 
4,372 6,264 9,057 11,693 2.78** 
Durable & fixed assets acquired 
over 24 months prior to survey 
849,924 821,335 786,097 795,593 0.71 
Pre-survey income per capita 3,592 814 3,505 925 0.86 
Notes: t statistics significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**); assets, income, and expenditure 
are in VND 1,000. 
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Table 4.6: Marginal effects on the probability of credit participation (Probit 
estimation) 
Explanatory Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) -0.0285 -0.0302 -0.0211 
 (0.55) (0.59) (0.41) 
Head‟s age (years) -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0073 
 (4.29)** (4.28)** (4.32)** 
Head‟s education (years of schooling) 0.0017 0.0019 0.0027 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.37) 
Marital status (married=1) -0.1033 -0.0974 -0.1094 
 (1.86)+ (1.75)+ (1.95)+ 
Household size in log
(a)
 0.1932 0.1951 0.1932 
 (3.56)** (3.63)** (3.59)** 
Pre-survey income per capita in log 0.1781 0.1730 0.1884 
 (2.15)* (2.13)* (2.28)* 
Pre-survey assets in log (assets acquired -0.0010 0.0018 -0.0014 
over 24 months prior to survey) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) 
Phone ownership (yes=1) 0.1309 0.1232 0.1389 
 (2.26)* (2.14)* (2.34)* 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) 0.0185   
 (0.27)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) 0.1570   
 (2.58)**   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) 0.1146   
 (1.95)+   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  -0.6642  
  (1.95)+  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  -0.5928  
  (1.81)+  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  -0.3297  
  (1.14)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  -0.3921  
  (1.35)  
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x TNPA    -0.0968 
   (1.20) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x PB    -0.1534 
   (1.06) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LT    0.1277 
   (2.09)* 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LP    0.0113 
   (0.70) 
Wald 2  44.56** 46.80** 53.35** 
Prob> 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Predicted probability at x bar 0.760 0.761 0.763 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 
1% (**). Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) ward is set as a base for ward dummies. 
(a
 
)
The marginal 
effect of household size (hhsize) on the predicted probability is calculated as, suppose Y= + 
.ln(hhsize), so that dY/dU = dY/d(hhsize)= .(1/hhsize), keep other things equal. 
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Table 4.7: Interval regression (Tobit Type 2) for loan amounts received 
Explanatory Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) -3,962.37 -3,977.1 -3,762.87 
 (2.01)* (2.02)* (1.92)+ 
Head‟s age (years) 528.75 525.4 500.85 
 (1.45) (1.43) (1.37) 
Head‟s age squared -5.57 -5.50 -5.38 
 (1.78)+ (1.75)+ (1.72)+ 
Head‟s education (years) 147.38 153.9 142.50 
 (0.51) (0.53) (0.47) 
Marital status (married=1) 1,972.25 2,041.4 1,762.18 
 (0.90) (0.94) (0.81) 
Household size in log 4,621.38 4,631.5 4,636.29 
 (2.48)* (2.48)* (2.43)* 
Pre-survey income per capita in log 7,322.34 7,252.5 7,272.70 
(2.01)* (2.02)* (1.98)* 
Pre-survey assets in log (assets acquired 624.64 653.2 572.99 
over 24 months prior to survey) (1.14) (1.19) (1.04) 
Phone ownership (yes=1) 5,024.36 4,963.4 4,965.04 
 (2.89)** (2.85)** (2.81)** 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) -1,606.15   
 (0.61)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) 2,389.45   
 (1.09)   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) 874.92   
 (0.41)   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  -6,635.6  
 (0.82)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  -8,489.4  
  (1.15)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  -2,397.1  
  (0.38)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  -4,124.7  
  (0.60)  
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x TNPA    -2,526.62 
  (0.87) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x PB   -7,899.71 
   (1.53) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LT   304.95 
   (0.18) 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) x LP   -280.37 
   (0.54) 
Constant -85,633 -81,289 -81,505 
 (2.40)* (2.25)* (2.28)* 
Wald 2  28.32** 29.42** 27.22* 
Prob>2 0.0050 0.0057 0.0116 
Sigma (test for Tobit model) 13720.32 13722.66 13715.53 
 (8.90)** (8.89)** (8.94)** 
Observations 405 405 405 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**). 
Five extreme outliers (of loan amounts) are dropped. 
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Table 4.8: The multinomial Logit estimation with Relative Risk Ratios for credit participation in specified credit sources  
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
RRR(b) Outcome for RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for 
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
Informal 
Credit  
Both-source 
Credit  
Formal 
Credit  
22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 
Head‟s gender  1.3865 0.5995 0.8756 1.3846 0.6006 0.8604 1.6307 0.6397 0.8694 
(male=1) (0.87) (1.43) (0.36) (0.87) (1.43) (0.41) (1.23) (1.25) (0.38) 
Head‟s age 0.9534 0.9628 0.9641 0.9539 0.9633 0.9644 0.9524 0.9614 0.9645 
 (3.81)** (3.38)** (3.07)** (3.79)** (3.35)** (3.03)** (3.79)** (3.48)** (3.05)** 
Head‟s education 0.9523 1.0346 1.0179 0.9555 1.0381 1.0165 0.9598 1.0311 1.0264 
(years) (0.91) (0.67) (0.35) (0.85) (0.74) (0.32) (0.76) (0.60) (0.52) 
Marital status  0.3492 0.7396 0.6627 0.3616 0.7390 0.7269 0.3084 0.6911 0.6253 
(married=1) (2.55)* (0.76) (1.01) (2.47)* (0.77) (0.79) (2.66)** (0.92) (1.14) 
Household size   2.2269 3.2430 3.3899 2.2499 3.2414 3.4761 2.0855 3.5470 3.3700 
in logarithm (2.17)* (3.15)** (3.23)** (2.20)* (3.12)** (3.31)** (1.96)* (3.37)** (3.22)** 
Pre-survey income 2.6851 3.7543 2.4145 2.5350 3.4970 2.3867 2.9895 3.2606 2.8708 
in logarithm (1.66)+ (2.11)* (1.70)+ (1.58) (2.01)* (1.65)+ (1.71)+ (2.07)* (1.99)* 
Pre-survey  1.0871 0.9553 0.9591 1.1010 0.9578 0.9756 1.1197 0.9367 0.9351 
assets in logarithm (0.69) (0.38) (0.35) (0.80) (0.36) (0.21) (0.91) (0.54) (0.57) 
Phone ownership 1.4456 1.7160 3.4660 1.3881 1.6439 3.4750 1.5408 1.7119 3.4014 
(yes=1) (1.00) (1.45) (2.98)** (0.89) (1.35) (2.95)** (1.11) (1.42) (2.89)** 
PB ward (urban) 0.3026 1.5091 1.3147       
 (1.83)+ (0.80) (0.63)       
LT ward (rural) 3.3774 6.0195 0.6904       
 (2.68)** (3.78)** (0.76)       
LP ward (rural) 1.7661 4.0763 1.2173       
 (1.31) (3.15)** (0.46)       
 
(Continued next page)
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Table 4.8: The multinomial Logit estimation with Relative Risk Ratios for credit participation in specified credit sources (continued) 
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for RRR Outcome for 
Informal 
Only 
Both 
sources 
Formal 
only 
Informal 
Only 
Both 
sources 
Formal only Informal 
 only 
Both 
 sources 
Formal 
only 
22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 22.63% 26.03% 25.30% 
Effects of  the proportion of borrowing neighbours within each ward  
Borrowing neighbour proportion 
x TNPA  
  0.0258 0.2249 0.0061    
  (1.43) (0.57) (2.31)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion 
x PB 
  0.0058 0.4571 0.0122    
  (2.03)* (0.31) (2.09)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion 
x LT 
  0.2312 2.8864 0.0084    
  (0.67) (0.48) (2.54)*    
Borrowing neighbour proportion 
x LP 
  0.1050 1.8797 0.0159    
  (1.02) (0.28) (2.23)*    
Effects of  the distance to the nearest bank from households within each ward  
Distance to nearest       1.4795 0.1511 0.5846 
bank x TNPA       (0.68) (2.84)** (1.00) 
Distance to nearest       0.2846 0.0419 0.9219 
bank x PB        (0.85) (2.93)** (0.09) 
Distance to nearest       5.2577 1.2746 0.5532 
bank x LT        (3.63)** (0.57) (1.09) 
Distance to nearest       1.2595 0.9533 0.9895 
bank x LP        (1.85)+ (0.45) (0.10) 
Wald 2  106.20 116.97 114.35 
Prob>2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1144 0.1215 0.1288 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and at 1% (**); the base outcome (0) is non-
borrowing households (non-borrowers which accounts for 26.03% observations). 
 
(b)
RRR coefficient is exponentiated coefficient = e

 = exp(, e.g. exp(0.3268)=1.3865 where =0.3268 is the estimated outcome of the 
standard multinomial Logit model.       
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Table 4.9: Marginal effects on the probability of credit constraints (probit 
model) 
Explanatory Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Head‟s sex (male=1) 0.0669 0.0676 0.0652 
 (1.07) (1.08) (1.04) 
Head‟s age (years) 0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 
 (0.82) (0.83) (1.04) 
Head‟s education (years) 0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.18) 
Marital status (married=1) -0.0218 -0.0257 -0.0177 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.25) 
Household size in log -0.0255 -0.0264 -0.0287 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.46) 
Pre-survey income per capita  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (3.22)** (3.20)** (3.40)** 
Pre-survey income per capita squared 1.01e-07 1.01e-07 1.03e-07 
 (3.27)** (3.25)** (3.47)** 
Pre-survey assets in log (acquired over -0.0399 -0.0407 -0.0344 
24 months prior to survey) (1.96)+ (2.00)* (1.67)+ 
Phone ownership (yes=1) -0.2171 -0.2158 -0.2070 
 (3.33)** (3.30)** (3.12)** 
Phuoc Binh – PB (urban) 0.0347   
 (0.37)   
Long Truong – LT (rural) -0.0012   
 (0.01)   
Long Phuoc – LP (rural) -0.0978   
 (1.28)   
Interaction terms    
Borrowing neighbour proportion x TNPA  0.2815  
  (0.73)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x PB  0.3216  
  (0.89)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LT  0.2406  
  (0.76)  
Borrowing neighbour proportion x LP  0.1234  
  (0.39)  
Distance to nearest bank (km) x TNPA    0.1813 
   (1.78)+ 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x PB    0.3732 
   (2.09)* 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x LT    0.1685 
   (2.30)* 
Distance to nearest bank (km) x LP    0.0115 
   (0.61) 
Wald 2  34.99** 34.33** 40.40** 
Prob>2 0.0005 0.0011 0.0001 
Predicted probability 0.4790 0.4790 0.4790 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0700 0.0700 0.0800 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses; statistically significant at 10% (+), at 5% (*), and 
at 1% (**). Tang Nhon Phu A (TNPA) ward is set a comparison base for ward dummies. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of household credit on education and 
healthcare spending by the poor in peri-urban areas 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Microfinance has increasingly attracted attention from the global development 
community because it is considered a powerful tool in poverty alleviation 
strategies in developing countries (Microcredit Summit, 2004). A common 
argument for microfinance is that it may help keep household production stable 
and mitigate adverse shocks; thus it helps to prevent school dropout and reduction 
in spending on healthcare (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005; Dehejia & Gatti, 2002; 
Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008; 
Ranjan, 2001). The effects on education and health are critical to sustainable 
poverty reduction since they affect the quality of human capital formation and the 
productivity of future generations. 
But there is a debate about the impact of microfinance (Cull, Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2009) including its impact on education and healthcare of borrowing 
households. For example, if access to credit raises female economic activity it 
may lead to children being taken out of school to replace maternal inputs in the 
care of younger siblings or to work in expanded household businesses. The debate 
has resulted from mixed evidence on microcredit impacts. On the one hand, 
microcredit has positive impacts on education, for example Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) find girls receive more schooling if households borrow from the Grameen 
Bank. On the other hand, some studies find no effects or adverse effects on child 
education (Hazarika & Sarangi, 2008; Islam & Choe, 2009; Morduch, 1998). 
Likewise, in terms of health, Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury and Millimet (2003) find 
higher weight-for-age and height-for-age amongst children of Grameen Bank 
borrowers, but Coleman (1999, 2006) finds negative impacts of microcredit on 
healthcare spending by households in Northeast Thailand. 
One difficulty in evaluating the impact of microcredit is that borrowers and 
non-borrowers typically differ in both observable and unobservable 
characteristics. The borrowers may self-select into borrowing activities due to 
their better characteristics. This makes it hard to form a counterfactual of what 
would have happened to the borrowers in the absence of credit and clouds 
interpretation of any estimated treatment effects. If studies fail to correct for this 
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self-selection problem, the estimates will give naïve and overestimated results of 
the impact (Coleman, 2006). One estimation approach that may better suit this 
problem is propensity score matching (PSM) where treatment effects are 
estimated by simulating a randomized experiment, matching households in the 
treated group with households in the control group that are as alike as possible – 
based on observable factors. It is then assumed that the matched households 
would have no systematic differences in response to the treatment, so they provide 
a valid counterfactual. Proponents state that PSM can replicate benchmarks from 
randomized experiments when used appropriately (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). 
In this chapter, a new survey, designed by the author to meet the conditions 
under which PSM works well, is used to examine the impact of household credit 
on education and healthcare spending by the poor in peri-urban areas of Ho Chi 
Minh City, Vietnam. In addition to matching statistically identical non-borrowers 
with borrowers, my estimates also control for household pre-treatment income and 
assets. These pre-treatment variables may be associated with unobservable factors 
affecting both credit participation and the outcomes of interest, so inclusion of 
these variables helps deal with the self-selection problem that may have biased 
some previous estimates of microcredit impacts. 
In addition to the use of PSM, two other important features of the current 
analysis warrant comment. First, my evidence comes from a newly industrializing 
peri-urban area on the outskirts of a city of over seven million people. In contrast, 
most studies of microcredit impacts have been for rural households.
48
 Poverty is 
becoming more urban and the poor are urbanizing more rapidly than the 
population as a whole (Ravallion, Chen & Sangraula, 2007). Thus, it is important 
that studies of microcredit expand to cover urban areas. The impacts of 
microcredit may differ between urban and rural areas, particularly for my 
outcomes of interest, since human capital is typically the most important 
household assets in urban areas and is rewarded more than in rural areas (Goetz & 
Rupasingha, 2004; Sicular et al, 2007). Also, urbanites consume less from own 
production and rely more on the market; so the influence of idiosyncratic shocks 
like illness and loss of employment may be larger in urban areas than in rural 
areas. Household credit can be a useful tool to fill the income gap created by the 
shocks; thus, in urban areas credit may be used to support consumption 
                                                 
48
 Previous studies in Vietnam just focused on the rural areas (e.g., Quach, Mullineux, & Murinde, 
2005; Nguyen, 2008). 
 82 
expenditure on healthcare, school fees and food rather than production expenses 
as found in rural areas (Barslund & Tarp, 2007; Johnson & Morduch, 2007). 
The second important feature of this analysis is that it considers both formal 
and informal credit. Most previous studies examine the impacts of formal or 
program credit but do not consider effects that credit from other sources has on 
the outcomes of interest (Coleman, 1999, 2006; Khandker, 2005; Morduch, 1998; 
Pitt & Khandker, 1998). Hence, the estimated treatment effects may include both 
those from the program participation and also those from other credit provided by 
relatives, friends, neighbours and informal moneylenders. On the other hand, my 
survey captures all sources of credit and the results reported below compare the 
effects of formal and informal credit. Access to formal credit is often influenced 
by policy makers, but there is less leverage over informal credit, so distinguishing 
their separate impacts is of interest. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews 
previous studies of household credit impacts on education and healthcare. Section 
5.3 discusses the estimation methodology. The empirical results are reported in 
Section 5.4. The final section presents concluding remarks. 
5.2 Previous literature 
Credit may affect household demand for education and health in two ways 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, p. 201). On the one hand, microcredit may help 
households earn higher income, which raises consumption and increases the 
demand for healthcare and children‟s education. On the other hand, if microcredit 
causes higher female employment, it then may decrease children‟s schooling if 
children have to replace mothers‟ input into the care of younger siblings or work 
in enlarged household businesses. 
There is mixed evidence on these potentially opposing effects. Inadequate 
schooling in poor countries is often attributed to lack of access to credit since 
households facing adverse shocks and having insufficient access to credit may 
pull children out of schools to reduce household expenditure and increase labour 
income by increasing working hours, including child labour (Dehejia & Gatti, 
2002; Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Kurosaki, 2002; Ranjan, 2001). 
In addition, borrowing households may take children out of school to work in 
family businesses (Hazarika & Sarangi, 2008) because small loans, a typical type 
of loan for poor households, are often associated with higher interest rates and 
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short-term repayment conditions; the loans therefore require high returns to repay 
(high) interest rates to lenders. To meet these requirements, poor borrowers may 
reduce their costs by using their own labour, which may include child labour. For 
example, Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2004) in a study on Vietnam find households 
who borrowed from higher interest rate sources use more child labour. 
Impacts on health and education may also interact. For example, if 
borrowing enables parents to provide medicines promptly once children are sick, 
then it may shorten sickness time and keep children at school. Healthier children 
may have better school performance, which helps keep children at school longer 
so they more productive adults. In contrast, lower school achievement and 
attendance are associated with child malnutrition (Glewwe, Jacoby, & King, 
2000). Healthcare services such as pasteurization, health insurance, family 
planning and pregnant-mother care are observed to be consumed more by 
microfinance clients than non-clients (CGAP, 2003). 
5.3 Analytical framework
49
 
5.3.1 Impact evaluation problems  
The most difficult part of credit impact evaluations is to separate the causal effect 
of credit from selection and reverse causation biases which are very common to 
nearly all statistical evaluations (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). To net out the 
treatment effects from other factors, requires answering the question of how 
borrowers would have done without any credit participation (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2005, 2010). This question is not easy to answer because researchers 
are unable to observe the virtual outcomes needed to construct such a 
counterfactual. 
Formally, estimating the impact of credit participation is to measure the 
difference in the outcome between treatment and control groups, that is, E(Y|D=1) 
– E(Y|D=0) where Y is the outcome, and D is the treatment taking value 1 if 
receiving treatment and 0 if otherwise. The difference in the outcome, however, 
may result from differences in observable characteristics, differences in 
unobservable characteristics, or from the treatment (credit participation). 
Estimates will be biased if one does not control for the differences in observable 
and unobservable characteristics. The differences in the observable characteristics 
cause “overt bias”, which can be removed by controlling for observables (Xi) in 
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 Sample design and data collection were discussed in Chapter 1. 
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estimation models (Lee, 2005). Thus, the impact is now E(Y| D=1, Xi) – 
E(Y|D=0, Xi). However, the estimated impact may also include a “hidden bias” 
resulting from unobservable characteristics. Design-based studies such as those 
with a randomised selection of treatment and control groups can help in this 
regard because the randomization enables us to cancel out the differences in both 
observable and unobservable characteristics between the two groups. But in credit 
impact evaluation, it is very hard to conduct the randomization with human 
subjects due to motivation and contamination problems (Mosley, 1997).  
Therefore, there are usually some problems in measuring the impact using 
non-experimental data because of non-random placement of credit programs and 
self-selection into credit participation by borrowers. The estimates of the causal 
effect can have selection bias if credit participation is correlated with unobserved 
characteristics that also affect the outcomes. For instance, households that are 
better motivated to invest in children‟s schooling may have higher demand for 
credit. Without an adequate measure of motivation, this omitted factor may make 
an observed correlation between credit and schooling seems like a causal effect. 
For my sample, the non-random placement of credit borrowing is not an 
important issue because all the surveyed households in the sample have income 
per capita under VND6,000 thousand, so are eligible for preferred credit (i.e. 
subsidised interest and easy conditions) from government funds. Selection by 
informal lenders and self-selection into credit borrowing due to unobservables, 
however, may occur. If data on pre-treatment variables of interest are available, 
researchers may examine differences in these variables in order to see whether 
there is a positive or negative selection on unobserved characteristics, conditional 
on the observed characteristics. If Y
T
0 and Y
C
0 are the outcomes for treated and 
control groups at time 0 (before the treatment), and after controlling for the 
observables, E(Y
T
0 | D=1, Xi) ≠ E(Y
C
0 | D=0, Xi), one should suspect 
unobservable confounders are affecting the treatment and outcomes, i.e. there 
exists “hidden bias” caused by the unobservable confounders. Lee (2005, p. 125) 
recommends that controlling for Y0 (together with Xi on the right hand side) may 
to some extent reduce the hidden bias. In my case, I do not have pre-treatment 
data on the variables of interest but I could use pre-treatment (baseline) income 
per capita as a control variable, as suggested by Mosley (1997), Heckman and 
Smith (1999), and McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2010). 
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Yij,t-1  =   + Dij,t     +  .Xij,t + ij,t-1   (5.1) 
where Yij is the outcome of interest of household i in ward j; D is a dummy 
variable representing if a household borrows (1) or not (0), X is a set of 
unchanged (or little changed) control variables over time (household 
characteristics). The coefficient  shows whether borrowers have higher or lower 
income per capita than non-borrowers prior to participating in the borrowing 
activities, conditional on their observed characteristics. If  is positive, that means 
a positive selection on unobserved attributes exists, borrowers tend to be richer 
than non-borrowers, which will lead the non-experimental estimators to overstate 
the impact of credit participation.  
5.3.2 Methods for measuring impacts 
Experimental data are not available in my case, and thus I need to employ non-
experimental methods. The non-experimental methods try to construct 
counterfactual outcomes for borrowers as if they had not borrowed, and then 
compare the current outcome with the counterfactual. The existing non-
experimental methods used so far in credit impact evaluations are classified as 
below. 
5.3.2.1 Quasi-experimental methods  
In the experimental method, the control group is similar to the treatment group in 
terms of both observed and unobserved attributes by using the randomization 
procedure (Bryson, Dorsett, & Purdon, 2002). In contrast, the quasi-experimental 
method tries to create a comparable control group by asking: “what would the 
treatment group have done without the treatment?” (Armendariz & Morduch, 
2005, 2010). To do so, there are three approaches: matching, before-after 
difference estimator (BA), and difference-in-differences estimator (DD).  In my 
case, I do not apply the BA and DD because data for those estimators are not 
available, hence I will only discuss the matching estimator. 
 Propensity score matching 
Matching selects non-participants who have similar observed characteristics to 
participants in order to generate a control group. Matched comparison and 
treatment groups are now similar in terms of observed characteristics (Dehejia & 
Wahba, 1999, 2002). The main advantage of the matching method is that one can 
draw on existing data sources, so it is quicker and cheaper to implement. 
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Nevertheless, matching does not control for unobservable characteristics that may 
cause selection bias, and as a result, the reliability of estimates is reduced or 
sensitive (Smith & Todd, 2005). The most widely used matching method is 
propensity score matching. Other methods of matching on each X (covariate 
matching) create a problem of high dimensionality which requires large datasets.  
The propensity score matching (PSM) method first estimates the propensity 
score for each participant and non-participant on the basis of observed 
characteristics, and then compares mean outcome of participants with that of the 
matched (similar in terms of scores) non-participants. In other words, the purpose 
of the PSM is to select comparable non-borrowing households among all non-
borrowing households to generate a control group, and then compare the outcome 
of the treatment and matched control groups. The crucial assumption is that 
amongst non-borrowers, those with the same or similar characteristics to 
borrowers should have the same outcomes as what the borrowers would have had 
without credit participation. This assumption is called unconfoundedness or 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The 
underlying point of this PSM is that control and treatment units with the same 
propensity score have the same probability of assignment to the treatment as in 
randomised experiments (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). 
The PSM method may produce estimates with low bias if datasets satisfy 
three conditions (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002): (i) data for treatment and control 
groups are collected using the same questionnaire; (ii) both treatment and control 
groups are drawn from the same locality; and (iii) the dataset contains a rich set of 
variables relevant to modelling credit participation and the outcomes. The 
similarity of treatment and control groups in terms of observable characteristics 
will increase the likelihood of getting matched and reduce the bias. Since all 
surveyed households of the current study were poor prior to credit participation, 
the PSM method should produce less biased estimates than for a sample of the 
general households whose income per capita may be highly divergent. Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd (1997) argue that a subpopulation of treated units is often of 
more interest than the overall population; and Dehejia (2005) emphasizes the 
better feasibility of the PSM method if applied to subgroups. 
The PSM method allows control for potential bias such as non-placement 
and self-selection on observed characteristics into program participation (Dehejia, 
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2005; Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). However, this method still fails to control for 
unobservable characteristics which may create the hidden bias because the scores 
are calculated on the basic of observed characteristics only. Dias, Ichimura and 
Berg (2007) argue that if the treatment assignment and the outcome are affected 
by unobservables, the matching may give biased results because the method is 
unable to control for them. Observed characteristics may not fully capture 
individual motivation, ability and skills which may affect the treatment 
participation. Success of the PSM depends on how close the control group is to 
the treatment group in terms of space and time, and the two groups should have as 
little baseline difference as possible (Lee, 2005).  
5.3.2.2 Non-experimental methods 
When one is unable to randomly select a comparison (control) group, apart from 
the quasi-experimental methods, the non-experimental methods can be applied. 
These methods rely on the assumption of treatment assignment/selection based on 
observed characteristics.  
 OLS and Tobit models  
OLS is used to estimate the impact of credit participation with an assumption that 
all differences (except for the credit participation status) between borrowers and 
non-borrowers affecting outcomes can be captured by the regressors Xij in an OLS 
regression, and the coefficient of interest, just reflects the impact of credit 
participation and not any omitted variable bias. The regression is as follows: 
Yij =   +  .Dij  +   .Xij   +  ij   (5.2) 
where Yij is the outcome of interest of household i in ward j; Dij is a dummy 
representing if a household borrows (1) or does not (0); and Xij is a set of control 
variables. For education expenditure, some households have no data on outcomes 
of interest, so the Tobit model will be employed; this maximum likelihood 
estimation method estimates the likelihood function using an additional 
assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. The Tobit estimator is 
more appropriate than the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) because the OLS 
parameter estimates of limited dependent variable models are biased and 
inconsistent (Gujarati, 1995, p. 573; Stock & Watson, 2003, p. 328).  
However, the selection into credit participation on unobserved 
characteristics may create a non-zero correlation between ij and Dij. Therefore, 
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selection bias on unobservable characteristics is beyond both OLS and Tobit 
method‟s accountability. The OLS and Tobit estimates may not reflect the impact 
accurately.  
 Instrumental variable model 
The IV method needs good instruments which predict the participation but do not 
affect the outcome of the treatment. When using IV models, one should bear in 
mind that the tests for validity of instruments and weak instruments are very 
important. When instruments are valid but weak, the IV estimator may be even 
more biased than the OLS estimators (Murray, 2006; Stock & Yogo, 2002). 
My potential instruments are household assets acquired over 24 months 
prior to the survey, pre-treatment income per capita, and distance to the nearest 
bank or credit institution. These variables may affect credit participation but not 
outcomes. I conducted the under-identification, over-identification and weak 
identification test. The tests show that my instrument candidates are weak, and 
hence the IV estimates may be highly upward biased. I also implemented the 
Hausman test, the test results accept the hypothesis that the difference between 
Tobit (for education expenditure) and IV Tobit estimated coefficients is not 
systematic. So I am able to conclude that the instruments are weak and it is not 
appropriate to apply IV models in my study (see Appendix 5.7 for detail of the 
tests). In addition, these instruments may not have valid exclusion restriction if 
they partly affect both the credit participation and the outcomes (education and 
healthcare expenditure). For instance, households having shorter distance to the 
nearest bank also have shorter distance to schools and healthcare centres because 
banks, schools and healthcare centres are typically located in community/ward 
centres. As a result, the distance to the closest bank, as an IV, may influence both 
credit participation and outcomes (education expenditure and healthcare 
expenditure).  
5.4 Empirical results 
In this section, I start with a simple test for self-selection into credit participation 
in Sub-section 5.4.1. OLS estimation (and Tobit for education expenditure) results 
are presented in Sub-section 5.4.2 to provide an initial examination of the impact 
of credit participation on education, healthcare and other consumption 
expenditure. Sub-section 5.4.3 presents PSM estimates of the impact on education 
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and healthcare expenditure. Sub-section 5.4.4 applies a simple strategy to detect 
unobserved selection bias by employing the multiple treatment effect method.  
5.4.1 Self-selection into credit participation  
As discussed in section 5.3.1, in this subsection I conduct the test for positive 
selection by regressing pre-treatment income on credit participation status, 
conditional on household observed characteristics, as in the equation 5.1. I 
observe a positive selection of borrowers (positive . The borrowers and non-
borrowers are observed to be different in terms of not only observed 
characteristics such as age, household size, and location (Table 5.1) but also in 
terms of unobservable characteristics (Table 5.2). Conditional on the household 
head‟s gender, age, education, and marital status, and on household size and ward 
dummies, the pre-treatment income difference is VND171 thousand and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In logarithms (the last column of Table 
5.2), borrowers‟ pre-treatment income is observed to be 7% higher than that of 
non-borrowers (statistically significant at the 5% level).  
Income per capita prior to credit participation may capture a host of 
unobservable attributes (e.g. entrepreneurial ability, skills, motivation) which 
affect outcomes of credit participation such as education, healthcare expenditure 
and other consumption expenditure, and also affect the likelihood of credit 
participation. In other words, the hypothesis that the borrowers are self-selected in 
terms of the unobservable characteristics is plausible. Therefore, non-
experimental estimators that fail to control for unobservables might overestimate 
impacts. But controlling for the initial variables such as income and assets may 
reduce the bias caused by the unobservable attributes (Mosley, 1997, p. 14). 
Indeed, Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) state that PSM can be a reliable 
estimator if the pre-treatment earnings are controlled for.  
5.4.2 OLS and Tobit estimation 
To examine the impact of credit participation on expenditure (apart from observed 
household characteristics such as head‟s gender, age, education, marital status, 
household size, number of children and location dummies), I controlled for pre-
treatment factors such as pre-treatment income and assets as proxies for 
unobservable characteristics which may affect the outcomes. 
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5.4.2.1 Credit participation impact on monthly education expenditure  
Table 5.3 shows the Tobit estimates of the credit impact on education expenditure 
for the sub-sample of households having children aged from 6 to 18 years (official 
school ages in Vietnam). In the left panel (columns 1 to 4) are the results for 
household monthly average education expenditure, while the right panel (columns 
5 to 8) has results for monthly average education spending per school-age child. 
The initial specification controls for household characteristics, ratio of school-
aged children to household size and location dummies (columns 1 and 5). 
Controls for pre-treatment household income per capita and assets acquired over 
24 months prior to the survey are then added (columns 2 and 6). To check the 
consistency of the estimates, the ratio of school-aged children is replaced with the 
number of school-aged children (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8). All signs of coefficients 
are as expected, and the estimates show a consistently positive impact of credit 
participation on education expenditure across the models. Controlling for 
household pre-treatment income and assets reduces the impacts slightly; but they 
remain statistically significant at the 5% level. For a Tobit model, the Tobit 
coefficient when multiplied by the fraction of uncensored observations gives the 
impact of the credit participation on the unconditional expected value of the 
dependent variable (Greene, 2003). This is shown as credit impact = 
*(uncensored observations/total observations) in the top row of Table 5.3. 
Borrowing households spent an average of VND119 thousand to VND133 
thousand more per month on children‟s education than do non-borrowing 
households.
50
  
5.4.2.2 Credit participation impact on monthly healthcare expenditure  
The OLS estimates in Table 5.4 show clearly that credit participation has a 
significant and positive impact on household healthcare expenditure. Controlling 
for household characteristics and location dummies, the borrowers spent about 
86% more on healthcare than non-borrowers (columns 1 and 5).
51
 Controlling 
further for the household pre-treatment household income per capita and assets, 
the impact declines slightly, but it is still highly significant (columns 2 and 6).  
These results are robust to different ways of dealing with how various age-
ranges affect household healthcare expenditure (columns 3 and 4). The elderly 
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 Estimated impact seems to be consistent if the whole sample is considered, and the impact is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
51
 The effect is calculated as 100*[exp()-1] 
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have the strongest effect on healthcare expenditure because they are often sick, so 
households spend more on their healthcare. The second strongest effect is from 
the presence of children under six years old which is an age group with high 
malnutrition (Ministry of Health, Vietnam);
52
 children often suffer illness e.g. 
diarrhoea and influenza. 
5.4.2.3 Impact on other monthly household expenditures 
Apart from the human capital investment, I also consider the impact of credit on 
daily household consumption including food and other household spending (non-
food, housing expenditure, etc).
53
 Credit participation positively and significantly 
affects the other household spending but insignificantly affects food expenditure.  
5.4.3 PSM estimation 
In this section, kernel (with the default bandwidth of 0.06) and radius matching 
(with the default radius of 0.1) PSM results of the credit impact on education and 
healthcare expenditure are discussed.
54
 Beginning with the same sets of covariates 
used in the OLS and Tobit regressions; interaction terms were also used to get 
balancing in estimating the propensity scores.
55
 The sets of controlling covariates 
should meet conditions of matching controlling variables discussed in Imbens 
(2004), Lee (2005), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) among others. Appendix 5.5 
presents discussion on how I chose covariates in the score estimation stage. 
5.4.3.1 Impact on education expenditure 
My base specifications (S1 and S3 in Table 5.5) use the same set of covariates as 
used in Models 1 and 3 (Table 5.3) for the Tobit regressions to estimate the 
scores. Though I do not have panel data to apply the difference-in-difference 
matching estimator which is believed to be considerably better than cross-
sectional matching estimators, inclusion of the pre-treatment household income 
and assets may reduce bias associated with unobservable characteristics (Imbens 
& Wooldridge, 2009; Mosley, 1997). The credit effects when pre-treatment 
income and assets are included in the matching are reported in the second (S2) and 
fourth rows (S4) of Table 5.5. The purpose of changes in model specifications 
between S1 and S3, and between S2 and S4 is to check the sensitivity of the effect.  
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 http://www.moh.gov.vn/homebyt/vn/portal  
53
 Estimates are reported in Appendix 5.1. 
54
 For discussion on implementation of various matching estimators and their advantages and 
disadvantages, see Appendix 5.4. 
55
 By doing so I may compare the estimation results. 
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Figure 5.1 below shows the kernel densities of the propensity scores when 
pre-treatment income and assets are included alongside the other controlling 
variables (S4 in Table 5.5). My matching satisfies the overlap and common 
support assumption (see more discussion in Appendix 5.6). The figure illustrates a 
substantial overlap in the distributions. The propensity scores range from 0.418 to 
0.943 and from 0.174 to 0.940 for borrowers and non-borrowers, 
respectively,
56&57
 but the means of scores are not much different (0.761 and 0.675 
for borrower and non-borrower groups, respectively). The following estimation of 
the average treatment effect is restricted to the area of common support, where the 
two distributions overlap. Thus, some non-borrowers who are quite unlike the 
borrowers are not used in the comparison.  
The estimates of the average treatment effect of credit participation on the 
treated (ATT) are reported in Table 5.5 for the whole sample.
58
 There is little 
difference in results between the two matching approaches used. Matching just on 
household characteristics and location dummies (S1 and S3), the effect of credit is 
observed to be statistically significant at the 1% level. After including the pre-
treatment income and assets (S2 and S4) the estimated impact of credit 
participation on education spending declines but is still significant at the 5% level. 
According to these PSM estimates, the borrowers on average spent about 
VND81 to VND99 thousand more on education per month than do their similar 
non-borrower counterparts. These estimates are lower than those from the Tobit 
model (which were about 119 to VND133 thousand, equivalent to about US$7.1 
to US$7.8). 
                                                 
56
 Probit estimation for constructing propensity scores is reported in Appendix 5.2. 
57
 Some studies suggest that the estimation should be in the range of 0.1 to 0.9, but there are 44 
observations having greater scores than 0.9 (about 11% of the sample); if dropped, the estimates 
will be misleading (Crump et al, 2009). 
58
 Estimations of the whole sample and sub-sample of households having school-age children give 
very similar results since PSM selects similar non-borrowers in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcomes. 
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Figure 5.1: Propensity of scores for borrowers and non-borrowers to 
estimate ATT for education expenditure 
 
Note: The propensity scores of control units outside the common support were cut off  
5.4.3.2 Impacts on healthcare expenditure 
Figure 5.2: Propensity of scores for borrowers and non-borrowers to 
estimate ATT for healthcare expenditure
59
 
 
Note: The propensity scores of control units outside the common support are cut off 
Figure 5.2 shows the kernel densities of the propensity scores estimated for 
evaluating the impact of credit on healthcare expenditure. The scores are from 
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 The sets of variables used for estimating scores to draw Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are different. Each 
set of the variables should affect both credit participation and outcomes (education expenditure in 
Figure 5.1 and healthcare expenditure in Figure 5.2). That is why two figures are slightly different. 
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when the pre-treatment income and assets are included alongside the other 
controlling variables in constructing the matches (S4 in Table 5.6). The propensity 
scores range from 0.348 to 0.989 for borrowers and from 0.195 to 0.962 for non-
borrowers.
60
 The estimation of the average treatment effect is restricted to the 
common support. 
The estimates of credit impact on healthcare expenditure are reported in 
Table 5.6. The estimates show that the effect of credit participation on healthcare 
expenditure is positive and statistically significant no matter which set of 
covariates and which matching approach are used. Borrowers spent about at least 
VND93 thousand more on healthcare than similar non-borrowers did. 
The matching should be less biased than results from OLS or Tobit because 
matching compares borrowers only with similar non-borrowers. Nevertheless, the 
“similarity” of non-borrowers to borrowers is built on observed characteristics, so 
bias may still exist if unobservables affect both treatment participation and 
outcomes of interest. The assumption is easily violated if we are unable to control 
for all variables, especially the unobservables that affect both the treatment 
participation and outcomes (Bryson, Dorsett, & Purdon, 2002). However, since I 
focus only on the poor, the disparity in unobservables between borrowers and 
non-borrowers may not be so large. Furthermore, I also controlled for household 
pre-treatment income and assets which are more likely to be associated with some 
unobservable attributes such as motivation, entrepreneurial ability and skills. As a 
result, the bias may be reduced and the reliability of the matching estimates 
improved. 
5.4.4 Multiple ordered treatment effect  
In this section, multiple treatment effects are estimated to contrast the impacts of 
informal and formal credit on education and healthcare expenditure. An additional 
advantage of multiple treatment effects is that they may help to detect potential 
bias associated with unobservable characteristics, which estimates of binary 
treatment effects are unable to deal with (Lee, 2005). This usage follows from a 
suggestion of Lee (2005) to explore the presence of selection bias by checking 
whether the main scenario of treatment effect is coherent with auxiliary findings. 
Specifically, applying the multiple ordered treatment effects in the current context 
treats credit from formal sources (F) as a full treatment, and credit from informal 
                                                 
60
 The Probit estimation for constructing propensity scores is reported in Appendix 5.3. 
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sources (I) as a partial treatment.
61
 When the treatment level is increased, the 
effect will become stronger (a good treatment). In contrast, if the treatment is 
reduced, then the effect will be weaker (a bad treatment). Assume that our 
expectation is a positive effect, but is not confirmed by multiple ordered treatment 
effects, then the initial causal findings (from binary treatment) are questionable 
and may be due to some unobserved attributes (Lee, 2005, p. 119). On the other 
hand, if there is no hidden bias, the treatment effect of the full treated group (F) is 
expected to be higher than that of the partial treated group (I), and in turn the 
effect of group (I) is greater than that of the non-borrower group (N), controlling 
for the same set of covariates Xi.  
One may question that the counterfactuals of the informal and formal groups 
are different, so their treatment effects are not comparable. To overcome this 
issue, I directly compare the informal and formal credit groups, set either of them 
as a control group and if the estimation outcome is consistent with the multiple 
treatment effect, then the unobserved confounder will be confirmed. 
The estimations of the multiple treatment effects using the PSM method can 
employ the conventional matching estimators (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). In the 
first stage of score estimation, the multinomial Logit (or Probit) model is used 
(Lechner, 2001). If the treatment is logically ordered, the ordered Logit/Probit is 
applied instead (Imbens, 2000). Nevertheless, the multinomial or ordered 
Logit/Probit are quite burdensome, hence a series of binary treatment estimations 
may be used instead (Caliendo & Hujer, 2005; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; 
Lechner, 2001). I follow this strategy and in turn compare the formal credit group 
with the non-borrowing group, the informal credit group with the non-borrowing 
group, and the formal credit group with the informal credit group. 
Estimates of the multiple treatment effects on education expenditure are 
reported in Table 5.7. The estimation procedure is similar to binary treatment 
effects in Section 5.4.2. In S1 and S3, household characteristics are used to 
construct the scores, then pre-treatment income and assets are controlled for in S2 
and S4.  The estimated impacts for informal credit are in columns 2 and 3, and the 
estimates for formal credit effect are in columns 4 and 5.  
                                                 
61
 Mean of accumulated loans per household is VND8,317 (about US$500) and VND15,135 
thousand (about US$920) for informal and formal credit respectively, and average size per loan is 
VND5,229 thousand (about USD317) and 9,327 thousand (about USD566) for informal and 
formal credit respectively.  
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The estimates show that informal credit has no significant effect on 
household education expenditure. In contrast, formal credit strongly affects 
education expenditure. Both kernel and radius matching estimators display similar 
estimates that are statistically significant at the 1% level. To guard against the 
higher impact of formal credit on education expenditure being attributed to better 
household characteristics (higher pre-treatment income and assets), I included 
these variables in the first stage of propensity score matching.  
A further step to confirm the absence of hidden bias is to directly compare 
impacts of formal credit (a higher level of treatment) to informal credit (a lower 
level of treatment). Estimates of the difference between the formal and informal 
credit are shown in the last column of Table 5.7. The estimates are consistent 
across the specifications of the matching variables. The higher credit level 
(treatment level) leads to a greater positive impact; suggesting that serious bias 
due to unobservables is not detected. Consequently, the positive treatment effect 
of credit on education expenditure appears to be collaborated. 
Likewise, I look at the impact on healthcare spending of formal and 
informal credit, and the difference in impacts of formal and informal credit. The 
impact estimates of informal credit and formal credit on healthcare expenditure 
are reported in Table 5.8. The results of the difference in impacts between formal 
and informal credit are presented in the last column of Table 5.8. The impact of 
informal credit is positive but only marginally significant at the 10% level. In 
contrast, the impact of formal credit on healthcare is more than double the effect 
of informal credit, although not precisely estimated (statistically significant at the 
10 percent-level).  
Using multiple ordered treatment effects can either undermine (if 
unobserved biases are present) or enhance (if no unobserved biases) findings of 
the initial binary treatment effect. While the multiple treatment effect method 
itself is unable to overcome unobservable bias, it helps to avoid being misled in 
interpreting binary treatment effect estimates (Lee, 2005, p. 121). In the current 
case, the higher treatment level has greater positive impacts on healthcare and 
education expenditure, suggesting that there are no other potential factors or 
confounders affecting credit participation and healthcare/education expenditure. 
As a result, the positive treatment effects of credit on healthcare and education are 
confirmed. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents estimates of the impacts of credit participation on the poor‟s 
education and healthcare expenditure in peri-urban areas of HCMC, Vietnam 
using a new survey designed to meet the conditions for the PSM method. 
The main conclusions from the estimates are as follows: First, OLS and 
Tobit estimates show that credit participation has positive and significant effects 
on household education and healthcare spending but not on food expenditure. As 
expected, my estimation results indicate that for the poor in peri-urban areas of 
Vietnam, the impact on food expenditure is not significant, which contrasts to 
Quach, Mullineux and Murinde (2005) who found that credit participation has 
positive and significant impact on per capita food expenditure in rural areas of 
Vietnam. Furthermore, food expenditure is a good proxy for household 
consumption and I find that food expenditure is much smaller impacted than 
spending on education and healthcare (human capital formation); therefore, 
facilitating access to credit for the poor is very important to support investments 
that can sustainably eliminate poverty.  
Second, the PSM estimates of the average treatment effect show that 
borrowers spent more on education and healthcare than their similar non-
borrowers. Credit participation has highly positive and significant effects on the 
poor‟s healthcare and education spending in the peri-urban areas.  
The PSM estimates are considerably lower and less biased than those of the 
OLS because PSM compares borrowers with similar non-borrowers. I focus on 
the poor so that the disparity between treatment and control units is little. I also 
controlled for the pre-treatment income which is more likely to be associated with 
some main unobservable attributes such as motivation, entrepreneurial ability and 
skills. Therefore, my estimation strategy is likely to reduce the bias and improve 
the reliability of the matching estimates. Furthermore, all the treated units are 
within the common support and no treated units are dropped when estimating the 
ATT effect, thus my estimates may not be misleading.  
Third, this study employs the multiple treatment effects and shows that only 
formal credit impacted positively and significantly on household education and 
healthcare spending. The ordering of results suggests that no other important 
unobserved factors substantially affected credit participation and the outcomes; 
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hence the reported effects of household credit on education and healthcare 
spending may be robust.  
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TABLES 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics and t-values for equal means by borrowing status 
Variables 
Borrowers Non-borrowers t-
value  Mean  Std.Dev Mean  Std.Dev 
Pre-treatment or fixed variables      
Head‟s gender (male=1)  0.507 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.03 
Head education (year) 4.911 3.35 4.664 3.76 0.60 
Married (yes=1) 0.648 0.478 0.607 0.491 0.74 
Head‟s age 52.901 13.97 59.467 15.46 3.87** 
Household size 5.191 2.343 4.523 2.597 2.34* 
Children below 6 years old (yes=1) 0.309 0.463 0.178 0.384 2.89** 
Children from 6 to 18 years old 1.118 1.024 0.869 1.100 2.05* 
Persons from 18 to 60 years old 3.230 1.694 2.692 1.793 2.71** 
Older-than-60 persons (yes=1) 0.352 0.478 0.533 0.352 3.25** 
Distance to nearest bank (Km) 2.226 2.098 1.804 1.900 1.93+ 
Distance to nearest market (Km) 1.409 1.032 1.085 0.872 3.10** 
Have a phone (yes=1) 0.809 0.394 0.644 0.481 3.18** 
Internet/newspapers (yes=1) 0.053 0.224 0.037 0.191 0.68 
Have a TV and radio (yes=1) 0.944 0.230 0.925 0.264 0.66 
Durable and fixed assets acquired over 
24 months prior to the survey 
849,924 821,335 786,097 795,593 0.71 
Pre-treatment income per capita 3,592 814 3,505 925 0.86 
Post-treatment variables      
Total monthly food expenditure 2,122.6 1,247 1,874.3 1,355 1.66+ 
Total monthly non-food expenditure
(a)
 1,525.3 1,612 1,206.2 1,309 2.04* 
Total monthly education expenditure 269.10 332 155.25 239 3.80** 
Total monthly education expenditure
(b) 
324.67 347 234.51 267 2.21* 
Total monthly health care expenditure 299.67 582 220.84 552 1.25 
Total monthly housing expenditure
(c) 
199.39 274 145.64 163 2.41* 
Monthly expenditure (food, nonfood, 
education, healthcare, housing) 
4,416.1 2738 3,602.2 2,597 2.75** 
Monthly expenditure per capita 918.18 589 878.41 533 0.60 
Notes: t-value statistically significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**); assets, income, and 
expenditures are in VND 1,000. 
(a)
This includes daily and yearly non-food expenditure excluding 
health, education and housing expenditure; 
(b)
for a sub-sample of households having children 
below 18 years old; 
(c)
this includes garbage disposal, electricity bill, drinking and water bill, 
housing maintenance expenses. Exchange rate USD/VND=16,481 in 2008. 
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Table 5.2: Testing for positive selection into credit participation (OLS estimation) 
Explanatory variables  No control Controls(1) Controls(2) 
Credit participation (yes=1) 86.86 170.72 0.068 
 (0.86) (1.81)+ (2.05)* 
Head‟s gender (male=1)  44.39 0.017 
  (0.45) (0.53) 
Household head‟s age  40.37 0.013 
  (1.97)* (1.89)+ 
Head‟s age squared  -0.36 -0.000 
  (2.00)* (1.90)+ 
Head‟s education  (years of schooling)  0.50 0.001 
  (0.04) (0.17) 
Head‟s marital status (married=1)  65.77 0.016 
  (0.58) (0.42) 
Household size in logarithm  -180.11 -0.065 
  (2.16)* (2.45)* 
Long Truong ward  -918.24 -0.226 
  (7.20)** (4.98)** 
Long Phuoc ward  -238.79 -0.020 
  (1.87)+ (0.44) 
Phuoc Binh ward  -609.26 -0.119 
  (4.40)** (2.44)* 
Constant 3,505.50 3,034.35 7.918 
 (39.26)** (5.08)** (38.24)** 
R-squared 0.002 0.202 0.160 
Observations 411 411 411 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; +significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 
1%; Dependent variable is the pre-treatment income per capita (in VND1,000) in Control and 
Controls(1), and in natural logarithm in Controls(2). The ward TNPA is set as a reference dummy 
for other wards. 
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Table 5.3: Tobit estimates of the impact on education expenditure for a sub-sample of 
households having children from 6 to 18 years old 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model specification  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit impact 127.43 119.22 132.66 121.02 87.24 79.23 92.93 83.92 
Credit  140.34 131.29 146.09 133.28 96.07 87.25 102.34 92.42 
participation (2.61)** (2.45)* (2.77)** (2.55)* (2.48)* (2.27)* (2.63)** (2.39)* 
Head‟s  76.31 71.30 64.39 58.50 55.57 51.74 54.61 50.57 
gender (1.57) (1.48) (1.34) (1.24) (1.59) (1.49) (1.55) (1.45) 
Head‟s age 1.94 1.99 1.74 1.46 -1.21 -1.14 0.85 0.69 
 (1.07) (1.10) (1.03) (0.88) (0.92) (0.88) (0.68) (0.56) 
Head‟s   18.77 17.14 21.37 19.53 12.32 11.12 11.71 10.51 
education  (2.70)** (2.48)* (3.11)** (2.87)** (2.46)* (2.24)* (2.31)* (2.09)* 
Marital status 31.71 25.78 18.17 2.94 -19.66 -26.22 24.83 13.01 
(married=1) (0.55) (0.45) (0.32) (0.05) (0.47) (0.63) (0.60) (0.32) 
School child  59.51 129.61   -501.42 -447.92   
ratio (0.39) (0.83)   (4.52)** (4.00)**   
Pre-treatment   34.95  55.70  63.28  64.31 
income in log  (0.43)  (0.70)  (1.07)  (1.08) 
Pre-treatment   39.94  46.69  26.82  28.95 
assets in log  (2.24)*  (2.69)**  (2.09)*  (2.25)* 
Children 6 to    72.41 84.81   -72.31 -63.75 
18 years old   (2.93)** (3.43)**   (3.97)** (3.48)** 
Constant -79.01 -879.6 -160.73 -1,186 329.30 -535.02 136.00 -742.89 
 (0.48) (1.22) (1.17) (1.71)+ (2.78)** (1.02) (1.34) (1.44) 
Wald 2 49.83 55.03 58.16 65.86 57.61 63.17 53.24 59.52 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Uncensored  237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Censored  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Notes: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; Dependent variable for Models 1-4 are  monthly average education expenditure in VND1,000; for 
Models 5-8 are monthly average education expenditure per child. Credit impact=*(uncensored/total 
observations). All model specifications were controlled for ward dummies. 
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Table 5.4: OLS estimates of the impact on healthcare expenditure in logarithm 
Explanatory variables  
Model specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit participation  0.621 0.548 0.658 0.595 0.621 0.548 
(yes=1) (3.30)** (3.00)** (3.52)** (3.30)** (3.30)** (3.00)** 
Head‟s gender (male=1) 0.202 0.210 0.208 0.211 0.202 0.210 
 (1.18) (1.24) (1.21) (1.24) (1.18) (1.24) 
Head‟s education (years) 0.065 0.054 0.060 0.051 0.065 0.054 
 (2.67)** (2.23)* (2.43)* (2.09)* (2.67)** (2.23)* 
Head‟s marital status  -0.305 -0.356 -0.181 -0.244 -0.305 -0.356 
(married =1) (1.48) (1.75)+ (0.93) (1.27) (1.48) (1.75)+ 
Household head‟s age 0.009 0.008   0.009 0.008 
 (1.65)+ (1.60)   (1.65)+ (1.60) 
Household size in  0.761 0.727   -0.239 -0.273 
logarithm (3.98)** (3.86)**   (1.25) (1.45) 
Child below 6 years old    0.300 0.229   
(yes =1)   (2.15)* (1.67)+   
Children from 6 to 18    -0.005 0.045   
years old   (0.08) (0.73)   
Person from 18 to 60 years old   0.201 0.183   
   (4.47)** (4.25)**   
Older than 60 (yes =1)   0.513 0.510   
   (3.16)** (3.25)**   
Pre-treatment income in   0.797  0.665  0.797 
logarithm  (2.71)**  (2.23)*  (2.71)** 
Pre-treatment assets in   0.187  0.194  0.187 
logarithm  (3.32)**  (3.44)**  (3.32)** 
Constant 1.646 -7.067 2.327 -5.466 1.646 -7.067 
 (3.69)** (2.86)** (7.18)** (2.19)* (3.69)** (2.86)** 
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.11 0.16 
F_value 7.65 9.22 7.83 8.46 4.04 6.22 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; 
Dependent variable is in natural logarithm form; models 1-4 are for monthly average healthcare 
expenditure (in log); models 5 and 6 are for monthly average healthcare expenditure per capita (in log) to 
check the economy of scale. In models 3 and 4, I dropped head’s age from the models because it is highly 
correlated with the dummy of person older than 60 years old. All model specifications were controlled for 
ward dummies. 
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Table 5.5: The average treatment effect on monthly average education expenditure in 
VND1,000 using matching estimators with whole sample 
Control variables in the propensity score estimation 
Treated/ 
controls 
Kernel 
matching 
Radius 
matching 
Head‟s gender, head‟s age, head‟s education, marital 
status, school-aged child ratio, and ward dummies (S1) 
304/107 
92.696      
(31.967)** 
98.696      
(32.393)** 
S2=S1 plus initial income in log, initial assets in logarithm  304/101 
85.020      
(34.027)* 
93.022      
(31.506)** 
Head‟s gender, head‟s age, head‟s education, marital 
status, number of children from 6 to 18, and ward dummies 
(S3) 
304/107 
87.447      
(33.875)** 
93.179      
(34.182)** 
S4=S3 plus initial income in log, initial assets in logarithm 304/101 
81.232      
(34.621)* 
86.861      
(34.448)* 
 Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 repetitions, statistically significant at 10% 
(+); 5%(*); 1%(**). Only few households (10 households) have more than or equal 4 children aged 6 to 
18 years old, to get balanced easier I group them into households having 4 kids. Si are model 
specifications. 
 
Table 5.6: The average treatment effect on monthly average healthcare expenditure in 
VND1,000 using matching estimators 
Control variables in the propensity score estimation Treated/ 
controls 
Kernel 
 matching 
Radius 
 matching 
Specification 1 (S1) 304/101 
112.277      
(48.711)* 
111.267      
(49.422)* 
S2=S1 plus initial income in log, initial assets in logarithm 304/97 
93.082     
(55.382)+ 
94.016      
(56.441)+ 
Specification 3 (S3) 304/107 
122.047      
(46.442)** 
131.161      
(44.413)** 
S4 =S3 plus initial income in logarithm, initial assets in log 304/102 
108.313      
(50.301)* 
112.895      
(48.612)* 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1000 repetitions, statistically significant at 10% 
(+); 5%(*); and 1%(**). 
S1: Head’s gender, head’s age, head’s education, marital status, household size in log, head’s age*gender, 
ward dummies 
S3: Head’s gender, head’s education, marital status, dummy of child below 6, number of children from 6 to 
18 years old, persons from 18 to 60 years old, dummy of older than 60 years old, head’s age*education, 
and ward dummies. 
 104 
Table 5.7: The average treatment effect on monthly average education expenditure in 
VND1,000 using matching estimators with whole sample 
Control variables in the 
propensity score estimation 
Informal credit  
vs.  
Non-borrowers 
Formal credit  
vs.  
Non-borrowers 
Formal vs. 
Informal 
ATTK ATTR ATTK ATTR ATTR 
Specification 1 (S1) 
35.283 
(38.173) 
26.968 
(37.641) 
152.813 
(47.642)** 
159.717 
(46.162)** 
111.607 
(44.662)* 
Specification 2 (S2) 
10.963 
(40.052) 
13.056 
(39.539) 
148.027 
(46.321)** 
146.784 
(48.596)** 
117.417 
(48.373)* 
Specification 3 (S3) 
33.991 
(37.867) 
24.652 
(36.579) 
144.884 
(46.097)** 
159.113 
(44.351)** 
108.720 
(42.935)* 
Specification 4 (S4) 
7.750 
(39.834) 
13.440 
(38.605) 
145.492 
(45.875)** 
148.440 
(48.368)** 
118.657 
(50.221)* 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications, statistically significant at 
10% (+); 5%(*); 1%(**). 
S1: Head’s gender, head’s age, head’s education, marital status, ward dummies, school-aged child ratio, 
and head’s age*head’s gender. 
S2: Head’s gender, head’s age, head’s education, marital status, ward dummies, school-aged child ratio, 
head’s age*head’s education, initial income in logarithm, initial assets in logarithm. 
S3: Head’s gender, head’s age, head’s education, marital status, ward dummies, number of children aged 6 
to 18 years old, and head’s age*head’s gender. 
S4: Head’s gender, head’s age, head’s education, marital status, ward dummies, number of children aged 6 
to 18 years old, head’s age*education,  initial income in logarithm, initial assets in logarithm. 
 
Table 5.8: Average treatment effect on the monthly average healthcare expenditure in 
VND1,000 using matching estimators  
Control variables in 
propensity score estimation 
Informal credit  
vs.  
Non-borrowers 
Formal credit  
vs.  
Non-borrowers 
Formal vs. 
Informal 
ATTK ATTR ATTK ATTR ATTR 
Specification 1 (S1) 
77.197       
(45.833)+ 
77.037       
(41.612)+ 
192.648       
(95.163)* 
198.287       
(98.337)* 
175.762       
(85.766)* 
S2=S1 plus initial income in 
log, initial assets in log  
65.709       
(43.060) 
68.638       
(40.846)+ 
165.153       
(96.364)+ 
183.121       
(92.470)* 
178.730       
(92.515)+ 
Specification 3 (S3) 
59.844       
(45.626) 
71.473       
(42.105)+ 
200.227       
(97.934)* 
198.616       
(97.505)* 
162.392       
(92.509)+ 
S4=S3 plus initial income in 
log, initial assets in log 
60.404       
(44.646) 
66.845       
(44.254) 
195.088       
(97.652)* 
194.632       
(96.055)* 
161.437       
(97.067)+ 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications, statistically significant at 
10% (+); 5% (*); 1% (**). In the last column of S1 and S4, the interactions are dropped to get balanced in 
the estimation of propensity scores. 
S1: Head’s gender, head’s education, marital status, head’s age, household size in logarithm, ward 
dummies, head’s age*gender. 
S3: Head’s gender, head’s education, marital status, dummy of child below 6 years old, number of children 
aged 6 to 18 years old, number of persons aged 18 to 60 years old, dummy of older than 60 years old, 
ward dummies, marital status*head’s gender. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 5.1: OLS estimates of the impact of credit on food and other household 
expenditure 
Explanatory Variables Model specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit participation  0.085 0.061 0.245 0.204 
 (1.35) (1.02) (2.77)** (2.39)* 
Head‟s gender (male=1) 0.034 0.039 -0.098 -0.089 
 (0.56) (0.66) (1.08) (0.98) 
Household head‟s age 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (0.99) (0.88) (1.33) (1.14) 
Head‟s education (years) 0.017 0.013 0.042 0.034 
 (2.22)* (1.76)+ (3.23)** (2.75)** 
Head‟s marital status 0.158 0.138 0.120 0.085 
(married=1) (2.31)* (2.07)* (1.24) (0.91) 
Household size in log 0.576 0.556 0.759 0.723 
 (7.59)** (7.54)** (7.62)** (7.49)** 
Pre-treatment income   0.243  0.392 
per capita in logarithm  (2.42)*  (2.72)** 
Pre-treatment   0.079  0.137 
assets in logarithm  (2.74)**  (5.86)** 
Constant 6.168 3.264 5.519 0.718 
 (35.64)** (3.75)** (21.60)** (0.56) 
F-value 16.73 16.78 10.98 14.10 
Prob>F (all coefficients=0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.35 0.39 0.30 0.37 
Observations 411 411 411 411 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; 
Dependent variable is in natural logarithm form; models 1 and 2 are for (monthly average) food 
expenditure (in log); models 3 and 4 are for (monthly average) other household expenditure. All model 
specifications were controlled for ward dummies. 
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Appendix 5.2: Probit estimation for constructing the propensity scores to estimate impacts 
on education expenditure for the whole sample 
Control variables 
Model specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Head‟s gender (male=1) -0.0910 -0.0926 -0.1002 -0.1051 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.60) (0.63) 
Household head‟s age -0.0165 -0.0157 -0.0175 -0.0170 
 (3.14)** (2.94)** (3.44)** (3.29)** 
Head‟s education (years) 0.0151 0.0132 0.0162 0.0143 
 (0.67) (0.58) (0.71) (0.62) 
Head‟s marital status (married=1) -0.0767 -0.1038 -0.0960 -0.1270 
 (0.44) (0.59) (0.55) (0.71) 
School child ratio 0.5207 0.6705   
 (1.34) (1.70)+   
Children from 6 to 18   0.1105 0.1373 
   (1.62) (1.98)* 
Pre-treatment income in log  0.5527  0.5593 
  (1.90)+  (1.92)+ 
Pre-treatment assets in log  0.0627  0.0653 
  (1.20)  (1.25) 
Long Truong Ward 0.5473 0.6253 0.5404 0.6166 
 (2.78)** (2.91)** (2.75)** (2.86)** 
Long Phuoc Ward 0.4852 0.4820 0.4761 0.4704 
 (2.49)* (2.44)* (2.44)* (2.39)* 
Phuoc Binh Ward 0.2571 0.2725 0.2191 0.2242 
 (1.23) (1.23) (1.04) (1.01) 
Constant 1.1461 -4.2521 1.2127 -4.2458 
 (2.86)** (1.68)+ (3.19)** (1.68)+ 
LR 2 26.86 32.29 27.70 33.34 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 411 411 411 411 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; among 411 households, there are 304 borrowing households and 107 non-borrowing 
households.     
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Appendix 5.3: Probit estimation for constructing the propensity scores to estimate impacts 
on health care expenditure  
Control variables 
Model specification 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Head‟s gender (male=1) -0.8468 -0.7924 -0.0963 -0.1096 
 (1.50) (1.40) (0.57) (0.64) 
Head‟s age (year) -0.0312 -0.0302   
 (3.98)** (3.83)**   
Head‟s education (years) 0.0112 0.0099 0.0622 0.0581 
 (0.48) (0.42) (0.96) (0.90) 
Head‟s marital status  -0.3759 -0.3876 -0.1372 -0.1556 
(married=1) (1.93)+ (1.97)* (0.77) (0.87) 
Household size in  0.6680 0.6957   
logarithm (4.28)** (4.37)**   
Child below 6 years old    0.3426 0.3146 
(yes=1)   (2.02)* (1.84)+ 
Children aged 6 to 18   0.1194 0.1426 
   (1.74)+ (2.05)* 
Persons aged 18 to 60   0.0967 0.0977 
   (2.06)* (2.05)* 
Older than 60 person    -0.3832 -0.3779 
(yes=1)   (2.06)* (2.03)* 
Pre-treatment income in   0.6096  0.5950 
logarithm  (2.04)*  (2.02)* 
Pre-treatment assets in   0.0249  0.0334 
logarithm  (0.46)  (0.64) 
Head‟s age*gender 0.0143 0.0130   
 (1.42) (1.29)   
Head‟s age*education    -0.0007 -0.0007 
   (0.64) (0.60) 
Long Truong Ward  0.4348 0.5547 0.5245 0.6387 
 (2.16)* (2.52)* (2.60)** (2.91)** 
Long Phuoc Ward  0.4086 0.4100 0.5036 0.5049 
 (2.05)* (2.04)* (2.56)* (2.54)* 
Phuoc Binh Ward   0.0366 0.0837 0.1223 0.1665 
 (0.17) (0.37) (0.55) (0.71) 
Constant 1.3743 -4.0387 0.0202 -5.3013 
 (2.54)* (1.56) (0.08) (2.11)* 
LR 2 46.45 51.25 36.99 41.81 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 411 411 411 411 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; among 411 households, there are 304 borrowing households and 107 non-borrowing 
households.     
 
 108 
Appendix 5.4: Implementation of propensity score matching
62
  
The procedure of propensity score matching (PSM) estimation consists of two 
stages. In the first stage, probit (or logit) is used to estimate the propensity score 
(pscore) or probability of receiving treatment conditioning on control variables, 
and then stratifies individuals or households into blocks according to their scores. 
In the second stage, the estimated propensity scores will then be used together 
with various average treatment effect estimators to obtain estimates of the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Each matching estimator and its advantages 
and disadvantages is discussed below. 
 Nearest neighbour matching (ATTND/ATTNW) 
For this matching method, one observation, that is closest to the treated 
observation in terms of the propensity score, from the control group is selected as 
a matching partner for a treated observation. The ATT is computed by averaging 
over the unit-level treatment effects of the treated. If there are multiple nearest 
neighbours (controls) that have the same propensity score, the average outcome of 
those controls is used. Bad matching is a drawback of this matching method 
because the nearest control unit(s) can be very far, in terms of the score, from the 
treated observation. 
 Stratification matching (ATTS) 
The ATTS estimator first estimates difference in average outcomes of treated and 
controls within the same block or interval for which the score has found all the 
control variables to be balanced. Then the ATT for the whole sample is computed 
using a weighted average of the block-specific treatment effects. The weight for 
each block is assigned by the corresponding fraction of treated units and the 
number of blocks. This approach is also called interval matching, blocking or sub-
classification (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984). The main drawback of stratification 
matching is that the closest control units to a treated unit may come from a 
neighbouring block, but those units are not used to match with the treated unit, 
while farther control units in the same block with the treated unit are used to 
match.  
 Kernel weighted matching (ATTK)  
The ATTK is computed averaging over the unit-level treatment effects of the 
treated where the outcome of control unit(s) matched to a treated unit is obtained 
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as the kernel-weighted average of control unit outcomes. The ATTK uses 
weighted averages of all observations in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome. The weights assigned to each unit in the control group 
depend on distance to the treated unit. The closer the distance, the higher weight 
will be assigned to the control unit. In other words, the weights are inversely 
proportional to the distance between propensity scores of the treated and a control 
unit. One advantage of the kernel matching is the lower variance (more efficiency) 
than that of nearest neighbour matching because more information from all or 
nearly all control units is used. The disadvantage of this approach is bad matching 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008, p. 43) because few or many far-distance control 
units are used to match with one treated unit. 
 Radius matching (ATTR)  
The ATTR estimate is computed by averaging over the unit-level treatment effects 
of the treated where control unit(s) within a pre-defined radius of propensity 
scores (for example, 0.1) is/are matched to a treated unit. If there are more than 
one control unit within a radius, the average outcome of those control units is 
used. This approach can avoid the bad matches found in the nearest neighbour 
matching and can overcomes the drawback of stratification matching, so the 
quality of matching rises (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008, p. 42). In theory, the 
smaller the radius, the better the quality matching becomes since matched control 
units and the treated unit have close scores. Radius matching, however, uses those 
treated units that have control matches within a radius, so if the radius is very 
small, many treated units are not matched and hence dropped. Therefore, the ATT 
by the radius matching estimator is no longer representative of the population of 
the treated units (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Smith & Todd, 2005). 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, p. 44) summarize trade-offs between bias and 
efficiency (low variance) for the matching estimators. No method outweighs, so 
choosing methods depends on the data structure at hand (Zhao, 2003). According 
to Zhao, the key data requirement for the PSM is that at each propensity score 
value or small score interval, the number of both treated and control observations 
is large enough to avoid the treated unit dropouts due to being not matched. In 
addition, if there is/are matches within a smaller (score) radius, the quality of 
matching will be improved, and matching estimates will be less biased.  
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In the empirical studies, ATTK and ATTR are more commonly employed 
because the possibility of more control units used is higher for ATTK and ATTR 
relative to the other matching estimators, so they are more efficient. 
Appendix 5.5: Choice of covariates for the propensity score estimation  
In the PSM method, choosing covariates is important because they affect the 
estimation outcomes. According to Lee (2005, p. 44), chosen covariate Xi must be 
pre-treatment and affect both outcome (Y) and the treatment (D – credit 
participation). In addition, to avoid the causality bias, Xi should not be affected by 
D, hence post-treatment covariates should not be controlled for because they will 
remove part (or all) of the effect of D on Y.  
The unconfoundedness assumption or conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) implies that the observable control covariates 
should not be affected by treatment, and the outcomes of interest are independent 
of treatment assignment. Thus, included variables should either be fixed over time 
or be measured before the treatment intervention (Caliendo & Kopienig 2008, p. 
38). The pre-treatment measured variables also must not be affected by 
anticipation of the treatment participation (Imbens, 2004). For example, if 
households know they will receive credit, this may lead to higher consumption 
even before the household was lent the money.  
Furthermore, variables should be excluded if they are either unrelated to the 
outcome or not proper covariates of the treatment participation decision model 
(Bryson et at, 2002; Rubin & Thomas, 1996). A variable that affects only credit 
participation but not treatment outcome is not necessary to control for because the 
outcome of interest is not affected by this variable. On the other hand, if a variable 
affects only the outcome but not the treatment participation, one should not 
control for since the variable will not make any significant differences between 
the treatment and control groups. Consequently, only variables that influence 
simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome should be included in 
the score estimation stage (Bryson, Dorsett, & Purdon, 2002, p. 24). 
Finally, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997) state that exclusion of important variables could seriously increase bias in 
estimates. But a covariate is not, or only weakly, correlated with outcomes and the 
treatment may reduce precision of estimates (Imbens, 2004, p. 23). In the presence 
of uncertainty, however, it is better to include too many rather than too few 
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covariates (Bryson, Dorsett, & Purdon, 2002, p. 25). Furthermore, (Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999) suggest starting with the covariates linearly and checking whether 
the balancing of covariates within each stratum is obtained, and then test for 
statistical significance of differences in the distribution of covariates. As the 
balance is obtained, the specification is accepted. Otherwise, one should change 
potential covariates into higher-order terms and interactions until the balancing is 
satisfied.  
Appendix 5.6: The common support and overlap 
The second assumption of PSM is the common support. Only a subset of the 
comparison group that is comparable to the treatment group will be used, 
therefore, it is necessary to check the overlap and the common support between 
the treatment and control groups. Lechner (2001) suggests inspecting the density 
distribution of propensity scores to check the overlap and common support in 
order to see whether comparability between the treatment and control groups is 
sizeable. So, what happens if the overlap is limited? 
Imbens (2004, p. 24) points out how the PSM methods handle the lack of 
overlap. Accordingly, the probability or score receives value from 0 to 1; the 
observations with probabilities close to one will receive high weights, leading to 
an increase in variance of the average treatment effect estimator. As a result, 
Imbens (2004) states that the PSM is designed to better cope with limited overlap 
in the covariate distributions than parametric regression models because adding 
control observations of outliers (scores will be near 0 or 1) in a parametric 
regression approach will lead to substantial changes in estimated coefficients.  
What happens if the assumption of the common support is violated? If 
treated and control observations fall outside of the common support, they need to 
be dropped. If the number of outside-common support observations of treatment 
group is large, estimate of the within-common support observations may be 
misrepresentative and misleading (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Imbens, 2004). 
Therefore, ignoring the common support problem or estimating subpopulation 
within the common support may give misleading estimates and inferences 
(Lechner, 2001).  
Furthermore, the lack of overlap in covariate distributions between control 
and treatment groups could lead to imprecise estimates and could cause the 
estimators to be sensitive to choice of specification (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, & 
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Mitnik, 2009). The evaluators often use a strategy of trimming the sample to 
address the limited overlap. Crump et al (2009) suggest a simple rule of thumb to 
discard all units of both control and treatment groups which have an estimated 
propensity score outside the range [0.1, 0.9]; these authors believe that the 
precision gain from the approach is substantial with most of the gain captured. 
This is because (i) using Probit and Logit models to estimate the scores will give 
more different results when the propensity scores are close to 1 or 0; (ii) for units 
with scores close to 1 or 0, the weights could be large so these units may 
considerably affect the estimates of treatment effects, and hence the estimates 
become imprecise (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009, p. 35). However, Crump et al 
(2009) also warn that potentially some external validity is lost by changing the 
focus to average treatment effects for a subset in the range [0.1, 0.9] of the 
original sample if the dropout observations significantly affect the estimated result 
when a large number of observations is discarded; the estimates could be 
misleading even if the strategy of estimation improves the lack of overlap. 
Appendix 5.7: Tests for weak instruments 
In this appendix, tests for instrumental variable (IV) are presented in which tests 
for weak instruments are emphasized. Three groups of potential instruments are: 
pre-treatment income (in log) and assets (in log); distance to the nearest bank 
within each ward; and a combination of all these instruments. So, three models 
with three IV groups will be run separately. 
Three strategies to detect the weak instruments are utilised. The first 
strategy is to check covariance correlations between the endogenous variable 
(credit participation) and the potential instruments (see Appendix 5.7 Table 1):   
Appendix 5.7 Table 1: Pairwise correlations between credit participation and 
potential instruments 
Pre-treatment 
income 
in log 
Pre-treatment 
assets 
in log 
Distance to nearest bank 
TNPA 
ward 
PB 
ward 
LT 
ward 
LP 
ward 
0.0785 0.0662 -0.1182 -0.0717 0.1023 0.0801 
This table shows low gross correlation coefficients implying considerable 
efficiency loss when using the IV model compared to the conventional models 
(OLS, Tobit) (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Belzil, 2007; Murray, 2006; Stock 
& Yogo, 2002). The correlations in this table, however, are not so low to suspect 
the weak instrument problems. Some coefficients are above 0.10, and the lowest is 
0.0662. This prompts more sophisticated tests to confirm weak instruments. 
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The second strategy is to use the Hausman test for Tobit models of 
education expenditure (education expenditure is restricted to a sub-sample of 
households having children aged 6 to 18). Results of the tests are presented in 
Appendix 5.7 Tables 2 for the three groups of instruments. In the first stage, 
Probit model is used to predict probability of credit participation (yhat) and its 
residuals (resid). In the second stage, either the yhat or a combination of resid and 
credit participation variable is plugged in Tobit model for education expenditure.
63
 
The Hausman test then is applied to test endogeneity of credit participation. The 
Hausman test results show that the null hypothesis (difference in coefficients of 
the conventional Tobit and two-stage Tobit model is not systematic) is accepted 
for all three models (the last row of Appendix 5.7 Table 2). Consequently, the 
instruments are weak, and hence IV models are inappropriate in my case.  
Furthermore, when the normal distribution assumption of dependent 
variable in the first stage is ignored, IVTOBIT model with joint estimation (two 
equations are simultaneously estimated) may be applied. The Wald test results for 
exogeneity of credit participation are presented in Appendix 5.7 Table 3. For a 
group of instruments of pre-treatment income per capita and pre-treatment assets, 
the test reject the hypothesis (exogeneity of credit participation) at the 10% level, 
but the first stage F-statistic is very low (only F-statistic=2.87, much smaller than 
10). This casts doubt on the validity of these instruments, and instruments are 
weak. For instrument of distance to nearest bank within each ward and a 
combination of all instruments, the test accepts the hypotheses (see columns 2 and 
3 in Appendix 5.7 Table 3). Indeed, the estimated coefficient of credit 
participation is very imprecise and seriously inconsistent, and this confirms that 
the instruments are weak as indicated in Angrist et al (1996) and Belzil (2007). 
The third strategy is to apply the approach by Stock and Yogo (2005) to test 
weak instruments, and the Hansen J Statistic to test validity of instruments (over-
identification test) of linear instrumental variable models of healthcare 
expenditure. Further, due to possible weak instruments, Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator may be less of bias problem and 
performs better than 2SLS estimator (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Stock, 2010). In 
addition, since a sample of 411 households may be small, the robust LIML IV 
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estimator for small sample is employed (ivreg2 command in Stata
®
 with options 
of “small” along with “liml, robust”).  
Results of the tests are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix 5.7 
Tables 4 for the three groups of instruments. The Hansen J Statistic for over-
identification test for the three models accepts the hypothesis of over-
identification for all the three models. However, results of weak identification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic) are always much lower than Stock-Yogo 
weak identification test critical values for all three models, suggesting that the 
instruments are weak, and the point estimates are very biased and seriously 
inconsistent, thus, it is unable to predict the magnitude of the effects accurately 
when applying IV models (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Belzil, 2007; Murray, 
2006; Stock & Yogo, 2002).  
Separate regressions for each instrument (pre-treatment income, assets, and 
the distance to the nearest banks) were also run, and I observed that all of the test 
results accept the null hypothesis of weak instrument. In short, the potential 
instruments are weak, thus the conventional estimators provide less biased 
estimates than 2SLS/IV estimators do (Murray, 2006, Stock, 2010; Stock & Yogo, 
2002). 
 In the above tests, with the joint estimation procedure (treatment 
participation and outcome equation), the normal distribution assumption of the 
first stage dependent variable was ignored even though it is a binary variable. This 
is because Wooldridge (2002) states that binary endogenous variable is not a 
problem, that is, one may ignore the assumption. The joint estimation procedure 
may be acceptable since non-fulfilment of the normality assumption may not be 
critical as it appears because the OLS still remain unbiased Gurajati (1995, p. 
543). However, the estimates that ignored the assumption are woefully inefficient 
(Nichols, 2009).  
 Treatment effect model may be a solution to the problem of non-fulfilment 
of the normality assumption of binary endogenous variable in the first stage. The 
binary endogenous regressor (credit participation) is viewed as a treatment 
indicator, hence this estimation is considered as the treatment effect model. Error 
terms (ui of main equation, and vi of instrumental equation) are assumed to be 
correlated, that is, cov(ui, vi) = 
 
where ui ~ NID(0, 
 and vi ~ N(0,1)This 
model offers an estimator similar to IV estimator in the case of a single binary 
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endogenous variable, and it improves efficiency of estimates (Nichols, 2009, p. 
56). For the treatment effect model (treatreg in Stata®), the Lambda or inverse 
Mills‟ ratio is estimated in the first stage and then is included in the second stage 
to correct for selection bias. Both manual 2SLS and treatreg provide consistent 
estimates, but the treatreg is more efficient because it uses information about the 
rest of the system that the 2SLS ignores. Accordingly, three models with the same 
specifications of the models in Appendix 5.7 Table 4 are regressed, and estimation 
results are presented in Appendix 5.7 Table 5. The purpose of the treatment effect 
model is to examine whether the first (treatment selection) and the second 
(outcome) model are independent. The Likelihood Ratio test results of 
independence between the selection equation and outcome equation (Ho:  = 0) 
accepts the Ho for all models at the 5% level. This casts doubt on the validity of 
instruments and weak instruments used in the models.  
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Appendix 5.7 Table 2: Hausman test for IVTOBIT model  
Estimator (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Two-stage  
Tobit (i) 
Two-stage 
 Tobit (i) 
Two-stage 
 Tobit (i) 
Tobit 
(bi) 
Credit participation 
(standard error) 
902.00 
(408.67)* 
-169.16 
(694.60) 
622.69 
(338.22)
+
 
146.09   
(52.81)** 
Controlling variables: 
Head‟s sex, age, 
education, marital 
status, number of 
school-age children, 
ward dummies 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
LR 2 (all coeffs=0) 
Prob >2  
61.63 
0.0000 
58.37 
0.0000 
60.19 
0.0000 
58.16 
0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0175 0.0166 0.0988 0.0165 
First stage statistic      
Pseudo R
2
 0.0927 0.0870 0.0988  
Wald 2 (all coeffs=0) 
Prob >2  
24.40 
0.0066 
21.46 
0.0441 
26.10 
0.0251 
 
Excluded instruments Pre-
treatment 
income per 
capita in 
log,  pre-
treatment 
assets 
in log 
Distance to 
the nearest 
bank within 
each ward 
Pre-treatment 
income per 
capita in log,  
pre-treatment 
assets in log, 
distance to the 
nearest bank 
within each 
ward 
No  
Hausman test (H0: 
b=2
Prob > 2  
3.47 
 
0.9426 
0.21 
 
1.0000 
2.03 
 
0.9909 
 
Comment: Hausman test results accept the hypothesis H0 that difference in coefficients is 
not systematic, so conventional Tobit model is preferred. 
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Appendix 5.7 Table 3: Joint estimation of IVTOBIT model   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Credit participation 
coefficient (standard 
error) 
978.55 
(618.13) 
-767.38 
(1373.51) 
611.82 
(406.71) 
Controlling variables: 
Head‟s sex, age, 
education, marital status, 
number of school-age 
children, ward dummies 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
Wald 2 (all coeffs=0) 
Prob > 2 
31.16 
0.0003 
26.29 
0.0018 
46.77 
0.0000 
First stage statistic     
Adjusted R
2
 0.0670 0.0487 0.0586 
F-statistic (all coeffs=0) 
Prob  >  F  
2.87 
0.0021 
2.11 
0.0170 
2.16 
0.0100 
Excluded instruments Pre-treatment 
income per 
capita in log, 
pre-treatment 
assets 
in log 
Distance to 
the nearest 
bank within 
each ward 
Pre-treatment 
income per capita in 
log, pre-treatment 
assets in log, 
distance to the 
nearest bank within 
each ward 
Wald test of exogeneity: 2 3.76 0.98 1.76 
Prob > 2 0.0526 0.3220 0.1844 
Comment: Wald test of exogeneity accepts the hypothesis H0 that credit participation is 
exogenous, so IVTOBIT model is inappropriate. 
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Appendix 5.7 Table 4: Impact of credit participation on logarithm healthcare 
expenditure using IV estimator (LIML estimation) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Credit participation 7.9100 -4.6918 14.2241 
 (4.7870)+ (5.9965) (40.8714) 
Head‟s gender (male=1) 0.3015 0.1288 0.3880 
 (0.3771) (0.3465) (0.8931) 
Head‟s age (year) 0.0626 -0.0304 0.1092 
 (0.0378)+ (0.0462) (0.3032) 
Head‟s education  0.0208 0.0977 -0.0178 
 (0.0639) (0.0555)+ (0.2739) 
Marital status (married=1) 0.4778 -0.8759 1.1560 
 (0.7129) (0.7432) (4.4823) 
Household size in log -0.8341 1.9232 -2.2155 
 (1.1406) (1.3767) (9.0070) 
Constant -4.0270 5.7811 -8.9413 
 (3.8336) (4.7795) (31.8808) 
Location controls 
(ward dummies) 
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
F (9, 401) 1.97 2.12 0.54 
Prob > 2 0.0415 0.0272 0.8456 
Observations 411 411 411 
First stage statistic    
Excluded instruments Pre-treatment 
income in log, 
pre-treatment 
assets in log 
Distance to 
nearest bank 
within each 
ward 
Pre-treatment 
income,  
assets, 
distance to 
nearest bank 
F-value (test for instruments 
jointly equal zero) 
3.82  
[0.0228] 
1.37 
[0.2425] 
2.01     
[0.0638] 
P-value in bracket    
Partial R
2
 0.0146 0.0123 0.0275 
IV tests (LIML IV estimation) 
Under-identification test (LM 
statistic): P-value in bracket 
4.854 
[0.0883] 
4.905 
[0.2971] 
9.727 
[0.1366] 
Weak identification test 
(Wald F statistic) 
3.816 1.373 2.006 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical value at 10% 
maximal LIML size 
8.68 5.44 4.45 
Hansen J statistic (overid 
test): P-value in bracket 
1.874 
[0.1710] 
1.555 
[0.6695] 
1.561 
[0.9059] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; +significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 5.7 Table 5: Impact of credit participation on logarithm healthcare 
expenditure using Treatment Effect Model 
Controls in wage equation (1) (2) (3) 
Head‟s gender (male=1) 0.2159 0.1972 0.2130 
 (0.1690) (0.1730) (0.1686) 
Head‟s age 0.0165 0.0065 0.0150 
 (0.0069)* (0.0056) (0.0079)+ 
Head‟s education  0.0589 0.0672 0.0602 
 (0.0254)* (0.0244)** (0.0253)* 
Marital status (married=1) -0.1932 -0.3397 -0.2159 
 (0.2174) (0.2011)+ (0.2187) 
Household size in log 0.5326 0.8309 0.5788 
 (0.2375)* (0.2111)** (0.2717)* 
Long Truong (LT) 0.8231 1.0142 0.8527 
 (0.2481)** (0.2314)** (0.2535)** 
Long Phuoc (LP) 0.7182 0.8943 0.7455 
 (0.2637)** (0.2483)** (0.2674)** 
Phuoc Binh (PB) 0.5160 0.5280 0.5179 
 (0.2817)+ (0.2710)+ (0.2771)+ 
Credit participation 1.6638 0.3003 1.4528 
 (0.6572)* (0.4727) (0.8877) 
Constant 0.8345 1.8957 0.9987 
 (0.6300) (0.5495)** (0.7717) 
Wald chi2 (9): all coeffs=0 64.25 55.00 59.42 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 411 411 411 
Wald 2 (= 0) 2.82 0.67 0.97 
Prob > 2 (= 0) 0.0930 0.4142 0.3255 
Controls in selection equation (first stage) 
Variables as of the wage equation Yes  Yes Yes  
Pre-treatment income in log, pre-
treatment assets in log 
Yes No  Yes  
Distance to nearest bank within each 
ward 
No   Yes  Yes  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%  
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Chapter 6: Heterogeneous household credit impacts on the poor’s 
spending: A quantile treatment effect and budget share analysis  
 
6.1  Introduction 
The impact of access to credit on the poor‟s consumption expenditure have been 
widely studied (Coleman, 1999; Rahman, Mallik, & Junankar, 2007; Nguyen, 
2008; Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury, & Millimet, 2003; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). 
However, the literature concentrates on finding average treatment effects (ATE), 
which assume that all treated households get the same impact from program 
participation. Studies in other settings show that treatment effects can vary widely, 
not only across sub-groups but also along the distribution of outcomes (Bitler, 
Gelbach, & Hoynes, 2006, 2008; Djebbari & Smith, 2008).  
This evidence of varying treatment effects is not just an econometric 
curiosity; it also accords well with what may interest policymakers. For example, 
finding that a credit program had much larger impacts for male borrowers would 
likely prove influential if policy makers were interested in closing gender gaps. 
Hence, a theme in the literature evaluating impacts of credit is to compare average 
treatment effects for sub-groups defined by observable characteristics (e.g., age, 
education, and gender). But the similarly interesting comparison of whether the 
impact is the same along the outcome distribution, such as for households with 
already high consumption versus those with low consumption, or already high 
healthcare spending versus the low spenders, is rarely done. This heterogeneity in 
treatment effects can be studied using a Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) 
estimator.  
In the current chapter, I report QTE estimates of the impact that access to 
credit has on the household spending of poor households in peri-urban areas of Ho 
Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam. I used a survey designed by myself and 
applied to a sample of the poor who are under the urban poverty line.
64
 Thus, in 
typical approaches to studying heterogeneity in treatment effects, this sample 
would be one identifiable sub-group who would have an average treatment effect 
estimated and assumed to apply to all members of the group. My results show that 
such an approach hides considerable within-group heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects.  
                                                 
64
 Set at VND 6 million per person per year, which is equivalent to about US$1 per day. 
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This chapter also uses the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator 
(SURE) to analyze the impact of credit participation on budget shares and to 
provide baseline estimated impacts for comparing with those of QTE. 
Heterogeneity in the impacts is found in most cases; especially for healthcare 
budget share. While the ATE shows no effects of credit on the budget share for 
healthcare, the QTE finds significant effects for low healthcare spenders, even 
within this supposedly homogenous group of the poor.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
presents a theoretical background of household credit impacts on household 
budget shares. Section 6.3 describes estimation strategies. Section 6.4 reports 
empirical results, and the final section provides the finding summary.  
6.2  Theoretical background  
There have been several recent instances employing the QTE to examine the 
heterogeneity in treatment impacts (Ababie, Angrist, & Imbens, 2002; Bitler, 
Gelbach, & Hoynes, 2006, 2008; Firpo, 2007; Heckman, Smith, & Clemnets, 
1997). Heckman et al (1997) were the first to examine the heterogeneity in the 
impacts, and they reject an important assumption of the conventional approach to 
program evaluation that all treated households get the same effect from the 
program participation. They find strong evidence of heterogeneity in the impact 
distributions using data from the National Job Training Program. Djebbari and 
Smith (2008), Galdo, Jaramillo, and Montalva (2008), and Dammert (2008) are 
the pioneers in investigating the heterogeneous program effects in developing 
countries. These studies show that program effects not only vary across subgroups 
(gender, age-groups, etc) but also change along the conditional distribution of 
outcomes, driven by unobserved characteristics. 
  Furthermore, exploring heterogeneous effects provides more information 
for policy intervention (Djebbari & Smith, 2008). One of their main findings is 
that program impacts are not uniformly distributed. Thus, the heterogeneous effect 
is not uniquely attributed to the observed characteristics. For example, the impact 
on wealth and nutrition is greater for households who were at a higher level of 
wealth and nutrition prior to program participation. They suggest that the variance 
of the impact is very important, and the higher the variance of impacts the less 
relevant the ATE is. Consequently, policy intervention might be more effective 
when one knows program effects at different points of the outcome distribution. In 
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other words, policy-makers should have knowledge about those who are at 
different points of the outcome distribution, and what the effect is at those points, 
in order to properly target the policies. Similarly, Dammert (2008) finds 
heterogeneity in impacts of cash transfer program on the distribution of food 
expenditure. Hence, the impacts on per capita food expenditure increase from the 
lowest percentile to the highest percentile of the distribution. In contrast, for the 
share of food expenditure, the effect decreases from the lower percentiles to the 
higher percentiles; in other words, the impact is lower for households that have 
higher levels of food shares prior to credit participation. Therefore, Dammert 
concludes that there is considerable heterogeneity in the impacts of the program 
on the distribution of expenditure, which is ignored in ATE models. Thus, the 
success of a program intervention depends on more than the mean effects. 
Similarly, Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006) find heterogeneity in the impact of 
the US welfare reform across the outcome distribution, with zero-effect on 
earnings for the bottom half of the distribution, but higher effect for the upper part 
of distribution except the very top percentiles. Heterogeneous impacts on income 
and transfers are also found by the study at different points on the outcome 
distribution.  
In summary, studies using quantile treatment effect estimation so far have 
come up with a consistent conclusion that the impacts vary across the outcome 
distribution. Thus, the QTE provides a more detailed picture of the program 
effects than that is obtained by ATE models.  
6.3 Analytical framework
65
 
6.3.1 Seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE)   
When considering simultaneously the impacts of household credit on all sorts of 
consumption expenditure, one should analyze a system of equations. Moreover, to 
set a baseline for comparison with QTE estimates,
66
 one may need to run the 
SURE model using the same set of covariates. So far, there have been few 
investigations into credit impacts on household consumption using a system of 
equations. Empirically, consumption expenditure analysis has attracted more 
attention; the main purpose of these analyses is to estimate the Engel curve and 
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 Sample design and data collection were discussed in Chapter 1. 
66
 Instead of setting OLS estimate baselines for the comparison, SURE provides the same 
estimates of coefficients (only standard errors are different). Moreover, SURE is a more efficient 
estimator than its OLS counterpart. I will discuss this issue in the next section. 
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income elasticity of demand for items of interest (e.g. food). Deaton (1997) 
provides a useful framework for this direction of the research. Some research on 
the topic can be found in Holcomb, Park and Capps (1995) and Chern et al 
(2003). In these studies, the Working-Leser model is employed (Working, 1943; 
Leser, 1963, 1976). To the best of my knowledge, Rahman et al (2007) are the 
first effort to examine the impact of household credit on consumption behaviour 
using the SURE model. They find that borrowers are better off in terms of both 
food and non-food items. 
The system of budget share equations are potentially linked by the 
covariance structure of their disturbances and also tied together by the adding-up 
restriction; hence the residuals of the equation system are simultaneously 
correlated. In this case, the SURE is an appropriate estimator (Zellner, 1962). 
Typically, the estimation of cross-section budget shares for several commodities is 
done with the SURE estimator. Canonical examples are estimation of the income 
elasticity of demand for a particular set of goods (Deaton, 1997; Holcomb et al, 
1995; Chern et al, 2003; Rahman et al, 2007).
67
  
Typically these income elasticities are estimated from Engel curves for 
budget shares, and while there are several functional forms available.
68
 The 
Working-Leser (Working, 1943; Leser, 1963) is often used. The Working-Leser 
equation is as follows: 
wi =  + ln(yi) + .ln(hhsize)i  + i   (6.1)
where wi is the budget share of a particular commodity i to total expenditure, ln(y) 
is the natural logarithm of monthly average expenditure per capita (per capita 
expenditure is used to take into account consumption behaviour across 
households),
69
 ln(hhsize) is the natural logarithm of household size. 
This functional form allows the whole sample to be used even though some 
households may not purchase certain goods, and so have zero budget shares 
                                                 
67
 I might apply An Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980), but 
relative price is not available, hence budget share of each item is independent of the price of the 
other if real expenditure (x/P) is held constant. Moreover, I collected cross-sectional data from 4 
wards in a small peri-urban area of HCM City, thus prices are assumed to be constant across 
households in the area, so the AIDS model becomes the Engel curve. 
68
 See Holcomb et al (1995) for more detailed discussion. 
69
 Regressions on either natural logarithm of monthly average expenditure per capita or natural 
logarithm of monthly average expenditure result in the same results of all coefficients except that 
of ln(hhsize). 
 124 
(Deaton, 1997, p. 304). The model is claimed to fit better than other alternatives 
(Leser, 1963, 1976). 
 The effect of household credit on the budget share will be examined by 
including in equation 6.1 a credit participation variable (D) and also controlling 
for location difference effects. The regression model now is as follows:  
wi =  + ln(yi) + Di + .ln(hhsize)i +.warddummyi + i (6.2)
One potential problem here is the endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables, including credit participation status. One may use instruments to first 
predict credit participation, and then use this predicted value in place of the 
original variable of credit participation. However, I am unable to apply this IV 
model since there are no good instruments available (see discussion in Appendix 
5.7, Chapter 5). Thus, I apply only the standard SURE to estimate a system of 
three equations for education, healthcare, and food.
70
  
6.3.2 Heterogeneity in treatment effects: Quantile treatment effects (QTE) 
The Quantile Regression (QR) estimator examines the effects of the regressors on 
the dependent variable at various points on the conditional distribution of 
responses (e.g. at the 25
th
, and 75
th
 percentiles). Quantile regression (QR) was first 
introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978); see also Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
The model specifies the th – quantile (0< <1) of the conditional distribution of 
the dependent variable, given a set of covariates xi, and assumes that residual 
distributions of each quantile are normally distributed as follows: 
Q(yi | xi) =  + xi.     
where yi is the outcome of interest (the budget share for each household 
expenditure group in my case) for household i, xi is a set of explanatory variables 
including an indicator for credit participation, and variables measuring the 
household head‟s gender, age, marital status, and education, along with household 
size, household expenditure, initial income, initial assets, and location of the 
dwelling. The treatment variable of interest is credit participation, which equals 
one if a household had any loans in the 24 months prior to the survey and zero 
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 Results for the other expenditure are from the adding-up restriction (i.e. wi = 1, thus i = 1 
and i = 0). 
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otherwise. A total of 304 households were borrowers, and 107 households were 
non-borrowers under this definition. The estimator (equation (6.3)) is the solution 
to the following minimization problem (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009): 
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 (6.4) 
In other words, the equation is the solution to a problem where the sum of the 
weighted absolute value of the residuals is minimised. As is increased, the entire 
distribution of outcome y is traced, conditional on Xi. We estimate  for each 
particular quantile rather than just . If we estimate  for , then much more 
weight is placed on prediction for observations with y ≥ xi. than for observations 
at 1-with y < xi. 
In one of my dependent variable, the education budget share, the data are 
left-censored at zero. The outcome yi in equation (6.3) and (6.4) is replaced by yi
*
. 
We do not observe y
*
 but rather y (Johnston & Dinardo, 1997, p. 442-445), where 
   
 
The estimation procedure for the censored quantile regression (qcenreg) is based 
on Wilhelm (2008) and Chernozhukov and Hong (2002).  
When quantile regression is adapted to investigate heterogeneity in program 
impacts the quantile treatment effect estimator (QTE) of Heckman, Smith, and 
Clements (1997) results. Let Y1 and Y0 be the outcome of interest for the treated 
(1) and comparison group (0). F1(y|xi) = Pr[Y1≤ y|xi] and F0(y|xi) = Pr[Y0≤ y|xi] 
are the corresponding cumulative distribution functions of Y1 and Y0 conditional 
on xi. If  denotes the quantile of each distribution, then y(T) = inf{y: FT(y|x) ≥ 
}, T=0, 1 (treatment status) where “inf” is the smallest value of y that meets the 
condition in the braces. For example, y0.25 = inf{y: FT(y) ≥ 0.25}, T = 0, 1.  The 
quantile treatment effect at quantile th is defined as = y(T=1) - y(T=0), the  
is the difference between the outcome of interest for the treatment and comparison 
groups at a particular th quantile. In other words, the QTE shows how the 
yi
*
  if  yi
* 
> 0 
yi =  
0    if  yi
* 
 ≤0 
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treatment effect (changes across specified percentiles of the outcome 
distribution. 
The QTE relies on the rank invariance assumption, that the relative value 
(rank) of the potential outcome for a given household would be the same under 
assignment to either treatment or comparison group (Firpo, 2007). However, since 
outcomes for the same household may differ from one distribution to another 
based on observable and unobservable characteristics, bounds have to be 
computed for the QTE (Heckman, Smith, & Clements, 1997). Even without rank 
invariance, the QTE may still be meaningful since policymakers may be interested 
in the marginal distributions of the potential outcomes. In such cases, the QTE is 
simply the difference between the same quantile of the marginal distributions of 
outcomes for the treated households and for comparison group households. 
The reason for using the QTE estimator is that the effect is different across 
points on the outcome distribution, while the OLS estimator estimates the 
conditional mean of the outcome distribution. The QTE provides a “much more 
complete picture” (Koenker & Hallock, 2001, p. 144). For example, Chamberlain 
(1994) finds that the effect of union on wage premium declines monotonically 
from 28% at the first deciles to 0.3% at the upper deciles. Moreover, the QR is 
able to show any tendency for a dispersion of budget shares as total household 
income or expenditure increases (Deaton, 1997; Koenke & Hallock, 2001).  
Heterogeneity in the outcome variable may correspond to either variation 
across particular sub-groups (or cohorts) in the population that would generate a 
local average treatment effect (LATE) or impacts of unobservable characteristics 
(Angrist, 2004). In the current chapter, I assume that the sample population is 
homogeneous since they are all under the poverty line, hence there are no sub-
groups that would have the LATE (and for whom a particular instrumental 
variable might bind, while it does not bind for others), and the heterogeneity in the 
outcomes is assumed to come from the random errors. Since I assume it is 
unobservables rather than local treatment effects causing the heterogeneity, I do 
not necessarily need an instrumental variable estimator (which can be combined 
with the QTE to address bias from selection on unobservable characteristics 
(Abadie, Angrist & Imbens, 2002)). If good instruments were available, the QTE 
with instrumental variables (IQTE) may be more precise than the conventional IV 
estimator at the median (Abadie, Angrist, & Imbens, 2002) in addition to 
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addressing the potential selection bias. However, in previous results with the same 
data used here, no good instruments are identified (Appendix 5.7 in Chapter 5), 
hence I rely on the assumption that selection into the treatment is based on 
observables.  
6.4 Empirical results  
In this section, the SURE is first applied in Section 6.4.1 to estimate average 
treatment effects of credit participation on budget shares and on the income 
elasticity of demand for different household expenditure groups. This analysis 
will set a comparative baseline to investigate the heterogeneity in the impact of 
credit participation in the following section. Section 6.4.2 presents the 
heterogeneous impacts of household credit by applying the Quantile Treatment 
Effect estimator. 
6.4.1 Impacts of credit participation on household budget shares  
Estimates of the impacts of credit on household budget shares are in the left panel 
of Table 6.1. Household expenditure is divided into 4 groups: education, 
healthcare, food, and the remaining expenditure (called others). The unconditional 
means of budget shares for these four groups are 5.35%, 6.15%, 52%, and 36.5% 
respectively. Due to the adding-up restriction, budget share of any one 
expenditure group is excluded from the regressions. These models control for 
household size in logarithm, expenditure per capita in logarithm, and location 
dummies (basic specification). Results from extended specification that are 
controlled for variables in the basic specification and are further controlled for 
household head‟s gender, education, age, marital status, pre-treatment income per 
capita and assets, are reported in the right panel of Table 6.1. The Breusch-Pagan 
test of independence of each equation in the system of equations rejected the 
hypothesis of independence at the 1% level for all models.  
According to results in Table 6.1, credit participation resulted in a 
significant increase in the budget share of education, and a decline in the budget 
share of food. The budget shares of healthcare and the other expenditure are 
positively affected by credit participation, but the effects are not statistically 
significant. The signs and magnitudes of impacts on the budget shares are similar 
when controlling further for household head‟s gender, education, age, marital 
status, pre-treatment income per capita, and pre-treatment assets (the extended 
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models on the right panel of Table 6.1).
71
 These findings are also consistent with 
the finding in the preceding chapter. It is likely that households who borrowed 
gave more priority to child education and healthcare spending, even though they 
were poor.  
Apart from the focus on credit participation, the Working-Leser equation is 
also used to estimate the income elasticity of demand, which is calculated as 
follows (White & Masset, 2002, p. 12): 
i
iii
ebudgetshar
1
1
/XY
1
. +1 = ).(X/Y +1 =elasticity Income
i
ii    
where Yi is monthly expenditure for group of good i,  i is the estimated 
coefficient from Working-Leser equation, X is monthly average household 
expenditure per capita in natural logarithm. The budgetsharei (Yi/X) is the budget 
share of the corresponding expenditure for group of good i. For example, using 
values from Table 6.1 (the right panel), the income elasticity of demand for 
education is calculated as 1+ 0.0043*1/5.35%=1.08. The income elasticity of 
demand for food, health, and the other expenditure is 0.83, 1.41, and 1.16, 
respectively.
72
 Accordingly, the estimates indicate that education, healthcare, and 
the other expenditure are luxury goods, whereas food is a necessity good for the 
poor. 
The finding here is opposite to a common belief (e.g. Rahman et al, 2007), 
that the poor often spend more on food when they have money from microcredit. 
My estimation results show that when poor households borrow, they commit 
larger budget shares to long-term investment in human capital formation such as 
education and healthcare spending. This consumption pattern of the poor is very 
significant for poverty reduction policies. 
Furthermore, one may think that borrowers and non-borrowers have 
different income elasticities of demand, i.e. they have different coefficient slopes 
of monthly average expenditure per capita (in logarithm). To check this, I added 
an interaction term between the credit participation status and the expenditure per 
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 Correlation coefficients between the expenditure per capita and the pre-treatment variables are 
quite low (<0.22), moreover, controlling for these initial wealth indicators will reduce the bias in 
the impact estimates (Mosley, 1997). 
72
 This is income elasticity of demand for food, it is slightly higher than that of Vietnam, 0.8 in 
1992, 0.75 in 1998 (White & Masset, 2002) but is perceivable because the households in my 
survey are poor so the demand for food is more elastic than that of general households.   
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capita. I ran both the basic and extended model and observed that all the 
coefficients of the interaction terms of all equations for education, health, food, 
and the other (remaining) expenditure are very small and not statistically 
significant at the conventional levels (the estimates are not reported). 
Consequently, borrowers and non-borrowers have the same income elasticity of 
demand because both groups are poor and hence their consumption behaviours are 
likely to be identical.  
Overall, credit participation positively influences budget shares of non-
necessity goods such as education, health, and other non-food items, but 
negatively affects necessity goods (food). In other words, households who 
borrowed have lower food shares. Since food share is an (inverse) proxy measure 
of welfare (Engel‟s law), this suggests that borrowing households are better off 
even after controlling for initial characteristics.  
6.4.2 Quantile treatment effect estimation  
In this section, I first examine unconditional monthly average consumption of 
education, healthcare, food and „other‟ expenditure and their budget shares for 
borrowers and non-borrowers at the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 percentile and the mean values 
(Table 6.2). Borrowers spent more than non-borrowers at any percentiles, and for 
all groups of expenditures. For education, healthcare, and the other expenditure, 
borrowers had higher budget shares than non-borrowers at all quartiles examined. 
Thus, borrowing households are spending more in absolute terms and also 
devoting a larger share of their budgets to capital human formation (education and 
healthcare) and other non-food expenditure at all points in the distribution. In 
contrast, the observed budget share of food spending is lower for borrowers than 
non-borrowers even though borrowers‟ absolute spending on food is higher.  
To test whether the higher human capital spending of borrowers across the 
distribution persists when conditioning on explanatory variables, I estimate 
quantile treatment effects at the 25
th
, 50
th
, and 75
th
 percentiles (Tables 6.3 to 6.6). 
The tables also present SURE estimates in the last column of each panel.
73
 The 
explanatory variables used are listed in Appendix 6.1. My basic specification 
includes location, household size, and expenditure per capita in addition to the 
                                                 
73
 SURE and OLS estimates are the same except for their standard errors, thus to compare QTE 
estimates to OLS estimates one can use SURE estimates instead of OLS impact estimates; 
furthermore we are not able to efficiently estimate OLS impact for education budget share due to 
left-censored data. 
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credit participation treatment variable, while an extended specification adds the 
gender, age, marital status, and education of the household head, and pre-
treatment income per capita, and pre-treatment assets.
74
  
Credit participation has positive impacts on the budget share for education 
(Table 6.3). The impact is heterogeneous across the distribution of the outcome, 
and higher significant effects are found at the median and upper percentiles of the 
distribution (75
th
 percentile) of budget shares. This apparent heterogeneity 
disappears after controlling for head‟s gender, age, education, pre-treatment 
income, and pre-treatment assets (the extended model in the right-panel of Table 
6.3). A graphical depiction of this pattern is shown in Figure 6.1. Accordingly, the 
impact is detected higher from the 25
th
 to 60
th
 percentiles, and lower from 65
th
 to 
80
th
 percentiles except for the very top (extreme observations) and below the 25
th
 
percentile.
75
   
Figure 6.1: Credit impact on education budget share 
 
In both the basic and extended specification, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the treatment effects of credit on the healthcare budget share 
(Table 6.4). For households with health budget shares below the median, access to 
credit is associated with significantly higher healthcare spending. But for 
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 Descriptive statistics for these variables and the tests of their differences between borrowers and 
non-borrowers are presented in Appendix 6.1. 
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 Unless stated, the Figures use parts of outcome distribution within the range (0.1 – 0.9) to avoid 
influences of few extreme observations on the graphs (Chernozhukov, 2000), and Figures are built 
on the extended model estimates. 
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households above the median, healthcare spending goes down (insignificantly) 
when a household is a borrower, except for the very top percentiles (above 85
th
, 
but the effect at the very top percentiles is insignificant) (Figure 6.2). The same 
pattern is observed when using the extended model specification. In neither case 
would these effects be apparent when using OLS or SURE. 
Figure 6.2: Credit impact on healthcare budget share 
 
Hence it seems that access to credit increases the healthcare budget share of 
households that had lower healthcare budget shares prior to their credit 
participation. This positive effect of credit is hidden when estimating an average 
treatment effect, even though the sample is for a homogenous group of peri-urban 
households from one district who are all below the poverty line. 
There also appears to be some heterogeneity in the effect of per capita 
household expenditure (used as a proxy for permanent income) on the healthcare 
budget share (Figure 6.3). The SURE estimates suggest that the healthcare budget 
share rises by about three percentage points for every one log point increase 
(approximately two standard deviations) in per capita expenditure. But this hides 
an effect (which is statistically significant in the extended specification) of the 
budget shares falling with higher expenditure at the 25
th
 percentile.  
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Figure 6.3: Impact of expenditure per capita on healthcare budget share 
 
Contrary to the credit impacts on education and healthcare budget shares, 
the effect of household credit on the budget share of food is negative and 
statistically significant at the lower, median and upper percentiles (Table 6.5). 
Controlling further for head‟s gender, age, education, pre-treatment income and 
assets, the effect above the median are smaller but still significant at the 10% 
level. The effect on the budget share for food is stronger (negative) at the lower 
percentile (about -6%), about -4% at the median, and lower (about -3%) at the 
upper percentiles. This finding is consistent with Dammert (2008) and indicates 
lower impacts of credit for households that had higher food shares prior to credit 
participation. 
Finally, I observe positive (but insignificant) effects of household credit on 
the shares of the remaining expenditure (housing, daily and annually non-food 
consumption expenditure), and the effect is stronger at higher percentiles on the 
distribution (Table 6.6 and Figure 6.4). The finding is consistent across models 
when controlling for a full set of covariates.  
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Figure 6.4: Credit impact on the other budget share 
 
6.5 Finding summary and conclusions  
The estimates by both SURE and QTE uncover that household credit impacts 
negatively and significantly on the budget share of food, whereas it affects 
positively on non-necessity goods, especially on education and healthcare 
expenditure groups. Contrary to a common belief that the poor often think of 
eating and other daily spending on necessity goods when they have money on 
hand, especially a marginal dollar, this study shows that the poor obviously give 
more priority to human capital spending than current eating, especially households 
whose budget shares for education and healthcare are relatively low prior to credit 
participation. Education and healthcare budget shares increased when the poor 
borrowed. Therefore, easing access to credit sources is likely to help steadily 
alleviate poverty in future due to the poor‟s improved human capital. 
Treatment effects can vary widely, not only across sub-groups but also 
along the distribution of outcomes. This chapter provides evidence where my 
sample is all under the poverty line of about US$1 per day and would typically be 
considered one identifiable sub-group, for whom an average treatment effect 
would be estimated. Yet I find some heterogeneity in treatment effects within this 
seemingly homogenous sample, which would be hidden if only an average 
treatment effect is reported. Specifically, the QTE estimator provides clearer 
evidence of the effects than the OLS/SURE counterparts especially for the 
healthcare budget share. While OLS/SURE estimates of the ATE show no 
significant effect of credit participation on healthcare budget shares, the QTE 
estimates show that credit has positive impacts on healthcare budget shares for 
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households with low levels of healthcare spending prior to borrowing. From a 
policy point of view, this suggests that facilitating access to credit sources could 
be a significant factor in improving the health of the urban poor. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 6.1: Working-Leser Equation by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) 
 Basic model Extended model specification 
Education  Health  Food  Others  Education  Health  Food  Others  
Credit  0.0180 0.0088 -0.0352 0.0084 0.0115 0.0114 -0.0296 0.0067 
 (0.0069)** (0.0105) (0.0158)* (0.0152) (0.0070)+ (0.0107) (0.0162)+ (0.0157) 
Lsize 0.0243 -0.0120 -0.0568 0.0445 0.0313 -0.0108 -0.0693 0.0488 
 (0.0067)** (0.0102) (0.0153)** (0.0147)** (0.0072)** (0.0111) (0.0168)** (0.0162)** 
Lpcx   0.0040 0.0303 -0.0925 0.0582 0.0043 0.0252 -0.0894 0.0599 
  (0.0061) (0.0092)** (0.0139)** (0.0133)** (0.0065) (0.0099)* (0.0149)** (0.0145)** 
Ward LT -0.0049 0.0269 0.0401 -0.0621 0.0004 0.0346 0.0303 -0.0654 
 (0.0084) (0.0129)* (0.0193)* (0.0186)** (0.0090) (0.0138)* (0.0208) (0.0201)** 
Ward LP -0.0172 0.0184 0.0566 -0.0578 -0.0131 0.0254 0.0482 -0.0605 
 (0.0084)* (0.0128) (0.0191)** (0.0184)** (0.0084) (0.0129)* (0.0194)* (0.0188)** 
Ward PB 0.0047 0.0272 0.0460 -0.0778 0.0082 0.0224 0.0536 -0.0842 
 (0.0095) (0.0145)+ (0.0217)* (0.0209)** (0.0097) (0.0150) (0.0225)* (0.0218)** 
Constant -0.0173 -0.1475 1.2111 -0.0463 0.0874 -0.3459 1.3190 -0.0606 
 (0.0446) (0.0681)* (0.1020)** (0.0983) (0.1021) (0.1570)* (0.2363)** (0.2289) 
Wald 2 34.90 20.16 70.35 40.33 57.90 35.32 82.59 46.61 
Prob > 2  
(all coeff=0) 
0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Dependent variables are budget 
shares. Lsize is household size (in log); Lpcx is monthly expenditure per capita (in log). The extended model specification in the right panel 
controlled further for head’s gender, age, marital status, education, and pre-treatment income per capita and asset. Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence for a system of (education, health, and food equation -basic model): 2(3) =72.709; (education, health, and the other 
expenditure equation-basic model): 2(3) =50.247; (education, health, and food equation -extended model): 2(3) = 70.012; (education, 
health, and the others equation-extended model): 2(3) = 50.893. The other expenditure (Others) includes housing, daily and annually non-
food expenditure. 
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Table 6.2: Monthly average consumption of borrowers (B) and non-borrowers (NB) 
Expenditure  Mean 25
th
 percentile 50
th
 percentile 75
th
 percentile 
Category B NB B NB B NB B NB 
Education
(a)
 
expenditure   
345.91 
(7.48)   
247.23 
(6.35) 
87.92 
(2.68) 
51.5  
(2.05) 
237.5 
(5.89) 
155.83 
(4.14) 
475.42 
(10.01) 
368.33 
(10.06) 
Education
(b)
 
expenditure   
269.10 
(5.90) 
155.25 
(3.78) 
000 
(0.00) 
000 
(0.00) 
160.08 
(4.09) 
40.42 
(1.93) 
399.17 
(9.04) 
214.58 
(5.31) 
Health 
expenditure  
299.67 
(6.43) 
220.84 
(5.31) 
63.17 
(1.84) 
12.08 
(0.61) 
119.67 
(3.37) 
69.67 
(2.26) 
290.42 
(7.50) 
185.00 
(6.06) 
Food 
expenditure  
2122.60 
(50.80) 
1874.30 
(55.64) 
1373.79 
(42.82) 
1005.94 
(46.28) 
1855.63 
(51.87) 
1560.00 
(56.69) 
2581.19 
(60.08) 
2392.00 
(65.56) 
Other 
expenditure   
1724.72 
(36.88) 
1351.80 
(35.27) 
848.08 
(28.04) 
609.03 
(25.55) 
1287.58 
(35.32) 
1011.17 
(33.51) 
1896.29 
(43.27) 
1583.33 
(40.68) 
Total 
expenditure 
4416.10 
(100) 
3602.19 
(100) 
2791.29 
(100) 
1974.51 
(100) 
3719.43 
(100) 
2917.79 
(100) 
5084.94 
(100) 
4811.60 
(100) 
Notes: 
(a)
 average consumption on education expenditure is calculated for a sub-sample of households having children from 6 to 18 years 
old; 
(b)
 is for the whole sample. The budget shares are in the parentheses. B stands for Borrowers and NB stands for Non-borrowers. 
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Table 6.3: Censored quantile regressions of credit impact on budget share of education  
Explanatory  
Variables 
Basic specification Extended model specification 
0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE
(a) 
0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 
Credit  0.0260 0.0183 0.0275 0.0180 0.0143 0.0142 0.0112 0.0115 
 (0.016) (0.010)+ (0.014)* (0.007)** (0.030) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007)+ 
Lsize 0.0241 0.0351 0.0431 0.0243 0.0268 0.0396 0.0572 0.0313 
 (0.012)* (0.009)** (0.019)* (0.007)** (0.024) (0.012)** (0.018)** (0.007)** 
Lpcx   0.0024 0.0038 0.0050 0.0040 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0121 0.0043 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.0061) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.0065) 
Constant -0.0610 -0.0473 -0.0335 -0.0173 0.0283 0.0428 -0.0017 0.0874 
 (0.071) (0.049) (0.118) (0.0446) (0.330) (0.137) (0.199) (0.1021) 
Obs
(b) 
269 382 407 411 230 373 403 411 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses with 1,000 replications; + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. SURE standard errors 
are not bootstrapped. Dependent variable is budget share of education. Lsize is household size (in log); Lpcx is monthly expenditure per 
capita (in log). Both the basic and extended models controlled for location dummies, while the extended model specification controlled 
further for head’s sex, age, marital status, education, pre-treatment income per capita, and pre-treatment assets. (a)OLS and SURE 
magnitudes of coefficients are identical, but SURE is more efficient than OLS, thus, is employed here. 
(b)
Due to the fact that the probabilities 
of being censored at different percentiles are different, controlling for observed characteristics, hence numbers of observations for each 
model at each percentile are not the same. 
 
Table 6.4: Quantile regressions of credit impact on budget share of healthcare expenditure  
Explanatory  
variables 
Basic specification  Extended model specification 
0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 
Credit  0.0078 0.0060 -0.0009 0.0088 0.0093 0.0115 -0.0053 0.0114 
 (0.002)** (0.006) (0.016) (0.0105) (0.002)** (0.006)+ (0.016) (0.0107) 
Lsize 0.0029 0.0048 0.0139 -0.0120 0.0020 0.0034 0.0061 -0.0108 
 (0.0020) (0.006) (0.013) (0.0102) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.0111) 
Lpcx   -0.0021 0.0004 0.0287 0.0303 -0.0037 -0.0014 0.0140 0.0252 
 (0.0015) (0.004) (0.01)** (0.009)** (0.002)* (0.005) (0.012) (0.0099)* 
Constant 0.0110 0.0037 -0.1547 -0.1475 -0.0102 -0.0764 -0.3048 -0.3459 
 (0.0114) (0.032) (0.063)* (0.068)* (0.027) (0.052) (0.133)* (0.1570)* 
Notes: Dependent variable is budget share of healthcare; number of observations is 411 households; otherwise see Notes in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.5: Quantile regressions of credit impact on budget share of food expenditure   
Explanatory  
Variables 
Basic specification  Extended model specification 
0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 
Credit  -0.0462 -0.0448 -0.0479 -0.0352 -0.0581 -0.0384 -0.0302 -0.0296 
 (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.017)** (0.0158)* (0.024)* (0.021)+ (0.018)+ (0.0162)+ 
Lsize -0.0517 -0.0541 -0.0563 -0.0568 -0.0684 -0.0545 -0.0611 -0.0693 
 (0.025)* (0.025)* (0.018)** (0.0153)** (0.031)* (0.026)* (0.024)* (0.0168)** 
Lpcx   -0.1044 -0.0947 -0.0772 -0.0925 -0.1023 -0.0775 -0.0640 -0.0894 
 (0.025)** (0.028)** (0.019)** (0.0139)** (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.023)** (0.0149)** 
Constant 1.1755 1.2593 1.2359 1.2111 1.1416 1.4443 1.5268 1.3190 
 (0.168)** (0.203)** (0.134)** (0.1020)** (0.466)* (0.427)** (0.340)** (0.2363)** 
Notes: Dependent variable is budget share of food; number of observations is 411 households; otherwise see Notes in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.6: Quantile regressions of credit impact on budget share of the other expenditure  
Explanatory  
Variables 
Basic specification  Extended model specification 
0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 0.25 0.50 0.75 SURE 
Credit  0.0144 0.0041 0.0338 0.0084 0.0014 0.0104 0.0219 0.0067 
 (0.016) (0.0175) (0.023) (0.0152) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.0157) 
Lsize 0.0441 0.0546 0.0339 0.0445 0.0454 0.0497 0.0541 0.0488 
 (0.016)** (0.021)* (0.025) (0.0147)** (0.017)** (0.023)* (0.030)+ (0.0162)** 
Lpcx   0.0366 0.0484 0.0702 0.0582 0.0271 0.0450 0.0848 0.0599 
 (0.021)+ (0.025)+ (0.026)** (0.0133)** (0.021) (0.025)+ (0.027)** (0.0145)** 
Constant -0.0423 -0.0081 -0.0316 -0.0463 -0.3529 -0.3873 0.1675 -0.0606 
 (0.155) (0.170) (0.182) (0.0983) (0.313) (0.363) (0.406) (0.2289) 
Notes: Dependent variables are budget share of the remaining expenditure (others); number of observations is 411 households; otherwise 
see Notes in Table 6.3.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 6.1: Descriptive statistics and t-values for equal means by borrowing 
status  
Variables 
Borrowers Non-borrowers t-value  
Mean  Std.Dev Mean  Std.Dev 
Variables for basic specification       
Monthly health care expenditure 299.67 582 220.84 552 1.25 
Health budget share  0.0643 0.092 0.0531 0.0929 1.07 
Household size in log 1.554 0.440 1.354 0.577 3.26** 
Total monthly expenditure  4,416.1 2738 3,602.2 2,597 2.75** 
Monthly expenditure per capita in log 6.691 0.484 6.611 0.596 1.25 
Tang Nhon Phu A (Yes=1) 0.188 0.391 0.299 0.460 2.24* 
Long Truong (Yes=1) 0.313 0.464 0.234 0.425 1.61 
Long Phuoc (Yes=1) 0.322 0.468 0.243 0.431 1.60 
Phuoc Binh (Yes=1) 0.178 0.383 0.224 0.419 1.01 
Additional variables for extended specification 
Head‟s sex (male=1)  0.507 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.03 
Head‟s education (year) 4.911 3.35 4.664 3.76 0.60 
Married (yes=1) 0.648 0.478 0.607 0.491 0.74 
Head‟s age (year) 52.901 13.97 59.467 15.46 3.87** 
Initial assets incl land & assets in log 13.183 1.243 12.977 1.667 1.17 
Initial income per capita in log 8.161 0.227 8.114 0.347 1.31 
Observations (households) 304 107  
Notes: t-value statistically significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**); assets, income, 
and expenditures are measured in VND 1,000.  
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Chapter 7: Household credit to the poor and its impacts on child 
schooling 
 
7.1  Introduction 
It is widely recognised that human capital plays an important role in productivity, 
earnings, and sustainable poverty reduction (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008; 
Maitra, 2003). Education not only passes specific knowledge to students but also 
enhances skills in acquiring new knowledge (Rosenzweig, 2010). However, the poor 
encounter two key development issues: income constraints and low education. These 
lead to a vicious circle of poverty. Income constraints result in low education 
investment and hence low education attainment. Low education results in low 
productivity and then low income. Hence, child schooling receives a lot of attention in 
development strategies and is considered a solution to breaking the vicious circle of 
poverty and to enhancing future development. However, education investment by many 
households in developing countries is insufficient, especially by poor households.  
Demand for education relies on parents‟ motivation, income constraints, and 
competing demands for children‟s time (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 2008). Under 
perfect financial markets, credit would be a tool to guarantee full investment in 
education. The underdevelopment of financial markets and income constraints, 
however, are the main reasons for deficient education for children in developing 
countries (Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Ranjan, 2001). Due to credit 
constraints, many households are not able to borrow or borrow insufficiently so they 
may pull their children out of school or ask their children to reduce study time and go to 
work, especially when households face adverse shocks (Kurosaki, 2002). Thus, access 
to credit would help households to smooth consumption without the need to cut 
children‟s schooling.  
Moreover, during the economic transition in Vietnam cuts to public subsidies in 
education have led to an increase in private education costs (Cloutier, Cockburn & 
Decaluwe, 2008). As a result, households, especially the poor, may need other external 
support, including credit, for their children‟s education. This chapter aims to evaluate 
the impacts of household credit on child schooling for the poor in peri-urban areas of 
Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Vietnam. The chapter has two goals: First, it examines 
whether borrowing keeps children in school longer than without borrowing. Second, the 
chapter examines whether the sources of credit and gender of children matter in impacts 
on child schooling. This chapter finds that although small loans may affect levels of 
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education spending, but they just bring slight benefits to the poor‟s child schooling. This 
is because the loan amounts are too small, especially amounts of informal credit, to 
cover “big” lump sums of education expenses for initial enrolments, and hence small 
loans do not affect parents‟ longer-term decisions about their children‟s schooling.  
This chapter is organised as follows: The next section reviews the literature on 
credit impacts on child schooling. Section 7.3 discusses estimation methods. Section 7.4 
reports estimation results and Section 7.5 provides concluding remarks. 
7.2 Literature on credit impact on child schooling 
Microcredit affects child schooling in two ways:
76
 one beneficial and one adverse. 
First, the beneficial impact is that household credit enables households to earn more; 
higher income will push up household consumption which further increases the demand 
for healthcare and child schooling (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, p. 201). The credit 
could be spent on schooling (school fees, textbooks, schooling materials, uniforms and 
other schooling expenditure) as well as on improving child nutrition and shortening 
their sickness time by allowing children to take medicines promptly. As a result, the 
spending helps keep children at school. Similarly, Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega 
(2008, p. 2,441) classify this channel of effect as “positive”, and name this effect 
“income effect”. The credit helps generate household income (positive impact) and then 
positively influences the demand for education. Moreover, education is a normal good, 
and thus it has a positive income-effect. As a result, an increase in education spending 
will positively affect child schooling. Therefore, access to credit allows households to 
smooth their consumption and then improve their decisions in favour of more education 
for their children (Maldonado, Gonzalez-Vega & Romeo, 2002, p. 29).  
Inadequate schooling, a situation when children are required to drop out of 
schools to help their parents or to cut down household spending, is often attributed to 
lack of access to credit (Dehejia & Gatti, 2002; Edmonds, 2006; Jacoby & Skoufias, 
1997; Ranjan, 2001). Households facing adverse shocks and having insufficient access 
to credit may withdraw children from school to reduce household expenditure and send 
children to work in order to smooth household consumption (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; 
Kurosaki, 2002). On the other hand, when households are able to borrow adequately at 
reasonable interest rates, they may not need child labour; then children may stay at 
schools longer. For example, according to CGAP(2003), there appears to be a large 
differential in child schooling between two groups of borrowers and non-borrowers in 
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 Generally, loans to the poor are often small so the terms “household credit” and “microcredit” are used 
interchangeably in this chapter. 
142 
Bangladesh; almost all girls of Grameen Bank borrowers have some years of schooling, 
whereas only 60% of non-borrowers‟ girls have some years of education. For boys, 81% 
and 54% respectively for borrowers and non-borrowers households have some 
schooling. Many other studies show that compared to non-clients of microfinance, 
enrolment rates and years of schooling are improved for microfinance clients‟ children 
after joining microfinance programs (Barnes, 2001; Chen & Snodgrass, 2001; Morduch, 
1998; Pitt & Khandker, 1998). 
The second way in which microcredit affects child schooling is a child labour or 
adverse effect. Borrowed money is spent on family businesses, which lead to an 
increase in household employment. This would undermine children‟s schooling because 
children have to replace their mothers in caring for their younger siblings, in looking 
after animals, and in doing housework and farming (Maldonado & Gonzalez-Vega, 
2008, p. 2,441). Consequently, children may encounter adverse effects of credit on 
schooling; children quit school immediately or reduce time for schooling. 
Consequently, their academic performance gradually worsens; children may repeat 
classes or find themselves discouraged from staying at school longer, and eventually 
drop out. Furthermore, child labour and schooling are exclusively parents‟ decisions 
(Edmonds, 2006); so when parents need more labour to increase family income and 
smooth consumption, they may pull their children out of school.  
Moreover, the child labour effect could result from requirements of immediate 
loan repayment. Loans to the poor often have higher interest rates (except subsidised 
loans) and short-term repayment conditions, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Borrowers therefore require high returns to pay high interest rates in a short period of 
time. To ensure repayment, poor borrowers may try to reduce their business costs by 
employing their own labour, including children, without wages. Consequently, children 
from borrowing households may be pulled out of school. For instance, Beegle, Dehijia 
and Gatti (2004) in a study on Vietnam find that households borrowing from higher 
interest rate sources were more likely to have child labour. They suggest that to increase 
child schooling requires facilitating access to credit with lower interest rates.  
Empirical studies of credit impacts on child schooling provide mixed evidence on 
these two types of effect. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that girl schooling increased 
when households borrowed from Grameen Bank, but when households borrowed from 
other microcredit programs no positive impacts on girl schooling were observed. In 
contrast, Hazarika and Sarangi (2008), in a study on rural Malawi, find that children are 
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more likely to work rather than go to school if their households have borrowed. In the 
case of Bangladesh, Morduch (1998) finds no effect on child schooling. Similarly, in 
the same country Islam and Choe (2009) even detect significantly adverse impacts of 
microcredit on child schooling.  
7.3  Analytical framework
77
 
7.3.1 Estimation methodological issues 
As noted in Chapter 5, the most difficult part of impact evaluations is to separate out the 
causal effect of credit from selection and reverse causation biases which are common to 
nearly all statistical evaluations (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005, 2010). For example, 
the longsighted and richer households often have easier access to credit and one has to 
ask whether household credit really affects the households‟ child schooling, or is it that 
the more education-motivated and richer parents simply are more likely to send their 
children to school as well as having easier access to credit. Therefore, there is a 
potential for selection bias here and for this reason the inference from estimated impacts 
on outcomes could be misleading.  
In the literature on credit impact evaluation as discussed in Chapter 5, selection 
biases from non-random placement of credit and self-selection into credit participation 
by borrowers have received much attention since these may cause overestimates of 
impacts (Amin, Rai, & Topa, 2003). Apart from randomisation methods (e.g. Banerjee, 
Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2009), other strategies and methods to reduce bias have 
been used, including treating new clients as a control group, examining discontinuities 
in client eligibility, potential or future clients and fixed effects (see Coleman, 1999, 
2006; Islam, 2010; McKernan, 2002; Morduch, 1998; Mosley, 1997; Pitt & Khandker, 
1998; Roodman & Morduch, 2009). As a variant on these non-random methods, a 
purposely selected sample is used here to try to reduce the bias. All the households in 
my sample are poor, with initial income per capita under VND6 million (about US$1 
per day) which makes them eligible for preferred (low interest rate and easy loan 
conditions) credits from the government. Thus, the non-random placement of credit 
borrowing should not be seriously problematic. In addition, the selection bias may be 
reduced by controlling for household pre-treatment income and parents‟ education, as 
suggested by Mosley (1997).  
Some studies on schooling employ Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) or 
Instrumental Variables (IV) (e.g. Berman & Knowles, 1999; Maitra, 2003) to address 
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 Sample design and data collection are discussed in Chapter 1. 
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selection and reverse causation biases. Demographic and educational characteristics of 
household heads, their jobs, household composition, and physical characteristics of 
dwellings are used as instruments. However, none of the studies applied the rigorous 
test for weak instruments suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). Although the studies 
applied the test for endogeneity, the test is not able to ensure whether the instruments 
are good enough. For IV models, testing weak instruments using Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) models is crucial (Murray, 2006); thus, using weak IVs could lead to 
upward biases, and the IV or 2SLS estimates could be worse than estimates by 
conventional estimators which treat credit participation as exogenous. In the current 
data, good instruments which affect credit participation but not child schooling are not 
available, I therefore apply only conventional Probit and Negative Binomial (NB) 
models.
78
  
7.3.2 Probit and Negative Binomial model 
Two outcomes of child schooling are examined here: current enrolment and the 
education gap. Analysis of the current enrolment is conducted using the standard Probit 
model. However, one single indicator e.g. grade attainment or current enrolment does 
not represent fully children‟s schooling because it does not indicate how well children 
did at school or whether or not children were grade-repeated. The education gap enables 
capture of this information, and it also represents how well children did at school. So 
the education gap may better reflect longer-term effects, while the current enrolment 
may reflect the immediate effect. The education gap is expressed as follows: 
Education gap = expected years of schooling – actual years of schooling 
 
 
The education gap can take positive integers from 0 to 12, thus the outcome of 
education gap is Poisson distributed, and a count data model is appropriate.  
The count data model is well established (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Greene, 
2008; Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984; Patil, 1970; Winkelmann, 2008, amongst 
others). Tabulating data on the outcome (Y) is a simple strategy to see the outcome 
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 Some potential IVs such as distance to banks, pre-treatment income and assets are used to conduct 
weak IV test, and all proved to be weak instruments. 
           0              if age ≤ 6 
Expected years of schooling =      (age - 6)  if 6 < age ≤ 18 
           12            if age >18 
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distribution (Appendix 7.2). The smaller is the mean, the higher the proportion of zeros, 
so zero observations are an important feature of count data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  
The Poisson model is:           =E(y|x) = exp(x‟)                (7.1) 
where Y denotes the outcome (occurrences), Y= 0, 1, 2, …., N, and y(t, t+t) denote the 
number of events/occurrences observed in the interval (t, t+t). Then the number of 
occurrences in an interval of a given length is Poisson distributed with the probability 
density as follows: 
Pr(Y = y) = e
-y /y!   where    y = 0, 1, 2, …., N 
Conditional mean and variance of Y equal  or Var(Y) = E(Y)=. When controlling for 
some exogenous variables x, the parameter is now specified as follows: 
    = exp(x‟)        (7.2) 
The Poisson model is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that 
events occur independently over time. The second assumption (called equidispersion, 
the key assumption of this model) is the equality of conditional mean and variance of 
dependent variable Y. In reality, equidispersion is commonly violated since count data 
is often overdispersed, that is the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, p. 556). The distribution often has a longer right tail and the 
variance-mean ratio exceeds one. The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is one of 
the most common reasons for the violation to the second assumption. The Negative 
Binomial (NB) model can be a solution to this problem. 
The NB model has Gamma distribution:  
= gamma(, v)    (7.3) 
where  is mean and v is a precision parameter.  
    E[]= and Var() = [1/v]. 
   dfyYyY )(]|Pr[]Pr[     (7.4) 
With mean of dependent variable E[Y] =  = exp(X), and 
Var(Y) =  + (1/v).2= E[Y] + (1/v). (E[Y])2 = E[Y] [1+ (1/v). (E[Y])]     (7.5) 
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Var(Y)=E[Y].(1+E[Y]) 
Because and v >0 then Var(Y) > E(Y), and thus the model allows for 
overdispersion.  
The test for Poisson models is based on tests for alpha  = 0 against  ≠ 0. The 
Wald test is used to test the H0: Poisson (= E[Y]) against HA: Negative binomial model 
with mean  and variance (1+). These two different parameterisations (Poisson and 
NB) imply different assumptions about functional form of heteroscedasticity. In reality, 
the outcome distribution is commonly overdispersed so the second assumption of the 
Poisson model is violated. Therefore, the NB models are preferable to Poisson models. 
This is the case for my data on the education gap where we have a conditional mean of 
1.145 and variance of 2.190 (Appendix 7.2).  
7.3.3 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
To corroborate the Probit and NB estimation findings, the PSM (propensity score 
matching) method is also used. PSM is able to reduce the bias in the conventional 
estimates since it only compares the treatment group‟s outcome with that of a similar 
control group. With PSM, matched comparison and treatment groups are similar in 
terms of propensity scores built on observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 1998, 
2002).
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 To evaluate the impact of credit participation on child schooling, PSM 
compares the schooling outcomes of children from borrowing households to what they 
would have had if their families did not borrow. Children from non-borrowers (who 
have the same or similar characteristics, such as demographic and socio-economic 
conditions which affect both credit participation and child schooling) are assumed to 
have the same outcomes that borrowers‟ children would have had if their parents had 
not borrowed. These children from non-borrower households can be used to generate a 
control group. So, what we need to do is to first estimate the propensity scores for each 
borrowing and non-borrowing household using household-level data and then merge the 
scores with the child-level data. The child-level data with the scores enables us to 
estimate the average treatment effects on child schooling using the PSM method. 
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 Discussions on advantages, disadvantages, conditions to successful PSM application, and the 
appropriateness of PSM application to the current dataset can be found in Chapter 5.  
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7.4 Empirical results  
7.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 7.1: Enrolment rate by age and borrowing status 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Education gap by age and by borrowing status 
 
 
Unconditional mean differences in child schooling of child group aged 6-18 years old 
between borrowers and non-borrowers are presented in Table 7.1. Roughly, children 
from borrowing households are better off (higher enrolment and lower education gap) 
than their non-borrower counterparts. However, the difference is insignificant. The 
difference in current enrolment between borrowers‟ children and non-borrowers‟ 
children is not very obvious (Figure 7.1). The education gap may reflect outcomes of 
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longer-term investment in schooling, since higher level education needs larger amounts 
of investment, and the poor are often both income-constrained and credit-constrained. 
Moreover, during the socio-economic reforms in Vietnam, cuts in public subsidies for 
higher education levels have pushed private education costs up. For these reasons, the 
education gap widens as child age increases (Figure 7.2). 
7.4.2 Estimation results 
Some current studies on schooling in Vietnam show that expenditure per capita (a proxy 
for household permanent income) is a good predictor of child schooling in Vietnam 
(Beegle, Dehijia, & Gatti, 2004; Behrman & Knowles, 1999). Accordingly, controlling 
for pre-treatment income, and assets as proxies for household wealth, is necessary. 
Furthermore, controlling for these initial variables can reduce selection bias as 
suggested by Mosley (1997) and can also avoid the problem of reverse causation bias 
that may occur if current income or expenditure is used.  
7.4.2.1 Probit and Negative Binomial estimation results 
Details of the education gap outcome distribution are presented in Appendix 7.2. The 
conditional mean is smaller than the variance so the distribution of the education gap is 
over-dispersed and has a longer right tail. Intuitively, the negative binomial models 
(NB) are appropriate in this case; however, to confirm this, I also run Poisson models 
and test for overdispersion, all the test results are statistically significant at the 1% level 
regardless of different alternative specifications;
80
 thus, the Poisson models are strongly 
rejected in favour of the NB model. The appropriateness of applying NB model is 
confirmed by the Wald test results (test for = zero) in Tables 7.3, 7.5, 7.7, and 7.8.81 
The test results imply that using NB improves the fit of the models, and the NB standard 
errors are smaller than the Poisson standard errors giving indicate more efficiency gains 
from NB models.  
The reported results start with estimates for child schooling using maximum 
likelihood Probit for current enrolment and maximum likelihood NB for education gap. 
Next, I then consider whether the impacts for boys and girls are different. Following 
that, the impacts of different sources of credit are reported. Finally, I test whether or not 
the combination of credit and parental education (and with income) helps child 
schooling.  
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 Applying estat gof  after poisson command in Stata
®
  
81
 Discussion on procedure for the test and choice of parameterisation is presented in Appendix 7.3. 
Alpha () can be interpreted as a measure of the variance of heterogeneity. 
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In each model, I include all children aged 6-18 years old. There are likely 
potential sources of biases that are between-household selection (i.e. which household 
sends children to school or their children stay longer at school), and within-household 
selection (i.e. which children are kept at school or receive more investment from their 
parents). The first problem can be addressed by controlling for household characteristics 
including household initial income, initial assets, parental education, credit 
participation, head‟s gender, number of children, distance to the nearest school, 
household dwelling locations, and especially household weights placed on each child.
82
 
For the second source of bias, I control further for child characteristics including child‟s 
gender, age and birth order. Schooling performance by children within a household may 
be influenced by child‟s IQ and parents‟ motivation (Bowles & Gentis, 2002). These 
factor effects can be captured by parental education, household income and assets. 
However, this leads to another potential problem that is the unobserved determinants of 
schooling, which are correlated across children within households. Thus, it may result in 
biased estimated standard errors (Deaton, 1997), and to correct the biased standard 
errors, robust clustered standard errors are estimated.  
a) Maximum Likelihood Probit for current enrolment and Maximum Likelihood 
Negative Binomial model for education gap  
The estimates in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that the probability of current enrolment 
and the size of the education gap are not significantly influenced by household credit. 
This finding is similar to Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002); these studies show that family background factors rather than short-term credit 
constraints determine education outcomes. The finding is also consistent with the 
relevant literature (Morduch, 1998; Manski, 1997; Kane, 1994) which indicates that 
credit participation or credit constraints do not significantly affect school attendance. In 
Chapter 5, I indicated that education expenditure was positively influenced by credit 
participation for households who already sent their children to schools, and it is likely 
that level of education expenditure is a current choice, while a decision regarding 
sending children to school and children‟s academic attainment reflects longer-term 
investments, and as such is affected by family background and economic conditions. 
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Weights (scores) were estimated using PSM method, equal weight was placed on within-household 
children, but different weights were placed on between-household children. Weighted Probit and NB 
model estimates are not much different from those of the unweighted estimates since there are only about 
1.05 children (aged 6 to 18) per household. The weighted estimates are reported in Appendix 7.4; 7.5, 
Appendix 7.6, and Appendix 7.7. 
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My finding agrees with Keane and Wolfin (2001) who point out that credit would have 
greater effects on consumption and labour supply than school enrolment. 
Small loans are not an appropriate way of financing education investment. I 
observed from fieldwork that the loans of the poor in the peri-urban areas are often very 
short-termed, one year or less, especially loans from the informal credit sector; hence 
they are not used to support long-term investment in schooling. Moreover, in less 
developed countries, though many households borrowed, they were still credit-
constrained because they were lent amounts smaller than those they demanded 
(Conning & Udry, 2005). Their loans were too small to finance long-term education 
investments,
83
 particularly larger lump sums for tuition and registration fees for new 
schooling year (Mason & Rozelle, 1998). As a result, short and small loans affect only 
current education expenditure; bigger and longer-term loans are required to improve 
child enrolment and reduce education gap. This agrees with Islam (2010) who suggests 
that longer credit participation and larger loans could bring out benefits since it takes 
time to have effects.  
Higher schooling fees and foregone earnings of older children would change roles 
of credit participation. Intuitively, one may think that the effects at upper levels of 
education would be higher than at lower levels. In order to examine the varying effects 
at different age groups, I run separate models for different age groups: 6-14 (primary & 
lower secondary school) and 15-18 (high school). Results are in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, 
columns 2 and 3, respectively. Estimates show no evidence of significant impacts of 
microcredit on enrolment rate at any level from 6 to 18 years old. This is also true for 
the education gap. The finding supports the previous discussion on trivial roles of small 
loans for child schooling. 
b) The impacts of household credit on child schooling for boys and girls 
In developing countries parents are biased in favour of boys over girls in human capital 
investment such as education. The literacy gender gaps are empirically examined to be 
very high in all developing regions (Wils & Goujon, 1998). To examine whether the 
trend is true in peri-urban areas in Vietnam, one could partition the sample into boy and 
girl groups and estimate two separate regressions. Small subsamples, however, may 
reduce the statistical significance of the estimates. I therefore employ an alternative 
approach to test the equality of credit variable coefficients between the two groups. I 
                                                 
83 For my surveyed households, an average loan size for education is about US$220, and one of the smallest loan 
sizes of households compared to US$690 for other purposes (excluding consumption loans). 
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include interactions between each variable with a dummy of children‟s gender (boy=1) 
as additional variables. When the child gender dummy takes a value of zero (i.e. girls), 
all the interaction term coefficients equal zero, so the non-interacted coefficients 
provide effects for the girl group. On the other hand, child gender is one, the interacted 
term coefficients provide boy-girl difference estimates.  
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 report the impacts of credit participation on female child 
schooling and the boy-girl difference in the impact. For the whole sample, female 
children from borrowing households have 9% more probability of current enrolment 
than same-sex children from non-borrowing households, but the effects are not 
statistically significant. For the younger group of primary and lower secondary 
education, the effect on girls‟ enrolment is in the same direction and statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
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 The effect difference between boys and girls is about 
(negative) 17% (i.e. the effect on boy schooling is about -8%), and it is strongly 
significant at the 1% level for the younger child group (Table 7.4). In short, when 
households borrowed, girls were better off but boys were worse off.  
The NB model estimates (Table 7.5) provide similar results of the effects by 
gender. For the whole sample, household credit participation leads to a decline of 0.26 
points in education gap for girls but leads to an increase of 0.37 points [0.37=0.11-(-
0.26)] in education gap for boys. Roughly, this finding implies that the effect is 
heterogeneous across child gender: Girls benefit from household credit participation, 
but the credit adversely affects on boys‟ schooling.  
Furthermore, girls‟ better academic performance is likely to help keep them at 
school longer and to receive more investment from their parents, that can be used to 
explain the positive impact on girls. Moreover, in the peri-urban areas in South Vietnam 
the traditional viewpoint of “valuing boys above girls or preferring boys to girls” has 
been increasingly weakened in recent times. Though the effects are not highly 
significant, my finding is contrary to Islam and Choe (2009) that microcredit in 
Bangladesh has negative impacts on both boys and girls, and the impact is (negative) 
stronger for girls than for boys. It is also contrary to the finding of positively significant 
effects of microcredit on child education, especially the impact for boys (Pitt & 
Khandker, 1998).  
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 Because of the small subsample of group aged 15 to 18, separate male and female groups are too small 
to run regressions. 
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c) The impacts of different sources of household credit  
To evaluate whether different sources of credit matter in the impact on child schooling, 
I classify the borrowers into three groups: Households that borrowed from formal credit, 
households that borrowed from informal credit, and households that borrowed from 
both informal and formal credit.  
The estimates in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show that formal credit positively affects 
child schooling, whereas informal credit adversely affects child schooling; and the 
effects of both informal and formal credit are stronger for the high school children 
group. To see whether the effects of informal and formal credit are different, I conduct 
the parameter test for difference between coefficients of formal credit and informal 
credit, and the test reveals that the difference is statistically significant for both current 
enrolment (Table 7.6) and education gap (Table 7.7). The difference, however, mostly 
comes from the group of high school-aged children because older children can 
participate in the labour force when their parents need more labour, especially labour 
without wages, to reduce business costs in order to repay high interest rate loans from 
informal credit. This finding is similar to Beegle, Dehijia and Gatti (2004) who find that 
children from households who borrowed from informal credit sources may have to 
leave school because their parents may be too poor to afford schooling fees and may 
need extra labour for their family businesses. In addition, short-term and small loans 
from informal credit are not suitable for greater schooling costs, especially high schools. 
d) The combination of credit with parental education (and with income) helps child 
schooling 
Does the combination of credit and education help the poor? This question is 
motivated by the existing literature, which has shown that credit itself is not able to help 
the poor effectively. For example, using Bangladesh data Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
found that girl schooling increased when households borrowed from Gameen Bank, but 
when households borrowed from other microcredit programs positive impact on girl 
schooling was not observed. Intuitively, the combination of credit and manifestation of 
children‟s schooling benefits in the Grameen Bank group meetings, not microcredit 
itself, may account for the positive effects on children schooling. 
Higher educated parents are often longsighted for their children‟s future 
livelihood, thus a combination of parental education and credit would accelerate the 
effects on child schooling. Therefore, to test whether parental education plays a role in 
accelerating the effect of credit usages in child education, I use an interaction term 
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between credit and the highest parental education (of either husband or wife). The 
interaction term will capture the effect of parental education on child schooling within 
the borrowing household group. Moreover, families with more educated parents may 
have higher incomes; households with lower incomes among the poor may be too poor 
to afford child schooling costs, while less poor households are able to afford schooling 
if they have additional money from borrowing. Therefore, one may think that credit to 
richer households in the poor group may have stronger effects on child schooling.  
I also use another interaction term between credit and pre-treatment income per 
capita to test whether among the borrower households, households with higher income 
have greater impacts on child schooling. The estimate results when estimating with 
inclusion of the interaction terms are presented in Table 7.8. The effects of both 
interaction terms are not statistically significant. The results suggest that amongst 
borrowing households children from higher educated and higher income parents also do 
not benefit from household credit for their schooling. In other words, there is no 
accelerator of parental education and initial income on the impact amongst poor 
borrowers because education of the poor parents is so low, only 5.5 years (achieved just 
primary school level) relative to that of parents in general in Vietnam - about 8.9 years 
of education (VHLSS, 2006).
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 Further, the return to schooling of lower education is 
very low (Doan & Gibson, 2009), hence the poor may not have been aware of 
educational benefits and may have had little motivation to increase their children‟s 
education.  
7.4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation results 
In order to corroborate the Probit and NB estimation results, I apply PSM methods to (i) 
binary treatment (household borrowed or not) and (ii) multiple treatment effect models. 
The matching methods (kernel and radius) are used for the whole sample and for a sub-
sample of households having children aged 6-18 years old. According to Bryson et al 
(2002), controlling variables used to estimate scores should affect both credit 
participation and child schooling outcomes.
86
 The variables include household head‟s 
gender, head‟s age, parental education, household head‟s marital status, number of 
children aged 6-18 years old, household members aged 18-60 years old, initial income 
per capita in logarithm, initial assets in logarithm, and household location dummies.  
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 This figure is estimated for general household head‟s education, if the highest parental education of 
either husband or wife is estimated, the years of education would be higher.  
86
 For more detailed discussion on matching method, see Chapter 5. 
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The estimates are presented in Tables 7.9 and 7.10. First, the PSM estimation 
using the binary treatment effect shows that credit participation does not strongly affect 
child schooling (Table 7.9). Roughly, the PSM estimates are consistent with the Probit 
and NB model estimates.  
Second, the multiple-treatment effect estimator in turn compares child schooling 
outcomes of informal borrowers and formal borrowers with that of the similar non-
borrowers.
87
 The estimates show that only formal credit affects the poor‟s child 
schooling, participation in formal credit improves the likelihood of enrolment and 
reduces the education gap (Table 7.10). Effect comparison between the formal and 
informal borrowing groups, however, would be inappropriate due to different 
counterfactuals of both these groups. Direct comparison in the last column of Table 7.10 
is used to overcome the problem of incomparable counterfactuals. The informal credit 
with a smaller (accumulated) loan amount per household (about US$500 on average) 
and with short-terms is not sufficient to support child schooling, whereas formal credit 
(with about US$920) is beneficial to child schooling.
88
 The multiple treatment effects 
analysis confirms the effects of household formal credit on child schooling. These 
findings also corroborate the Probit and NB model estimates. 
7.5 Discussion and concluding remarks   
This study evaluates the impact of household credit on child schooling of the poor in the 
peri-urban areas in Vietnam. The chapter delivers the following conclusions: 
First, the small sized and short-term loans fail to help improve the poor‟s child 
schooling. Second, the effect of household credit varies across child gender. Girls are 
more likely to receive more education investment and stay longer at school. The finding 
contrasts with the existing literature on the differences in boy-girl schooling impacts in 
South Asia, which indicates that microcredit benefits boys more than girls or affects 
girls more adversely than boys. Furthermore, evidence of the traditional view of „boys 
over girls‟, even though it is common in other similar developing countries, was not 
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 The multiple treatments also help detect potential bias associated with unobservable characteristics in 
estimates of binary treatment effects (Lee, 2005, p. 119). If treatment level is increased (bigger loan size, 
here is the formal credit), then the effect will be stronger. Assume that our expectation is a positive effect, 
but the expectation is not confirmed by multiple ordered treatments, then the initial causal findings (from 
binary treatment) are questionable and may have been due to some unobserved attributes. On the other 
hand, if there is no hidden bias, the treatment effect of formal credit is higher than the effect of informal 
credit; in turn, the effect of informal credit is greater than the observed outcome for the non-borrowing 
group, controlling for the same set of covariates Xi. 
88
 The average loan size is VND5,229 thousand (about USD317) and VND9,327 thousand (about 
USD566) for informal and formal credit respectively, since many households have more than one loans 
so the reported sizes of loan in the text are accumulated ones. Note that not all of these amounts are for 
education, but they are used for all purposes. 
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observed in this peri-urban area of HCMC, Vietnam. Girls‟ better schooling 
performance helps keep them at school longer and hence they receive more investment 
in education from their parents.  
Third, a closer look at impacts of each credit source reveals that formal credit has 
brought beneficial effects to children‟s education, while informal credit has failed to do 
so. Consequently, to improve child schooling in the long term needs to ease access to 
formal credit for the poor. Otherwise, the poor will continue to rely on informal credit 
and will end up in debt and will then pull their children out of school. Consequently, 
informal credit may exacerbate poverty in the long term rather than help the poor out of 
poverty. The poor are both income and credit constrained, so government interventions 
such as facilitating formal credit access are needed (Caucutt & Lochner, 2005). The 
poor need a “big push” to break down the vicious circle of poverty.  
Providing subsidies or tuition exemption to all children is an impossible solution 
in poor countries like Vietnam since it may pose a burden on the government budget. 
An alternative is to target subsidies to low-income household child schooling. In fact, 
the current tuition exemption policy in Vietnam is ineffective to help poor children 
because the tuition accounts for just less than one third of total education costs, and 
almost all school fee exemptions are for primary schools regardless of parental income 
levels. Only 1% of the tuition exemption value is for children from poor households and 
4.3% is for ethnic minorities (Behrman & Knowles, 1999, p. 230). Therefore, 
expanding preferred loans or fully tuition exemption to the poor, as well as providing 
subsidies for textbooks, uniforms, study materials and other school fees is a further 
necessary policy to encourage poor children to go to school and keep them at school 
longer.  
In Vietnam, the greater school expenditure, which is influenced by household 
budget constraints, may relate to obtaining higher quality schooling and better academic 
performance from participating in extra classes (Dang, 2007). Therefore, credit still has 
an important role in education investment. However, regulated tuition levels by the 
government could partly undermine the effects of credit on schooling. 
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TABLES 
Table 7.1: Mean values of some key variables and t-values for equal means for the 
group of 6 to 18 years old children by borrowing status 
Variables 
Borrowers Non-borrowers t-
value  Mean  Std Mean  Std 
Head‟s gender (male=1)  0.528 0.500 0.606 0.491 1.43 
Parents‟ highest  education (years) 5.551 3.333 5.452 3.585 0.26 
Head married (yes=1) 0.723 0.448 0.730 0.446 0.16 
Head‟s age (years) 50.501 13.762 57.625 15.300 4.30** 
Household size (persons) 6.087 2.743 6.433 3.335 0.97 
Younger siblings under 6 years (yes=1) 0.280 0.449 0.240 0.429 0.82 
Children from 6 to 18 years old 1.942 0.963 2.096 1.187 1.22 
Members from 18 to 60 years old 3.325 1.670 3.202 2.002 0.57 
Members older than 60 (yes=1) 0.293 0.456 0.529 0.502 4.33** 
Distance to nearest aged-range school 1.247 1.481 1.298 1.451 0.31 
Child‟s gender (male=1) 0.451 0.498 0.5481 0.500 1.75+ 
Child‟s age (years) 12.823 3.708 13.096 3.693 0.67 
Value of durable assets acquired over 24 
months, land and house (in log) 
13.149 1.180 12.702 1.929 2.25* 
Pre-survey income per capita (in log) 8.115 0.234 8.102 0.389 0.32 
Enrolment rate (children aged 6-18) 0.784 0.413 0.760 0.429 0.51 
Education gap
(a)
 (children aged 6-18) 1.061 2.216 1.346 2.392 1.10 
Enrolment rate (children aged 6-14) 0.917 0.276 0.911 0.288 0.16 
Education gap (children aged 6-14) 0.265 0.750 0.429 0.951 1.20 
Enrolment rate (children aged 15-18) 0.577 0.496 0.583 0.498 0.08 
Education gap (children aged 15-18) 2.289 3.028 2.417 3.052 0.25 
Notes: t-value statistically significant at 10% (+), 5% (*), and 1% (**). (
a
) The education gap 
here is a real gap between the expected years of education minus the actual children’s years of 
education.
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Table 7.2: Marginal effects of credit on current enrolment (Probit model) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Children 
aged 
 6-14 
Children 
aged 
 15-18 
Credit participation  (yes=1) -0.0032 -0.0139 0.0223 
 (0.08) (0.66) (0.23) 
Pre-treatment income capita  0.0575 0.0781 -0.1928 
in log (0.97) (2.48)* (1.30) 
Pre-treatment asset in log 0.0127 0.0023 0.0066 
 (1.03) (0.42) (0.19) 
Highest parental education (year) 0.0256 0.0125 0.0424 
 (4.08)** (3.84)** (2.96)** 
Household head‟s gender  0.0231 0.0042 0.0453 
(male=1) (0.62) (0.19) (0.54) 
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0656 -0.0303 -0.1343 
 (3.71)** (2.79)** (3.31)** 
Labour force
(a)
  -0.0061 -0.0000 0.0041 
 (0.69) (0.01) (0.17) 
Child‟s gender (male=1) -0.0892 0.0052 -0.2940 
 (2.53)* (0.30) (3.64)** 
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.0334 -0.0305 0.1980 
 (0.87) (1.19) (2.30)* 
Child‟s age 0.1801 0.0907 -0.1884 
 (4.87)** (2.76)** (4.13)** 
Child‟s age squared -0.0090 -0.0044  
 (5.79)** (2.71)**  
Distance to the nearest school
(b) 
-0.0019 -0.0138 0.0364 
 
(0.13) (0.98) (1.01) 
Observations 483 286 197 
Pseudo R-squared  0.30 0.24 0.22 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 111.31 37.17 50.18 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Predicted probabilities at x-bar 0.858 0.965 0.596 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; Column 1 is for the whole sample; Column 2 is for a sub-sample of 
children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-
sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). 
(a)
The number of household 
members aged 18-60 as a proxy for labour force.
 (b)
The distance is regarded to ages at 
different educational levels e.g. it is the distance to the nearest primary school if 6 ≤ age 
≤ 10; the distance to the nearest lower secondary school if 11 ≤ age ≤14; the distance to 
the nearest upper secondary or high school if 15 ≤ age ≤18. All the models were 
controlled for location dummies.     
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Table 7.3: Negative Binomial Regression (NB2) for credit impact on 
education gap   
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged 6-14 Child aged 15-18 
Credit participation   -0.0313 0.0290 0.0168 
(yes=1) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) 
Pre-treatment income  -0.2516 -0.7769 0.2454 
capita in logarithm (0.85) (2.13)* (0.71) 
Pre-treatment asset in  -0.0763 -0.0907 -0.0350 
logarithm (1.20) (1.02) (0.49) 
Highest parental education  -0.0818 -0.1523 -0.0485 
(years) (2.46)* (2.50)* (1.33) 
Household head‟s gender  -0.0348 -0.2499 0.1293 
(male=1) (0.21) (0.75) (0.68) 
Number of children aged  0.2046 0.2772 0.2106 
6-18 years old (2.65)** (1.75)+ (2.13)* 
Labour force  0.0252 0.0427 -0.0317 
 (0.50) (0.52) (0.60) 
Child‟s gender (male=1) 0.4080 0.3439 0.4509 
 (2.41)* (1.18) (2.20)* 
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.0351 0.1317 -0.1242 
 (0.18) (0.36) (0.57) 
Child‟s age 0.3411 0.2704 0.3566 
 (9.17)** (4.78)** (3.09)** 
Distance to the nearest 
 
-1.1115 -1.5309 -1.2794 
school
 
(2.99)** (2.77)** (3.14)** 
Constant  -1.8093 3.9100 -6.6078 
 (0.68) (1.45) (1.63) 
Observations  483 286 197 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 222.96 79.24 40.79 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Alpha (a) 1.3868 
(5.85)** 
1.2798   
(1.91)+ 
1.2193 
(5.45)** 
(a)
The alpha parameter, highly significant, means that the Negative Binomial regression 
is an appropriate approach. Model in column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% 
level, either the Poisson or NB can be applied in this case.  The estimated results by the 
NB and Poisson estimators are similar. Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 
10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is for the whole sample; 
Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary 
school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). 
All the models were controlled for location dummies. 
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Table 7.4: Marginal effect of credit on current enrolment by gender (Probit) 
Explanatory variables 
 
Children aged 6-18 Children aged 6-14 
Girl Boy-girl 
difference
(a) 
Girl Boy-girl 
difference
(b) 
Credit participation  (yes=1) 0.0915 -0.1712 0.0496 -0.2276 
 (1.41) (1.93)+ (2.37)* (3.54)** 
Pre-treatment income capita  -0.0405 0.1207 0.0164 0.0201 
in logarithm (0.57) (1.11) (1.33) (1.16) 
Pre-treatment asset  0.0458 -0.0562 0.0033 -0.0078 
in logarithm (2.74)** (2.53)* (1.57) (1.92)+ 
Highest parents‟ education  0.0300 -0.0069 0.0027 0.0036 
 (3.76)** (0.58) (1.93)+ (1.48) 
Household head‟s gender  0.0473 -0.1011 0.0216 -0.1073 
(male=1) (0.92) (1.26) (1.81)+ (2.42)* 
Number of children from  -0.0366 -0.0593 -0.0030 -0.0128 
6 to 18 years old (1.60) (1.72)+ (0.62) (1.96)+ 
Labour force  -0.0115 0.0117 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (0.92) (0.69) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firstborn child (yes=1) 0.0759 -0.0988 -0.0011 -0.0200 
 (1.49) (1.13) (0.11) (0.82) 
Child‟s age 0.2117 -0.0642 0.0386 -0.0232 
 (4.45)** (0.92) (3.35)** (1.22) 
Child‟s age squared -0.0098 0.0018 -0.0018 0.0011 
 (4.99)** (0.63) (3.19)** (1.15) 
Distance to the nearest school
 
0.0091 -0.0214 0.0000 -0.0072 
 (0.45) (0.78) (0.01) (0.97) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.39  
Wald 2 (all coefficients =0) 135.74 84.70  
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 483 286 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; 
(a) 
&
 (b)
 are coefficients of interaction terms between the explanatory 
variables and child’s gender dummy (boy =1). All the models were controlled for 
location dummies. 
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Table 7.5: Impact of credit participation on education gap by gender (NB 
model) 
Explanatory variables Aged 6-18 Aged 6-14 
Girl  Boy-girl 
difference
(a) 
Girl  Boy-girl 
difference
(b) 
Credit participation (yes=1) -0.2616 0.3726 -0.7496 1.1840 
 (0.93) (0.94) (1.64)+ (1.98)* 
Pre-treatment income capita  -0.2196 0.0736 -0.7754 0.2298 
in logarithm (0.49) (0.12) (1.04) (0.26) 
Pre-treatment asset  -0.2109 0.2057 -0.1121 0.1425 
In logarithm (2.06)* (1.69)+ (1.08) (0.96) 
Highest parent‟s education  -0.1419 0.1023 -0.2420 0.1681 
 (3.14)** (1.63) (2.60)** (1.36) 
Household head‟s gender  -0.1436 0.2616 -0.4496 0.5953 
(male=1) (0.54) (0.76) (0.83) (0.90) 
Number of children from 6  0.1271 0.1454 -0.1596 0.6861 
to 18 years old (1.10) (0.96) (0.76) (2.27)* 
Labour force  0.0379 -0.0254 0.0363 0.0741 
 (0.47) (0.25) (0.39) (0.52) 
Firstborn child (yes=1) 0.0245 0.0858 0.1971 -0.0872 
 (0.08) (0.21) (0.41) (0.13) 
Child‟s age 0.3491 0.0024 0.3610 -0.1924 
 (6.37)** (0.03) (3.25)** (1.56) 
Distance to the nearest  0.1700 -0.0995 0.1092 0.0144 
School (1.33) (0.67) (0.31) (0.04) 
Constant   -0.1659  4.2791 
  (0.04)  (0.73) 
Alpha 1.3918 
(5.96)** 
0.6967 
(1.57) 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 292.74 131.02 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; and 
** significant at 1%. 
(a) 
&
 (b)
 are coefficients of interaction terms between the 
explanatory variables and child’s gender dummy (boy =1). All the models were 
controlled for location dummies. 
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Table 7.6: Marginal effects on enrolment status by types of credit (probit 
model) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Children aged  
6-14 
Children aged  
15-18 
Informal credit (yes=1) -0.0639 -0.0002 -0.1461 
 (1.25) (0.01) (1.19) 
Both sources of credit (yes=1) -0.0160 -0.0409 0.0037 
 (0.33) (1.33) (0.03) 
Formal credit (yes=1) 0.0637 -0.0121 0.1959 
 (1.25) (0.39) (1.70)+ 
Pre-treatment income capita  0.0634 0.0767 -0.1633 
in logarithm (1.10) (2.72)** (1.13) 
Pre-treatment asset in  0.0155 0.0020 0.0125 
Logarithm (1.22) (0.38) (0.36) 
Highest parental education  0.0240 0.0135 0.0417 
 (3.98)** (4.53)** (2.98)** 
Household head‟s gender  0.0184 -0.0050 0.0339 
(male=1) (0.50) (0.26) (0.39) 
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0613 -0.0269 -0.1227 
 (3.48)** (2.65)** (3.02)** 
Labour force  -0.0080 0.0014 -0.0069 
 (0.89) (0.35) (0.28) 
Child‟s gender (boy=1) -0.0898 0.0079 -0.2883 
 (2.58)** (0.46) (3.53)** 
First born child (yes=1) 0.0318 -0.0265 0.1842 
 (0.84) (1.12) (2.11)* 
Child‟s age 0.1774 0.0860 -0.1754 
 (4.86)** (2.82)** (3.82)** 
Child‟s age squared -0.0088 -0.0041  
 (5.77)** (2.76)**  
Distance to the nearest school
 
0.1116 0.0362 0.2535 
 (1.96)+ (1.48) (1.68)+ 
H0: informal = formal (P-value) 0.019*
 
0.672 0.007** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.25 0.25 
Wald 2 (all coeffs=0) 110.89 47.94 57.79 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 197 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; the reference group for credit types is non-borrowers. All the models 
were controlled for location dummies. 
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Table 7.7: Impact on education gap by type of credit (NB model) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Children aged  
6-14 
Children aged  
15-18 
Informal credit (yes=1) 0.1006 -0.1181 0.2852 
 (0.44) (0.28) (1.02) 
Both sources of credit (yes=1) 0.0995 0.2099 0.1184 
 (0.40) (0.52) (0.44) 
Formal credit (yes=1) -0.3411 0.0239 -0.3897 
 (1.25) (0.06) (1.25) 
Pre-treatment income capita  -0.2835 -0.8128 0.1778 
in logarithm (0.99) (2.21)* (0.53) 
Pre-treatment asset  -0.0797 -0.0842 -0.0353 
in logarithm (1.27) (0.90) (0.52) 
Highest parental education  -0.0788 -0.1580 -0.0455 
(years) (2.50)* (2.58)* (1.32) 
Household head‟s gender  0.0062 -0.2003 0.1571 
(male=1) (0.04) (0.61) (0.79) 
Number of children  0.1995 0.2659 0.1920 
aged 6 to 18 (2.58)** (1.69)+ (1.97)* 
Labour force  0.0281 0.0271 -0.0069 
 (0.58) (0.34) (0.13) 
Child‟s gender (boy=1) 0.4206 0.2950 0.4364 
 (2.53)* (1.04) (2.17)* 
First born (yes=1) 0.0496 0.1236 -0.0912 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.42) 
Child‟s age 0.3346 0.2691 0.3016 
 (9.06)** (4.76)** (2.62)** 
Distance to the nearest school
 
-1.0455 -1.4828 -1.1493 
 (2.82)** (2.65)** (2.85)** 
Constant -1.4565 4.2060 -5.2948 
 (0.57) (1.50) (1.35) 
H0: informal = formal (P-value) 0.084+ 0.730 0.035* 
Alpha ( 1.3488 
(5.8)** 
1.2806 
(1.91)+ 
1.1611 
(5.3)** 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 231.47 88.34 50.89 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 197 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; Model in column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% level, either 
the Poisson or NB can be applied in this case. The estimated results by the NB and 
Poisson estimators are similar. The reference group for credit types is non-borrowers. All 
the models were controlled for location dummies. 
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Table 7.8: Effect of interaction terms between credit and parental education, 
and credit and household income 
Explanatory variables dprobit model
(a)
  NB model 
Credit participation (yes =1) 0.7214 -1.2088 
 (0.55) (0.27) 
Pre-treatment income capita in logarithm  0.0891 -0.2832 
 (1.13) (0.81) 
Pre-treatment asset in logarithm 0.0130 -0.0638 
 (1.07) (0.96) 
Highest parental education  0.0228 -0.1475 
 (2.00)* (2.35)* 
Credit participation*income per capita -0.0674 0.0849 
 (0.58) (0.16) 
Credit participation*highest  0.0035 0.0918 
parental education (0.26) (1.26) 
Household head‟s gender (male=1) 0.0246 -0.0377 
 (0.66) (0.22) 
Number of children from aged 6-18 -0.0669 0.2130 
 (3.71)** (2.69)** 
Labour force  -0.0058 0.0258 
 (0.65) (0.52) 
Child‟s gender (male=1) -0.0894 0.3966 
 (2.54)* (2.37)* 
First born child (yes =1) 0.0351 0.0382 
 (0.91) (0.20) 
Child‟s age 0.1809 0.3453 
 (4.87)** (9.50)** 
Child‟s age squared -0.0090  
 (5.79)**  
Distance to the nearest school
 
-0.0010 0.1028 
 (0.07) (1.64)+ 
Constant  -1.4549 
  (0.50) 
Observations 483 483 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 114.17 224.50 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.30  
Alpha (  1.3849 
(5.9)** 
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; 
(a)
dprobit model estimates marginal effects. All the models were 
controlled for location dummies. 
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Table 7.9: The Average Treatment Effects using matching estimators   
Propensity score 
estimation stage 
Outcome of schooling Treated/ 
controls 
Kernel 
matching 
Radius 
matching 
A subsample 
(households with 
children aged 6-18) 
Current Enrolment 370/84 0.017 
(0.054) 
0.031 
(0.061) 
Education Gap (year) 370/84 -0.167 
(0.297) 
-0.194 
(0.300) 
 
Whole sample 
Current Enrolment 379/98 0.010 
(0.052) 
0.010 
(0.054) 
Education Gap (year) 379/98 -0.146 
(0.282) 
-0.138 
(0.292) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1000 repetitions, statistically 
significant at 10% (+); 5%(*); 1%(**). Only few households (10 households) have more 
than or equal 4 children aged 6-18, to get balanced easier I group them into households 
having 4 kids. Controlling variables in the propensity score estimation (propensity score 
estimation with household level data):  Head’s gender, head’s age, parental highest 
education, marital status, children aged 6-18, members aged 18-60, initial income in log, 
initial assets in logarithm, ward dummies. 
 
 
Table 7.10: The average treatment effects using matching estimators with 
whole sample in propensity score estimation 
Outcome of schooling 
Informal credit  
vs  
Non-borrowers 
Formal credit  
vs  
Non-borrowers 
Formal  
vs 
Informal 
ATTK ATTR ATTK ATTR ATTR 
Current Enrolment 
-0.024       
(0.072) 
-0.025       
(0.075) 
0.140       
(0.058)* 
0.105       
(0.052)* 
0.129       
(0.054)* 
Education Gap (year) 
0.023       
(0.395) 
0.043       
(0.379) 
-0.746       
(0.300)* 
-0.665       
(0.293)* 
-0.745       
(0.273)** 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with 1000 replications, statistically 
significant at 10% (+); 5%(*); 1%(**). Controlling variables in the propensity score 
estimation: Head’s gender, head’s age, highest parental education, marital status, ward 
dummies, number of children aged 6-18, number of members aged 18-60, initial income 
in logarithm, initial assets in logarithm, and head’s age*education. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 7.1: Smoothed child enrolment ratio and education gap by age 
Child Age 
Enrolment rate (%) Education gap (years) 
Borrowers Non-borrowers Borrowers Non-borrowers 
6 83.3 82.2 0.01 0.00 
7 87.9 85.6 0.07 0.13 
8 91.3 88.1 0.13 0.26 
9 93.3 89.9 0.19 0.37 
10 94.4 91.6 0.26 0.48 
11 93.4 91.5 0.33 0.62 
12 89.4 87.9 0.50 0.91 
13 85.0 83.4 0.81 1.23 
14 79.5 77.8 1.07 1.52 
15 72.5 71.7 1.44 1.77 
16 63.5 63.9 1.89 2.23 
17 53.6 53.4 2.40 2.75 
18 44.6 46.2 2.81 3.36 
Notes: Bandwidth (a smoothing parameter) = 0.9 is chosen in the Lowess (locally 
weighted scatter-plot smoothing estimator) command in Stata
®
. This information is used 
to graph Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. 
 
Appendix 7.2: Mean and variance of education gap for children aged 6-18 
Variable Observations Mean Variance  Std.Dev Min Max 
Unconditional  483 1.122 5.087 2.255 0.000 12 
Conditional  483 1.145 2.190 1.480 0.019 12 
Source: estimation from the author’s survey 
Tabulation of education gap for children from 6 to 18 years old 
Education gap Frequency Percent Cumulative  
0 31         6.42         6.42         
1 284        58.80        65.22 
2 64        13.25        78.47 
3 32         6.63        85.09 
4 17         3.52        88.61 
5 14         2.90        91.51 
6 8         1.66        93.17 
7 12         2.48        95.65 
8 4         0.83        96.48 
9 1         0.21        96.69 
10 8         1.66        98.34 
11 3         0.62        98.96 
12 5         1.04       100.00 
Total 483 100.00 100.00 
Source: Estimation from the author’s survey 
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Appendix 7.3: Choice of Negative Binomial Models 
 
NB models fit two different parameterisations of the NB model: Negbin I or NB1: 
(Var(Y)=(1+)E[Y] - a linear variance function), and Negbin II or NB2: 
(Var(Y)=E[Y].(1+E[Y]) - a version with quadratic variance. The NB2 has 
dispersion (ratio of variance/mean) for the i
th
 observation equal to 1+E[Yi] i.e., 
the dispersion is a function of the expected mean of the counts for the j
th
 
observation: E[Yi]. The alternative parameterisation, NB1, has dispersion equal to 
1 + ; i.e. it is a constant for all observations. If alpha  = 0 (or delta  =0) 
corresponds to dispersion = 1, thus it is simply a Poisson model. One may want to 
fit both parameterisations NB1 and NB2, and choosing either of them rely on 
larger (least negative) log pseudo likelihood. In most cases, however, both models 
will yield similar results, and the parameterisations will not significantly differ 
from one another. Thus, the choice of parameterisation is not important (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2009). 
A common approach to deal with the overdispersion for count data is to use 
the generalised linear model including NB (Hoef & Boveng, 2007) because the 
overdispersion parameter can vary across individuals so some variables can affect 
the location and scale parameters of the distribution, therefore, the generalised NB 
model which allows the different effects of different variables on the location and 
the scale of the distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). In my case, I compare the 
regression statistics, e.g. Log pseudo likelihood, and see that both NB2 and 
generalised NB produced identical statistics. As a result, I apply only NB2 in the 
current research. 
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Appendix 7.4: Marginal effects of credit on current enrolment (weighted 
Probit estimates) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Children 
aged 
 6-14 
Children 
aged 
 15-18 
Credit participation  (yes=1) -0.0028 -0.0116 0.0154 
 (0.07) (0.51) (0.16) 
Pre-treatment income capita in  0.0142 0.0583 -0.2567 
logarithm (0.21) (1.54) (1.42) 
Pre-treatment asset in logarithm 0.0119 0.0015 0.0095 
 (0.95) (0.27) (0.27) 
Highest parental education (year) 0.0261 0.0127 0.0439 
 (4.06)** (3.68)** (3.02)** 
Household head‟s gender  0.0341 0.0123 0.0529 
(male=1) (0.91) (0.52) (0.63) 
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0674 -0.0306 -0.1419 
 (3.75)** (2.67)** (3.46)** 
Labour force
(a)
  -0.0060 0.0007 0.0025 
 (0.67) (0.16) (0.10) 
Child‟s gender (male=1) -0.0900 0.0068 -0.3028 
 (2.47)* (0.36) (3.69)** 
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.0228 -0.0331 0.1872 
 (0.58) (1.23) (2.15)* 
Child‟s age 0.1791 0.0944 -0.1939 
 (4.69)** (2.74)** (4.12)** 
Child‟s age squared -0.0090 -0.0046  
 (5.64)** (2.71)**  
Distance to the nearest school
(b) 
0.0007 -0.0141 0.0366 
 
(0.05) (0.96) (1.00) 
Observations 483 286 197 
Pseudo R-squared  0.30 0.21 0.23 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 112.54 33.01 51.58 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Predicted probabilities at x-bar 0.86 0.96 0.59 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; Column 1 is for the whole sample; Column 2 is for a sub-sample of 
children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-
sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). 
(a)
The number of household 
members aged 18-60 as a proxy for labour force.
 (b)
The distance is regarded to ages at 
different educational levels e.g. it is the distance to the nearest primary school if 6 ≤ age 
≤ 10; the distance to the nearest lower secondary school if 11 ≤ age ≤14; the distance to 
the nearest upper secondary or high school if 15 ≤ age ≤18. All the models were 
controlled for location dummies.   
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Appendix 7.5: Credit impact on education gap (weighted NB estimates) 
Explanatory variables Whole sample Child aged 6-14 Child aged 15-18 
Credit participation   -0.0173 0.0481 0.0111 
(yes=1) (0.08) (0.14) (0.05) 
Pre-treatment income  -0.0887 -0.8237 0.3785 
capita in logarithm (0.25) (1.64) (0.96) 
Pre-treatment asset  -0.0717 -0.0949 -0.0308 
in logarithm (1.07) (0.93) (0.42) 
Highest parental education  -0.0832 -0.1550 -0.0504 
(years) (2.48)* (2.47)* (1.38) 
Household head‟s gender  -0.0915 -0.3405 0.0872 
(male=1) (0.54) (1.03) (0.46) 
Number of children  0.2021 0.2458 0.2040 
aged 6-18 (2.57)* (1.54) (2.06)* 
Labour force  0.0253 0.0374 -0.0243 
 (0.50) (0.46) (0.46) 
Child‟s gender (male=1) 0.3967 0.3653 0.4309 
 (2.32)* (1.22) (2.11)* 
Firstborn child (yes =1) 0.1191 0.1748 -0.0300 
 (0.61) (0.47) (0.14) 
Child‟s age 0.3501 0.2699 0.3557 
 (8.77)** (4.56)** (2.99)** 
Distance to the nearest 
 
-1.0308 -1.5100 -1.1781 
school
 
(2.63)** (2.63)** (2.87)** 
Constant  -3.3714 4.4675 -7.8268 
 (1.01) (1.09) (1.70)+ 
Observations  483 286 197 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 225.64 58.02 41.56 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Alpha (a) 1.3862  
(5.71)** 
1.5292 
 (2.14)* 
1.3862 
 (5.71)** 
(a)
The alpha parameter, highly significant, means that the Negative Binomial regression 
is an appropriate approach. Model in column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% 
level, either the Poisson or NB can be applied in this case.  The estimated results by the 
NB and Poisson estimators are similar. Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 
10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Column 1 is for the whole sample; 
Column 2 is for a sub-sample of children aged 6 to 14 (primary and lower secondary 
school ages); Column 3 is for a sub-sample of children aged 15 to 18 (high school ages). 
All the models were controlled for location dummies. 
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Appendix 7.6: Marginal effects on enrolment status by types of credit 
(weighted probit estimates) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Child aged  
6-14 
Child aged  
15-18 
Informal credit -0.0590 0.0029 -0.1390 
 (1.14) (0.11) (1.13) 
Both sources of credit -0.0161 -0.0344 -0.0093 
 (0.33) (1.12) (0.08) 
Formal credit 0.0662 -0.0093 0.1909 
 (1.28) (0.29) (1.63) 
Pre-treatment income capita  0.0218 0.0610 -0.2256 
in logarithm (0.33) (1.83)+ (1.28) 
Pre-treatment asset in log 0.0142 0.0014 0.0151 
 (1.12) (0.26) (0.42) 
Highest parental education  0.0245 0.0137 0.0434 
 (3.99)** (4.36)** (3.07)** 
Household head‟s gender  0.0277 0.0024 0.0379 
(male=1) (0.74) (0.12) (0.43) 
Number of children aged 6-18 -0.0630 -0.0272 -0.1302 
 (3.51)** (2.50)* (3.15)** 
Labour force  -0.0080 0.0021 -0.0083 
 (0.89) (0.50) (0.33) 
Child‟s gender (boy=1) -0.0895 0.0095 -0.2953 
 (2.50)* (0.52) (3.57)** 
First born child (yes=1) 0.0211 -0.0292 0.1710 
 (0.54) (1.17) (1.92)+ 
Child‟s age 0.1761 0.0896 -0.1806 
 (4.68)** (2.79)** (3.83)** 
Child‟s age squared -0.0089 -0.0043  
 (5.62)** (2.76)**  
Distance to the nearest school
 
0.1062 0.0335 0.2395 
 (1.78)+ (1.23) (1.53) 
H0: informal = formal (P-value) 0.024* 0.6633 0.012* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.22 0.25 
Wald 2 (all coeffs=0) 112.64 43.91 58.68 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 197 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; All the models were controlled for location dummies. 
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Appendix 7.7: Impact on education gap by type of credit (weighted NB 
estimates) 
Explanatory variables Whole 
sample 
Child aged  
6-14 
Child aged  
15-18 
Informal credit 0.0893 -0.1129 0.2458 
 (0.38) (0.26) (0.91) 
Both sources of credit 0.1084 0.2479 0.1147 
 (0.43) (0.60) (0.44) 
Formal credit -0.3230 0.0149 -0.3755 
 (1.16) (0.03) (1.21) 
Pre-treatment income capita  -0.1383 -0.9054 0.3026 
in logarithm (0.40) (1.75)+ (0.80) 
Pre-treatment asset in  -0.0741 -0.0899 -0.0312 
logarithm (1.14) (0.84) (0.45) 
Highest parental education  -0.0812 -0.1620 -0.0484 
(years) (2.55)* (2.57)* (1.42) 
Household head‟s gender  -0.0454 -0.2746 0.1184 
(male=1) (0.26) (0.84) (0.60) 
Number of children aged 6-18 0.1962 0.2303 0.1853 
 (2.50)* (1.45) (1.90)+ 
Labour force  0.0274 0.0196 -0.0024 
 (0.57) (0.25) (0.05) 
Child‟s gender (boy=1) 0.4073 0.3147 0.4156 
 (2.42)* (1.06) (2.07)* 
First born (yes=1) 0.1339 0.1684 0.0046 
 (0.69) (0.46) (0.02) 
Child‟s age 0.3439 0.2679 0.3048 
 (8.67)** (4.55)** (2.58)* 
Distance to the nearest school
(a) 
-0.9786 -1.4678 -1.0661 
 (2.53)* (2.56)* (2.60)** 
Constant -2.8717 5.1939 -6.4822 
 (0.89) (1.20) (1.47) 
H0: informal = formal (P-value) 0.1104 0.7624 0.0520+ 
Alpha ( 1.3526 
(5.73)** 
1.5237  
(2.13)* 
1.1393 
(5.31)** 
Wald 2 (all coefficients=0) 232.35 67.54 51.07 
Prob > 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 483 286 197 
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses, + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%; Model in column 2, the test of =0 is accepted at the 5% level, either 
the Poisson or NB can be applied in this case. The estimated results by the NB and 
Poisson estimators are similar. All the models were controlled for location dummies. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions  
 
8.1 Conclusions 
This thesis has examined how the poor in peri-urban areas of Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC), Vietnam access credit and the impacts of that credit on education and 
healthcare spending, and child schooling.  
Such examination is needed because as shown in the thesis, the role of 
education in earnings has become much more important during the transition to a 
market economy in Vietnam. The rate of return to schooling in Vietnam has 
increased quickly and has reached the global average rate of return of about 10%. 
The increase in the rate of return to schooling and the demand for skilled workers 
provides an exit from poverty for the poor in urban and peri-urban areas who rely 
heavily on labour income. But to use this exit they need to invest more in human 
capital, such as healthcare and education. One way for the poor to increase their 
investment in human capital is through microcredit, but the poor in peri-urban 
areas are highly credit-constrained and rely heavily on informal credit. There is 
distinction in borrowing behaviours between poor households in rural and urban 
wards in these peri-urban areas. In urban wards, the poor depend more on limited 
and subsidized funds from the government and are less likely to borrow from 
informal credit which provides loans based mainly on interpersonal trust rather 
than collateral. Households in rural areas who live further away from banks find it 
easier to borrow, while households in urban areas living near banks have a lower 
probability of borrowing and are more credit-constrained. There are two main 
possible reasons: the first is mutual help among people in rural areas where they 
have better interpersonal trust, while this trust is weak in urban areas; the second 
is complicated procedures such as lending procedures and property ownership 
certification blocking the poor from credit resources.
89
 Apart from loans from 
government funds, the poor are almost always excluded from other formal credit 
resources.  
Although the poor are highly credit-constrained, a sizable proportion of 
them have obtained credit, from either government subsidized or informal credit 
sources. This credit participation has positive and significant effects on household 
                                                 
89
 Kim (2004) provides a good example of the complicated procedure required by HCMC 
government  to obtain certificates of land and house ownership. 
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education and healthcare spending. However, after disaggregating it appears that  
only formal credit has benefited the poor in terms of increasing education and 
healthcare spending because loans from informal credit sources, which are often 
very short-termed and small-sized, are not suitable for human capital investment. 
Allowing for heterogeous impacts also shows credit has larger impacts for 
households with initially low levels of healthacre spending. A gender 
disaggregation of impacts on education shows larger positive effects for girls. 
Formal credit has brought beneficial effects to children‟s education (both 
expenditure and child schooling outcomes), whereas informal credit has failed to 
do so. Consequently, to improve child schooling in the long run requires easing 
access to formal credit for the poor; otherwise, the poor will rely upon informal 
credit and will end up in debt and may then pull their children out of school. As a 
result, informal credit may exacerbate poverty in the long term rather than help 
the poor out of poverty.  
8.2 Avenue for future research 
Future research should take into account some of the limitations in this thesis as 
indicated below. 
First, one may think about possible endogeneity of education due to 
unobservable individual ability and the methods which fail to control for 
schooling quality that could lead to bias in the estimated returns to schooling. The 
fixed effect models with panel data would overcome the bias by estimating returns 
to changes in schooling over time (two points of time). Alternatively, future 
research using data on siblings‟ education or IQ index with an instrumental 
variable model can be feasible approaches; siblings‟ education may be highly 
feasible in the context of available data in Vietnam to overcome the endogeneity 
problem. Another approach, though it may be harder to find data for, is to use 
parents‟ education to predict wage-earner‟s education; this approach could be 
applied to younger groups of the sample, but for the older groups, their parents‟ 
education data would be unavailable in Vietnam. 
Second, credit participation and constraints can also be determined by 
unobservable attributes, such as households‟ entrepreneurial ability, attitude to 
risks and access to social networks. In the current questionnaire used for 
collecting data for this thesis, I designed some questions (in Section 6 of the 
questionnaire attached) to capture the access to social networks, but the “yes/no” 
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questions did not reflect fully the access to social networks. Future studies should 
design questions to represent levels of households‟ actual contribution or 
involvement in the social networks, and to measure entrepreneurial ability and 
attitude to risk, which will enable researchers to control for influences by these 
variables and confirm the current thesis findings.  
Third, the PSM estimates are considerably lower than those of the OLS 
because PSM compares borrowers with similar non-borrowers, though still based 
on observable characteristics. Controlling for the pre-treatment income and assets, 
which are more likely to be associated with some main unobservable attributes 
such as motivation, entrepreneurial ability and skills, would reduce the bias. 
However, the pre-treatment variables may not capture all the unobserved bias, 
thus future research should develop some indicators to represent these attributes 
and control for the indicators when estimating propensity scores. For example, 
likert-scale questions such as indicators for parents‟ attitude to children‟s 
education, indicators for individual attitude to risk or entrepreneurial ability, or 
indicators representing a household‟s social network should be used to confirm 
and consolidate my findings. 
Future research may also use the instrumental variable method to overcome 
the endogeneity problem. Distance to the bank is commonly used as IV in the 
literature, but it does not work in peri-urban areas because distance affects both 
credit participation and the outcomes (since banks and services are clustered 
together). Therefore, future research should look for appropriate IVs for peri-
urban areas, for example, access to credit information could be a better IV than 
the distance to the nearest bank.  
Fourth, the conclusion of heterogeneous impacts in Chapter 6 relied on the 
assumption that the sample population is homogeneous, hence there are no sub-
groups who would have the LATE (and for whom a particular instrumental 
variable might bind, while it does not bind for others), and that the heterogeneity 
in the outcomes comes from the random errors. Since I assume it is unobservables 
rather than local treatment effects causing the heterogeneity, I do not necessarily 
need an instrumental variable estimator. However, the assumption that the 
selection into the treatment is based on observables, may not be true; in future 
research one should look for good instruments for peri-urban areas and the QTE 
with instrumental variables (IQTE) may be more precise than the conventional IV 
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estimator at the median (Abadie, Angrist, & Imbens, 2002) and can address the 
potential bias. 
Fifth, future studies also need to investigate impacts on child academic 
performance, higher education and other health indicators such as height for ages, 
BMI, malnutrition rate, etc. to confirm the effect findings. 
Finally, the sample used in this thesis is likely to be representative of the 
poor group whose initial income per capita is below the poverty line at the survey 
time in this particular district but not necessarily for Ho Chi Minh City nor for 
Vietnam. In future if resources suffice, one should enlarge the sample size and 
cover of survey areas to some other peri-urban districts of HCMC, then the result 
will be representative of both the poor in HCMC and Vietnam as a whole because 
HCMC is the fastest urbanizing and biggest city in Vietnam. 
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3. Brief objectives of this research  
The research tries to investigate the microcredit market and its impact on 
household education and healthcare in suburban areas of Ho Chi Minh City, 
Vietnam. The research focuses not only on formal microcredit but also on 
informal microcredit transactions.  
More specifically, in order to reach the targets the researcher tries to answer 
the following questions 
 Who are customers of microcredit organizations? In other words, what are 
determinants of household credit participation and credit constraints? 
 What are the impacts of credit participation on household health care, 
education expenditure, and on children‟s schooling? 
4. Research participants 
The participants of this research are households and household members in the 
selected areas. Participants/households are randomly selected from the district 
population of the poor; the researcher does not rely on any subjective criteria 
when he selects your household into the sample.  
5. Tasks and expected time of the survey  
We (field team) will interview you (as a household head or household head‟s 
spouse) and may have you complete some sections of the questionnaire. If you 
do not understand the questions or would like to ask for more information, you 
are encouraged to ask us. This interview may take about one hour.  
6. Guarantee for confidentiality to information collected 
The data and interview responses will be used by the researcher to write 
descriptive and econometric analyses of the research issues, which the 
researcher has chosen. Only the researcher and his supervisors Prof John 
Gibson and Prof Mark Holmes will be privy to the questionnaires, notes, data 
and the information collected. 
Questionnaires and notes will be destroyed upon completion of data entry, 
and the researcher will keep a copy of the data on files but will treat it with the 
strictest confidentiality, data file will be locked in his office. No participants 
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will be named in research reports unless an explicit consent has been given by 
the participants. 
To assure the confidentiality for your household information, we will 
detach the coversheet and wipe off the “household number” on the coversheet 
after data entry, and store the coversheet with the consent form. When 
finishing data entry we will delete a column of household members‟ names, 
we only use members‟ IDs or codes to manage the observations in data files.  
Finally, we will destroy the questionnaire with your information on it. 
In addition, at the beginning of each survey day the researcher and his 
supervisor will distribute 04 questionnaires to each interviewer (including 01 
reserved questionnaire) and 04 envelops with the researcher‟s contact detail on 
them. The field team will put the questionnaire into envelops, and then paste 
and seal envelops after finishing interview. We will ask you to sign on the 
seals to make sure nobody can change information collected. At the end of the 
day, the researcher and his survey supervisor will gather all questionnaires 
completed including unused questionnaire and store at the researcher‟s home. 
On the next day, the task will be the same for other households, and the 
supervisor will go to your (interviewed) household to check whether the field 
team had done the interview. After checking, he will certify the questionnaire 
by signing on the questionnaire coversheet at the researcher‟s office (in 
Vietnam). After conforming to these strict steps, data entry will be entered into 
files and the questionnaires will be destroyed. 
Only the researcher and his academic supervisors will be allowed to access 
to the information/data collected. The researcher will keep a copy of dataset on 
file but will treat it with the strictest confidentiality. The researcher will build 
a separate dictionary file to exploit the dataset, without it nobody can 
understand and use the dataset successfully. In addition, the researcher will set 
password for the dataset and dictionary file. Therefore, we hope that this 
procedure assures the confidentiality for the information that your household 
provides us. 
7. You have the right at any time before, during and after the research period 
to:  
• Before starting the interview, we would like to inform you that if you take 
part in the study, you have the rights to refuse answering any particular 
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question, and to withdraw from the study at any time before completing the 
data collection, and  
• You have the rights to ask any further questions about the study if you 
would like to have more information during the interview and after the 
survey, and  
• You have the rights to access to a summary of the findings from the study 
when it is concluded by sending the researcher email, post mail or phone. 
The researcher will provide you the required information, which is related 
to the research. 
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Household number:……………………………………………….
Household head (name):............................................................ Sex M F
Number of people in the household:……………………………..
Address..................street.........................................ward.............................….………phone: …………….
Name of respondent:…………………………………. Code (in household roster):
Name of interviewer:…………………………………….
Date of interview: day...…month..…...year 2008
Direction
GPS latitude N
GPS longitude E
Supervisor Interviewer
(sign) (sign & name)
Note:  Supervisor will sign after visiting the households describled on this sheet and confirming that they were interviewed 
on the day indicated, and all sections in this questionnaire were checked.
Degrees (ddd) Minutes (mm.mmm)
March to May 2008 - Vietnam
File_HHTHE UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO
Waikato Management School
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
Department of Economics 
Confidential
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SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD ROSTER (LIST OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS)
1. You please tell us full name of 2. Sex 3. Relationship to 4. How old is [name]? 5. How is 6. What is the current 7.Job of [name]?
C each person who has been having head of household (if  [name] is less than [NAME]'s marital status of [NAME]? 1=farmer
meals, sleeping and sharing income Head………………………… 1 or equal 05, both month residency 2=small trader
o and expenditure in your household, w ife/husband…………………………2 and year should be status? (only ask persons from 3=street vendor
start with household head. child......................................………..3 recorded) 13 years old and over) 4=fac worker
d parents..........................................…..…..4 5=professional
sister/brother………………. 5 Permanent=1 Never married……………. 1 6=entreprenuer
e Male…….1 grandfather/grandmother……………..6 Semi-permanent married……………………. 2 7=retired
Write down in capital letters Female…2 grandchild…………………………7 record record ( KT3 )     =2 w idow ed……………………………………3 8=government
and in order of satellite families other relationship……………………………..8 2 digits 2 digits Others     =3 divorced……………………………….4 9=housew ork
separated……………………….5 10=jobless
years months 11=other(specify)
s1q2 s1q4a s1q4b s1q5 s1q7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
s1q8a: s1q8c:
s1q3s1q1
File_HM1
s1q6
8. During the 12 months prior to the last 12 months, what was household's residency status in Q5? and household 
Head's status in Q6 and Q7? (record answer in the corresonding cells in the right hand side) s1q8b:
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SECTION 2A: EDUCATION (ask all members)
1. Name 2 3. What is the 4 5 6 7
Can highest education In the What In the last 12 months, What is the expenses for [NAME] to go to school Expenses for 
[name] [NAME] obtained? last 12 type of (include pre-school/kindergarten expenses) other courses?
C reade & months school try to ask and f ill in the detail columns (homework,
write? 0=no garde has has if  no expenditure, record 0 tutorial, 
o (start with completed [NAME] [name] if  remember total amount & some detailed expenses, f ill in corresponding columns typewriting, 
household head) 1-12 school years attended studied in foreign language
d 13=technical w orker school? last 12 computer skills,
(record exactly 14=vocational (ask people months other studies?
e the same code 15=college below or a b c d e f g h
of household  16=bacherlor degree equal 18) tuition and contribution for Uniforms Textbook, Other Extra Other Total
member in the Yes=1 18=master Yes=1 1=Public registration fees school, class and other reference school classes expenditure? (a+b+…+g) thousands
Roster) No=2 20=doctor No..=2 2=semi-public to study outside (building, parent'sclothing book? tools (paper,(include (transport, dong
(>>go to 3=private of school association,…) required by pens, bag, language, accomodation
section 2B) the school? pencils….) computer) others,…)
s2aq1 s2aq2 s2aq3 s2aq4 s2aq5 s2aq6a s2aq6b s2aq6c s2aq6d s2aq6e s2aq6f s2q7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
TOTAL
s2aq7
FILE_HM2
thousands dong
s2aq6g s2aq6h
s2aq6FILE_HH2
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SECTION 3: HEALTH FILE_HH3
Pls provide us some information on your household's health care
1. In the last 12 months, has any member of your household gone to the health care centre and/or hospital? Yes ….. 1 (>>2) s3q1
(including doctor's visit and cases whereas he/she is not sick or ill but taking health check, prenatal check-up, abortion, No …… 2 (>>7)
setting a coil, paid vacination….)
2 3 4. Was [name] 5. What is the total out-patient 6. What is the total in-patient 
Name of Which health facility hospitalized then? treatment cost of [name]? treament cost of [name] (incl hospital s3q7. In the last 12 months, how much did your household 
person has [NAME] used? (incl. consultation and other fee and other expenses like feeding-up spend on buying medicine for self treatment or stand-by 
C used (including invited a expenses like feeding-up allow ance allow ance, other services as requested without consultation   
health care health care provider , other service fees as requested medicince, health tools…) (incl. medicine & other expenses such as: transportation, 
o services to home)  medicine, health tools ..) related to treatment for one time vehicle parking fee ...)
(record exactly w ard health center.............................1 Yes  … .1 (>>6) related to treatment for one time
d the same code district health center......................2
of household  polyclinic...................... 3 No, just be an s3q8. In the past 12 months, how much has your household
e member in the government hospital.......................4 outpateint…2 (>>5)  spent on health tools? Example: stethoscope, hearing aid 
Roster) private health facility....................................5 Unit: 1000 VND Unit: 1000 VND apparatus, taking machine, sphygmomanometer,
traditional medical 6 >> TIMES & NEXT PERSON >> TIMES & NEXT PERSON medicine cabinet…
practitioner............................................…7
other health facility...............................8 amount/once times amount amount/once Times Amount
s3q2 s3q5a s3q5b s3q5c s3q6a s3q6b s3q6c s3q9. In the past 12 months, how much has yr household 
1 contributed to social health (health fund, construction of health
2  centres, preventive compaigns, …)
3
4
5 s3q10. How much has your household paid for health 
6 insurance in the past 12 months?
7
8
9 s3q5. Total of s3q5c (out-patient)
10
11
12 s3q6. Total of s3q6c (in-patient)
13
14
15 s3q11. Total Household's health expenditure 
16 (=s3q5+s3q6+s3q7+s3q8+s3q9+s3q10) 
17
18
19
20
21
TOTAL s3q5 s3q6
FILE_HM3
s3q3 s3q4
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SECTION 4: HOUSEHOLD CREDIT 
1. In the last 12 months, do you or your household have an account (borrowing or saving, 
or ATM at any bank or other financial institutions)?
yes.......................... 1 s4q1 4. Have you or your household members borrowed (in cash or in kind) in the 
No........................... 0    last 24 months from relatives, friends, banks, social-politial organizations
2. In the last 12 months, have any household members demanded to borrow?    credit fund, rotating credit and savings association, pawnbrokers…. ?
(incl the demand was satisfied and not satisfied) yes.................1(>> 5) s4q4
yes.……………….. 1 (>>3) s4q2 No....................0 (>>go to Section 5)
No........................... 0 (>>4) 5. Have you or your household members borrowed (in cash or in kind) in the 
3. Was the demand satisfied? Yes, full…….1 s4q3 yes..............1 s4q5
Yes, partly…2 No................0
No…………..0
10. What is the interest
rate of this loan?
Social Policy Bank……………………...1
r
Other commercial banks………………3 (if the interest rate is not specified,
d Job placement support fund…………..4
Credit Cooperatives……………………5 Amount)
e People Credit Fund……………………..6
Socio-polical organizations……………7
r Private moneylenders………………….8
Relative, friends………………………..9
Rotating Credit&Saving Associations..10
Thousand VND Month Year
s4q7 s4q8a s4q8b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
TOTAL
Pawnbrokers…………………………..12
FILE_HH6
s4q12a s4q12b
years            months
s4q11
Others………………………………….13
O
6. What are the sources 
of your loans in last 24 months
s4q6 s4q9
Bank for agriculture and rural
7. What is the
value 
of your
household's 
loan?
8. When did your 
household
 borrow 
the loan?
(only for last 24 month 
loans)
9. What is 
the loan's purpose?
Consumption.................1
Debt repayment………...2
House purchase/
building/maintenance....3
Land purchase…………4
Wedding/funeral/
woship/birthday party….5
Study fee……………… ..6
Health care……………...7
Production/business......8
Others (specify)…...….9Hunger elimi & povt reduction fund…..11
Rate (%) Time unit
11.Did your
household use 
assets as 
collateral for 
this loan? 
Yes=1
No= 0
record Time Unit and/or Interest 
s4q10b
Interest
amount
s4q10a
12. What is this 
loan contract terms
(record as in credit
contract)
s4q10c
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SECTION 5A: FOOD CONSUMPTION AND DRINKS FILE_HH5A
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Within the 
past 7 days 
did anyone 
in your 
household  
purchase 
any […]?
Within the 
past 7 days 
did anyone 
in your 
household  
consume 
any […] from 
a stock you 
keep?
Within the past 7 
days did anyone in 
your household  
consume any […] 
from your own 
production?
REVIEW 
QUESTIONS 2-5.
 IS AT LEAST ONE
 ANSWER 'YES'?
How much would
 it have cost your 
household to 
purchase the 
same amount?
YES..1
NO…0 YES..1 YES..1 YES..1 YES..1 YES..1 ,000
(»NEXT) NO…0 NO…0 NO…0 NO…0 NO…0 VND
s5aq1 s5aq2 s5aq3 s5aq4 s5aq5 s5aq6 s5aq7
1 Cereals and Cereal products
2 Noodles/rice noodle
3 Meat, meat products, fish
4 Vegetables
5 Fruits
6 Cooking mixed spices
7 Sugars, milk and milk products
8 Beverages/alcohol/beer..
9 Coffee, tea, cigarettes
10 Outdoor eating/party
TOTAL Q7
8. Total Food consumption and drinks for last 12 months (Total Q7 x 52 weeks) s5aq8
9. Compare with period of 12 months prior to the last 12 months, how much (%) did the Total Q7 s5aq9
change?
Within the past 7 days, did the members of your 
household eat/drink any [. . .] within the household?
PLEASE ONLY LIST ITEMS CONSUMED WITHIN THE 
HOUSEHOLD AND EXCLUDE FOOD CONSUMED 
OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD WHICH SHOULD BE 
INCLUDED IN No 10
ASK FOR ITEMS BEFORE MOVING TO Q2.
Within the past 
7 days did anyone 
in your household  
consume any […] 
from 
gifts/assistance
 you received or 
any other sources? 
K
K
203 
SECTION 5B: NON-FOOD EXPENDITURES (DAILY) FILE_HH5B
1 2 3
Code In the las 12 month, How many How much
which of the following items months did did your household
did your household consume/purchase? your househlod buy this item 
          mark X if the answer is yes buy this item each month?
X in the last 12
ask Q1 for all items before starting Question 2 months ? ,000 VND
s5bq1 s5bq2 s5bq3
100
101
102
103
104
105
106 Matches, candles, flint?
107
108
109
110
111 Shampoo, conditioning?
112 Bath soap, liquid
113 Lotion, powder & lipsticks
114 Toothpaste, tooth brush?
115 Toilet paper, razorblades,
116 Books, newspapers, magazines?
117 Flowers?
118 Entertainment? (cinema, video, sports)
119 Lottery tickets?
120 Regular worship items?
121 Haircut, hairdressing?
122 Other daily expenses
Total s5bq3
4. Compare with a month in the period of 12 months prior to the last 12 months, how much (%) 
did the Total of q3 change on average? s5bq4 %
Kerosene for cooking or light?
Item
Disk washing liquid,
House cleaning liquid?
Washing powder 
Softening liquid ?
Gasoline, lubricant and grease for 
motor, car…
Bicycle, motorcycle or car parking fee?
Pocket money for children?
Coal, wood, sawdust, chaff?
Gas?
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SECTION 5C: NON-FOOD EXPENDITURES (ANNUALLY) FILE_HH5C
1. In the last 12 month, which of the following items 2. Value of  purchase
CODE did your household consume/purchase? in the last 12
months?
ask question 1 for all items before q2 X ,000 VND
Item s5cq1 s5cq2
123
124 Ready-made clothing (incl. Underwear)?
125 Mosquito net and netting?
126 Face towel, scarves? 
127 Rush mats, blankets, pillows? 
128 Other sewing materials and garments? (needles, thread, socks...)
129 Tailoring or laundry service?
130 Shoes, sandals, wooden clogs?
131 Nylon sheeting, hats, umbrellas?
132 Light bulbs, electric wire, plugs, fuse?
133 Porcelain and glass bowls, plates, teapots and cups,…
134 Pans, pots, bins, buckets, basins?
135 Vacuum thermos and liner?
136 Bags and baskets?
137 Lighter, flashlight, battery...?
138 Cradle, hammock, pram?
139 Other household items? (EXCL durable goods)
140 Bike tires, tubes, bicycle spare parts?
141 Motorbike, car tires, tubes, motorcycle, car spare parts?
142 Maintenance and repair of living tools
143 Boat, bus, train, taxi, car, transportation fees?
144 Pictures, photos, houseplants?
145 Sport instruments
146 Toys (for children and common)? 
147 Envelopes, stamps, telephone, postage fees?
148 Internet charges
149 Cosmetic surgery, body building?
150 Excursion, holidays?
151 Jewelry, watch, makeup?
152 Other cultural activities?
153 Hiring domestic services?
154 Other annual expenses
Subtotal (s5cq2a)
Contributions to social funds (for natural relief, poverty reduction 
fund, education encouragement fund…)
156
157 All kinds of taxes (excl. production tax)
158 Wedding, birthday, one-month/one-year old baby party…
159 Funeral and worship on special occasions in your household 
160 Arranged parties in your household 
161 Give, donation, support, assistance,..
162
Subtotal  (s5cq2b)
Total s5cq2
3. Compare with period of 12 months prior to the last 12 months, how much (%) 
did the Total q2 change? s5cq3
Fabric?
      mark X if the answ er is yes 
Other expenses
155
Public labor contribution
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SECTION 6: Services and information access
Pls provide us some information about local insfractructure, access to social services and market, and information
1. Are there any phones in your Yes…1 4. Are there any radio in your s6q4 Yes…1
household including cellphone? s6q1 No….0 household? No….0
2. Does your household use internet? Yes…1 5. Does your household subcribe Yes…1
s6q2 No….0 newspapers/magazines? s6q5 No….0
3. Are there any TVs in your household? Yes…1 6. Has any household member participated social  Yes…1
s6q3 No….0 organizations (women, youth, farmer, veteran No….0
union…)? s6q6
 
7. Pls tell us name of the nearest [……] to your household (including other ward and/or other district)
s6q7 Metre
Government and market
a
b Trade center and supermarket
c District People's Committee
d Ward People's Committee
Financial institutions
e
f Other credit/financial institution
g Pre-school/kindergarten
h Primary school
k Lower secondary school
l Upper secondary school
m Health center
n
o Medical diagnostic clinic
Daily market
Institutions
FILE_HH6
Hospital
Bank 
Schools
Health facilities
Name and address
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SECTION 7: HOUSING 
Pls provide us some information about your housing.
s7q1
1. How many houses/flats does your family own? 13. How much did you spend on construction from starting 
to completion? thousand 
s7q2 VND s7q13
2. How long has your household been living in this house?years
3. Does this house/flat belong to you? 14. How much did you spend on big repairation, renovation, 
yes, totally ....... 1 s7q3        improvement of your house/land in the last 12 months?
yes, partly.........2 thousand s7q14
No..................... 3 VND
4. Do you have to pay for house rent 15. How much did you spend on small repair in the last 12 
s7q4 months (incl. painting ..) thousand
yes....................1 VND s7q15
no..................... 0(>>6)
16. Do you have to pay for living & drinking water? s7q16
5. How much did you pay for rent of your dwelling in the last yes............. 1
12 months (in cash and in kind)? no............... 0 (>>18)
thousand VND s7q5
17. How much did you have to pay for this water in the last 12
6. What is the current price of your dwelling ? s7q6 months? (01 month bill x 12 months)
thousand VND thousand VND s7q17
7. Apart from this dwelling, do you have any other landlot or 18. Did you have to pay for living electricity in the last 12 months? 
house/flat? Yes....................1 yes..............1
No…..................0(>>12) s7q7 no................0 (>>20) s7q18
8. What is the current price of this landlot or house/flat? 19. How much did you pay for electricity used for living purpose in
s7q8        the last 12 months? thousand
thousand VND (01 month bill x 12 months) VND s7q19
9. Did you buy any land or house/flat in the last 12 months? 20. Do you have to pay for garbage disposal?
yes................... 1 (>>11) s7q9 yes............. 1
no......................0 (>>10) no............... 0 (>>22) s7q20
10. When was the last time of purchase? month year 21. How much did you pay for living garbage disposal ?
if you bought before the last 12 months (>> 13) (01 month bill x 12 months) thousand
s7q10as7q10b VND s7q21
11. How much did you pay for in the last 12 months ?
thousand VND 22. Sum of expenses on housing, electricity, water, and
s7q11 garbage disposal thousand
12. Do you have any newly built house/flat compled in the last 12 (5+11+14+15+17+19+21) VND s7q22
months? yes..............................1
no.............................0(>>14) s7q12
FILE_HH7
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SECTION 8: FIXED ASSETS AND OTHER DURABLE ASSETS
1. Pls let us know what kind of following things does your household have (ask household head or his/her spouse)? 
Code mark Code mark
x if yes x if yes 
101 Perennial crops garden 130 fishing net 
102 Aquaculture production area 131 Goods keeping things 
103 Other agricultural land area 132 Other professional equipment 
104 Buffalo, cow for production and breeding 133 Video 
105 Breeding male and female pig 134 Color T.V. 
106 Basic poultry, cattle 135 Black white T.V 
107 Breeding facilities of farming 136 Applifier/speakers
108 Workshop 137 Radio / Cassettes 
109 Shop 138 Recorder 
110 Other production base 139 Computer
111 Car 140 Camera, CD, VCD, DVD players
112 Truck 141 Refreezerator, Freezer 
113 Pulling machine 142 Air-condioner 
114 Trailer 143 Washing, drying machine
115 Motorbike 144 Electric fan
116 Bicycle 145 Water heating machine in the bathroom
117 wagon 146 Gas cook
118 Moteur boat, boat 147 Electric cook, rice pan, airpressure pan 
119 Other means of transportation 148 troller (various kinds) 
120 Lathe, welding, cutting machine 149 Wardrobe (various kinds)
121 Casting machine 150 Bed 
122 Wooden sawing machine 151 chair, table, sofa, ... 
123 Pumping machine 152 vacuum cleaner, exsisccate
124 Power generator 153 Antique,  piano, oocgan, dressing table
125 Printer, photocopy machine 154 Other valuable things 
126 Fax machine 155
127 Telephone (desk/mobile) 156
128 Sewing, weaving, embroider … 157
129 Other machine and equipment 158
Assets, tools Assets, tools 
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SECTION 8: FIXED ASSETS AND OTHER DURABLE ASSETS (CONT) FILE_HH8
R 2
o Name of assets, other durable assets 
w (MARKED X previously)
No
s8q2 Code Yes Value Yes Value
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
TOTAL s8q3a s8q3b
more than 24 months
3
How long did your household buy/receive this item?
and
how much does this item value at the present?
(Unit: 1000 VNĐ)
less than 24 months
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SECTION 9: COMMUNITY/WARD CHARACTERISTICS (ask ward-government officers)
Ward:………………………………. Code:……..
Pls provide us some information about local insfractructure and social services
1. How many primary schools are there in this ward? s9q1
2. How many lower secondary schools are there in this ward? s9q2
3. How many upper secondary schools are there in this ward? s9q3
4. How many pre-schools/kindergartens are there in this ward? s9q4
5. How many clinic, health center, hospital are there in this ward? s9q5
6. How many financial/credit institutions are there in this s9q6
ward excluding relatives and friends?
7. How many commercial centers and supermarkets are there in this ward? s9q7
8. How many daily markets are there in this ward? s9q8
FILE_HH9HOUSEHOLD CREDIT SURVEY
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This 
w ard
Degree 
(ddd)
Minutes
 (mm.mmm) Direction
Daily market 1 . N
. E
Daily market 2 . N
. E
Daily market 3 . N
. E
Daily market 4 . N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
Pre-school
/kindergarten 3
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Pre-school
/kindergarten 1
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Pre-school
/kindergarten 2
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Credit Institute 2 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Credit Institute 3 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
9. Pls tell us some information about education, healthcare and financial services in this ward or neighouring 
wards/districts which people in this ward often use. If the selected service is in this ward, tick "X" on "This 
ward".
Name & address
Bank 3 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Supermarket/comm
ercial center 1
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
GPS Longitude
District People's 
Committee
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Ward People's 
Committee
GPS Latitude
Supermarket/comm
ercial center 2
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Credit Institute 1 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Bank 1 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Bank 2 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
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Question 9 (continue) 
 
 
 
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
. N
. E
Medical diagnostic 
clinic 2
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Hospital 2 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Medical diagnostic 
clinic 1
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Health center 2 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Hospital 1 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Upper secondary 
school 2
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Health center 1 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Low er secondary 
school 3
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Upper secondary 
school 1
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Low er secondary 
school 1
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Low er secondary 
school 2
GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Primary school 2 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Primary school 3 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
Primary school 1 GPS Latitude
GPS Longitude
